Short-Term, Long-Term, and Efficiency Impacts of Recent Mergers and Acquisitions in the U.S. Banking Industry by Al-Sharkas, Adel
University of New Orleans 
ScholarWorks@UNO 
University of New Orleans Theses and 
Dissertations Dissertations and Theses 
12-17-2004 
Short-Term, Long-Term, and Efficiency Impacts of Recent Mergers 
and Acquisitions in the U.S. Banking Industry 
Adel Al-Sharkas 
University of New Orleans 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td 
Recommended Citation 
Al-Sharkas, Adel, "Short-Term, Long-Term, and Efficiency Impacts of Recent Mergers and Acquisitions in 
the U.S. Banking Industry" (2004). University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations. 208. 
https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/208 
This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by ScholarWorks@UNO 
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is permitted by the 
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from 
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself. 
 
This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UNO. For more information, please contact scholarworks@uno.edu. 
SHORT-TERM, LONG-TERM, AND EFFICIENCY IMPACTS OF RECENT MERGERS 
AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
University of New Orleans 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in  
The Department of Financial Economics  
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
Adel Al-Sharkas 
 
B.A., Yarmouk University, 1988 
M.S., Yarmouk University, 1990 
 
December 2004 
 ii
DEDICATION  
 
To my family, for their overwhelming love and support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
My utmost appreciation goes to my family whose love and support were instrumental to the 
successful completion of my dissertation.  I am especially indebted to my wife Samah, who took 
care of our lovely daughters, Farah and Tamara, and comforted me while attending to my 
constantly demanding work. 
 
I profoundly thank my advisor, Dr. Kabir Hassan, for his unconditional supervision and 
guidance.  I have highly benefited from his strong support not only in academics but also in 
aspects that touch upon my career.  I thank him for leading me into the banking area.  I greatly 
value his initial ideas relating to bank mergers, so that I could explore such an interesting topic in 
this dissertation. 
My appreciation and gratitude are also owed to the other dissertation committee members: Dr. 
Tarun Mukherjee, Dr. Oscar Varela, Dr. Peihwang Wei, and Dr. Ronnie Davis.  My special 
thanks go to Dr. Mukherjee. His updated information was really helpful throughout my work. Dr. 
Varela is also greatly appreciated for his suggestions and support. 
Also my sincere thanks and appreciation are extended to my friends James R. Bartkus and 
Ammar Jarrar who have made a great effort in checking my writing.  Because of them, my 
moderate writing in this dissertation is still readable. 
I would like to thank the faculty of the Department of Economics and Finance, Dr. Hesham 
Abdel-Rahman, Dr. Walter Lane, Dr. Elton Daal, Dr. Sudha Krishnaswami, Dr. Neal Maroney, 
Dr. Atsuyuki Naka, Dr. Arja Turunen-Red, and Dr. Gerald Whitney. Finally, special thanks are 
extended to my friends Ahmad Telfah, Adel Bino, and Joseph Farhat. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES...............................................................................................................v 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... vii 
ABSTRACT..................................................................................................................... viii 
 
CHAPTER 1 
1.1       ABSTRACT............................................................................................................ 1 
1.2       INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................2 
1.3       REVIEW OF LITERATURE ..................................................................................8 
1.4       METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................17 
1.5       RESULTS ..............................................................................................................29 
1.6       CONCLUSIONS....................................................................................................45 
 
CHAPTER 2 
2.1       ABSTRACT.......................................................................................................... 47 
2.2       INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................48 
2.3       REVIEW OF LITERATURE ................................................................................53 
2.4       METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................57 
2.5       RESULTS ..............................................................................................................64 
2.6       CONCLUSIONS....................................................................................................85 
 
CHAPTER 3 
3.1       ABSTRACT.......................................................................................................... 89 
3.2       INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................90 
3.3       REVIEW OF LITERATURE ................................................................................96 
3.4       METHODOLOGY ..............................................................................................104 
3.5       RESULTS ............................................................................................................116 
3.6       CONCLUSIONS..................................................................................................142 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................145 
VITA................................................................................................................................155 
 
 
 
 
 v
LIST OF TABLES 
 
1.1- Comparison of event studies on bank mergers ......................................................... 10 
1.2- Descriptive statistics for selected variables............................................................... 19 
1.3- Cumulative abnormal returns (Target Banks) .......................................................... 30 
1.4- Cumulative abnormal returns (Bidder Banks) .......................................................... 31 
1.5- Cumulative abnormal returns (Combined Firms)..................................................... 33 
1.6- Target cumulative abnormal returns by time period................................................. 35 
1.7- Bidder cumulative abnormal returns by time period ................................................ 37 
1.8- Combined cumulative abnormal returns by time period .......................................... 38 
1.9- Combined cumulative abnormal returns by size....................................................... 39 
1.10- Expected signs of independent variables .................................................................. 39 
1.11- Cross-sectional regression results for target firms.................................................... 41 
1.12- Cross-sectional regression results for bidder firms................................................... 42 
1.13- Cross-sectional regression results for combined firms............................................. 43 
2.1- Descriptive statistics for selected variables............................................................... 58 
2.2- Pre-merger, post-merger, and changes in performance for merging banks............. 66 
2.3- Correlations of performance changes with pre-merger performance variables....... 71 
2.4- Correlations of performance changes with size and relative size ............................ 74 
2.5- Average BAHR for bank mergers............................................................................. 77 
2.6- Long-run stock returns of bank mergers, relative alternative benchmarks.............. 78 
2.7- Fama and French (1993) three-factor regression on monthly returns for bank 
            mergers (five years following merger) ...................................................................... 81 
2.8- Fama and French (1993) three-factor regression on monthly returns for bank  
            mergers (three years following merger) .................................................................... 82 
2.9- Fama and French (1993) three-factor regression on monthly returns for 
            non-merged banks (three year following merger)..................................................... 83 
2.10- Long-run stock returns of bank mergers categorized by year of merger ................. 85 
3.1-      Variables employed in measuring the cost and alternative profit efficiency......... 114 
3.2-      Sample statistics of variables................................................................................... 116 
3.3-      The ML cost and profit frontier parameter estimates ............................................. 117 
3.4-      Summary statistics for the stochastic cost efficiency of the non-merged and  
             merged banks........................................................................................................... 118 
3.5-      Summary statistics for the stochastic profit efficiency of the non-merged and  
             merged banks........................................................................................................... 120 
3.6-      Pre-merger and post-merger cost and profit efficiency .......................................... 121 
3.7-      Changes in cost efficiency for merging banks........................................................ 124 
3.8-      Changes in profit efficiency for merging banks (1987-1999) ................................ 126 
3.9-      Pre-merger cost efficiency for acquiring and acquired banks ................................ 129 
3.10-    Pre-merger profit efficiency for acquiring and acquired banks ............................. 130 
3.11-    Mean efficiency measures of merged banks and non-merged banks..................... 133 
 vi
3.12-    Productivity and efficiency changes for merged banks and non-merged banks.... 138 
3.13-    Spearman rank order(s) correlation coefficients among efficiency estimates 
             and proxy-measured of performance...................................................................... 140 
 vii
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
 
1.1- Technical and technological efficiency change (Malmquist Productivity Index) .137 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii
ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the wealth effects of bank mergers on bidder, target, and combined 
firm shareholders for a sample of 785 mergers during the period 1980-2000. The dissertation 
employs two unique bank event study methodologies to calculate abnormal returns for bidder, 
target and combined firms. The first methodology is a modified market model that controls for 
shocks common to the banking industry. The second is an EGARCH (1,1) model that adjusts for 
the violated regression assumptions of the traditional market model event study. Namely, it 
controls for the linearity assumption, heteroskedasticity, and the correlation in the error term. 
The results of both methodologies reveal that target shareholders enjoy significantly positive 
abnormal returns, whereas the bidder shareholders experience significantly negative abnormal 
returns. Overall, announcements of bank mergers generate positive wealth effects for the 
combined shareholders. However, the evidence presented in this dissertation, to some extent, 
underscores the importance of the choice of models describing stock returns in examining the 
impact of bank mergers. In addition, when mergers are analyzed to determine the effects of 
relative size and relative book-to-market values, we find evidence that the relative size 
significantly affects the target, bidder and combined firm return; method of payment is also 
found to be significant in abnormal returns. Moreover, we find that the number of bidders affects 
only the bidder returns, while book-to-market values are irrelevant factors. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS IN BANK MERGERS: 
NEW EVIDENCE DURING THE PERIOD (1980-2000) 
 
1.1 Abstract 
This essay examines the wealth effects of bank mergers on bidder, target, and 
combined firm shareholders for a sample of 785 mergers during the period 1980-2000. 
The essay employs two unique bank event study methodologies to calculate abnormal 
returns for bidder, target and combined firms. The first methodology is a modified market 
model that controls for shocks common to the banking industry. The second is an 
EGARCH (1,1) model that adjusts for the violated regression assumptions of the 
traditional market model event study. Namely, it controls for the linearity assumption, 
heteroskedasticity, and the correlation in the error term. The results of both 
methodologies reveal that target shareholders enjoy significantly positive abnormal 
returns, whereas the bidder shareholders experience significantly negative abnormal 
returns. Overall, announcements of bank mergers generate positive wealth effects for the 
combined shareholders. However, the evidence presented in this essay, to some extent, 
underscores the importance of the choice of models describing stock returns in examining 
the impact of bank mergers. In addition, when mergers are analyzed to determine the 
effects of relative size and relative book-to-market values, we find evidence that the 
relative size significantly affects the target, bidder and combined firm return; method of 
payment is also found to be significant in abnormal returns. Moreover, we find that the
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number of bidders affects only the bidder returns, while book-to-market values are 
irrelevant factors. 
1.2 Introduction 
Banks play a pivotal role in the proper functioning of the economy via their input 
in the payment’s system as well as in the channeling of funds between savers and 
investors.  Consequently, banks are the single most important conduits of monetary 
policy.  Developments of the financial system in the past three decades have seen the 
emergence of other financial institutions, including mutual funds.  Notwithstanding, these 
institutions have yet to eclipse the banks’ role as the principal suppliers of deposit 
accounts and commercial credit, both of which facilitate the proper functioning of 
financial intermediation.  However, changes in the average scale, and the in 
organizational and market structure of the banking industry would have critical 
implications for not only the future evolution of financial markets, but also the 
implementation of monetary policies. 
From 1934 through the 1970s, the number of banks in the United States remained 
fairly stable.  In the late 80s, however, the number of American banks started to decrease 
significantly.  Specifically, between 1980 and 2000, the number of banks declined from 
14,404 to 9,214, a decrease of 36 percent.1  The two main causes of such a retreat were 
bank failures and bank mergers.  Statistics show that between 1985 and 1992, failures 
contributed significantly to the decreases in the number of banks.  Still, failures 
accounted for less than half of the decrease in the number of the banks.  This trend has 
become more evident since 1992, where the number of bank failures accounted for less 
                                                                                          
1 http://www.fdic.gov 
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than 15% of the total decline in the number of banks. The remaining part of the reduction 
can be explained by the growing trend towards larger banks and bank consolidation.   
The merger mania has yielded considerable research interest in this topic. In spite 
of a large body of literature, many puzzling questions remain unanswered.  For instance, 
a common finding is that bank mergers do not create value, yet they continue to occur.  
Empirical evidence indicates that, on average, there is no statistically significant gain in 
either market performance or operating performance of the combined firm.  Moreover, 
shareholders of target firms gain at the expense of the bidder firms.  This has been 
documented over the course of many studies covering different time periods and across 
countries, and it is true whether one examines accounting data or the market value of 
equity. 
Additionally, markets are unable to accurately anticipate the ultimate success of 
individual mergers, as indicated by the absence of any correlation between changes in 
accounting-based performance measures and stock market returns around the merger 
announcement. Indeed, the merger wave that has swept across the U.S. shows no sign of 
waning, and there is increasing evidence of a similar move in Europe. A number of 
empirical questions surface with respect to the effectiveness of such events. First, do 
bank mergers, on average, create value? Second, are there merger characteristics that 
allow us to distinguish between bank mergers’ announcement period returns?  
The main objective of this essay is to analyze the effect of bank mergers on 
bidder, target and combined firms. For this purpose, the analysis is extended to a 
relatively larger data set (785 mergers) over a long time period (1980-2000). This large 
data set will provide a better opportunity to measure the full wealth effects from bank 
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mergers. Statistically, it has been shown that with small data sets, one or two unusual 
mergers can easily influence results.   
This analysis differs from previous studies of bank mergers in three respects.  
First, this analysis of bank mergers spans a longer time period, with the advantage of 
considering more recent bank mergers.  Second, this study reveals a detailed analysis of 
stock market returns pertinent to 785 mergers of U.S banks. Examining combined returns 
will help to determine the overall economic impact of the merger.  In particular, the 
expected overall contribution of the merger is studied as opposed to only the expected 
value from either the bidder's or the target's standpoint. 
Third, we introduce two new bank merger event-study models. Previous bank 
merger event studies utilize the standard market model methodology to find whether bank 
mergers generate abnormal returns for bidder, target and combined firms. There is a 
critical assumption in using the traditional event study methodology, including the 
linearity of the relationship and the independence and the homoskedasticity of the stock 
returns. In this essay, we construct an EGARCH model that is superior to the standard 
market model in the sense that it controls for the linearity, homoskedasticity and 
correlated error term assumptions of the standard market model. Violation of these 
assumptions could lead to inefficient estimators in the market model. Moreover, using a 
sample from the banking industry provides a control for industry-specific factors that 
could affect returns.  
The common control in previous event studies is the market return. However, 
there may be other factors specific to each industry that should be included in order to 
obtain unbiased results. Unlike previous bank merger literature, this study goes beyond 
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the simple market model. We use a three-factor model that controls for exchange rate and 
interest rate shocks common to the banking industry. 
This is the first attempt, to the best of our knowledge to focus on models used in 
the bank mergers event study. Hence, not only does this study evaluate bank mergers but 
it also investigates the results of two new different event study methodologies. The 
results show that the target bank shareholders experience significant positive abnormal 
returns while abnormal returns to bidding bank shareholders are significantly negative.  
For combined firms, cumulative abnormal returns are significantly positive. Comparing 
the results of both methodologies reveals that the modified market model may overstate 
the abnormal returns for bidder, target and combined firms. Therefore, we argue that 
basic conclusions regarding issues such as the wealth impact of bank mergers can depend 
on the chosen model. Actually, the empirical results suggest that the choice of 
methodology will affect inference about the magnitude effect of bank mergers. 
Accordingly, the failure to use accurate models to describe stock returns might be 
responsible for the mixed and contradictory results reached by earlier studies regarding 
the impact of bank mergers. 
Finally, this study estimates cross-sectional regressions of the abnormal returns of 
target, bidder, and combined firms on a number of explanatory variables. In particular, 
we examine the effects of relative size, relative book-to-market value, method of 
payment, and the number of bidders on the abnormal returns of bidder, target, and 
combined firms. For bidder returns, the regression results demonstrate that the coefficient 
on relative size is significantly positive, suggesting that relatively large targets capture a 
significantly large merger premium. Interestingly, for bidders, abnormal return is 
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negatively related to relative size. The larger the target relative to the bidder, the smaller 
the CAR will be for the bidder. This result indicates that the bidders fare much worse 
when target is relatively large. This negative coefficient is consistent with the positive 
coefficient on relative size in the target returns if the higher returns to target shareholders 
in relatively large mergers lose bidder shareholders. Moreover, if the market believes the 
merger is value destroying for the bidder, the larger the relative size of the target, the 
more value will be transferred from the bidder to the target.  
Empirical evidence suggests target, bidder, and combined firm returns are positively 
related to cash mergers. As for the number of bidders variable, it is negatively related to 
bidders’ returns. The negative sign of this variable is consistent with the overpayment 
hypothesis. Also, there is evidence that diversifying mergers are bad for bidders. 
However, we fail to find evidence that this variable affects target and combined returns. It 
is worth noting that the results show that relative book-to-market values are not 
confirmed as relevant factors.  
The remainder of this essay proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 presents some literature 
related to bank merger theory. Section 1.3 reviews the literature on bank mergers. Section 
1.4 describes the data and summary statistics. Section 1.5 describes the methodologies 
followed in this essay. Section 1.6 represents the empirical findings. The last section 
concludes. 
1.2.1 Traditional Views of the Value of Mergers 
Merger activity results in overall benefits to shareholders when a consolidated, post-
merger firm is more valuable than a simple sum of the two separate pre-merger firms; 
therefore synergy is said to exist. Such a merger should create value for both firms. The 
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primary cause of this gain in value is supposed to be the performance improvement 
following the merger.  The research on post-merger performance gains has focused on 
improvements in one of several areas, namely, efficiency improvements, greater market 
power, or greater diversification. With regard to efficiency gains, greater cost savings are 
most commonly mentioned.  Many mergers have been motivated by a belief that a 
significant quantity of redundant operating costs could be eliminated through the 
consolidation of activities. 
A bank is said to have economies of scale when its average cost falls as output 
increases. Mergers enable costs to be lowered if scale, or scope, economies can be 
achieved.  Larger institutions may be more efficient if redundant facilities and personnel 
are eliminated within the post-merger organization.  Moreover, costs may be lowered if 
one bank can offer several products at a lower cost than separate banks each providing 
individual products.  Cost efficiency may also be improved through merger activity, 
especially if the management of the acquiring institution is skilled at holding down 
expenses for any given level of activity. 
1.2.1.1 Underlying theories  
It has been documented that banks engage in mergers because mergers may improve 
banking efficiency by offering a more profitable product mix besides eliminating 
redundant costs and improving management.  Banks may also merge to take advantage of 
increasing market power.  In either case, it is expected to see, in an efficient capital 
market, a higher combined value (adjusted for the market movement) of the two merging 
banks upon the announcement of a merger (conditional on its being unanticipated). 
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Various theories have been introduced to explain the wave of bank mergers. For 
example, the efficiency hypothesis predicts that mergers enhance efficiency and help 
poor banks to survive as competition becomes increasingly intensive in the banking 
industry.  Another well-cited hypothesis suggests that mergers increase the market 
power2 due to reduced competition. In general, studies have introduced the following 
three incentives for the bank mergers: 
(1) Operating economics, which result from economics of scale in management, 
marketing and production.   
(2) Financial economics, including lower transaction costs and better coverage by 
security analysts. 
(3) Differential efficiency, which implies that the management of one firm is more 
efficient and that the weaker bank’s assets will be more productive after the merger.   
1.3 Review of Literature 
The great pace of merger activity in the banking industry has attracted a lot of 
interest in detecting the wealth effects produced by such deals. The merger activity 
should be primarily motivated by the desire to maximize shareholders' wealth. Therefore, 
one would expect the acquisition to generate synergies that can be achieved in several 
ways.3 Specifically, a merger may exploit economies of scale, benefit from 
diversification in the product mix or in the geographic market extension, displace 
inefficient management, or enhance revenues by improving marketing. Geographic or 
product diversification can then be valuable in stabilizing returns.  This can raise value by 
                                                                                          
2 On the other hand, some argue that the barriers to entry instituted by previous banking regulations may 
have created more market power than current market concentration.  
 
3 See Pilloff and Santomero (1996) and Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) for analytical review of the 
motivations behind a merger deal. 
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reducing the expected value of bankruptcy costs and, accordingly, reducing the cost of 
capital. 
There is some evidence that efficiency gains are a rational motive for acquisition.  
Cornet and Tehranian (1992)4 report improvement in profitability of 30 large target 
banks. Financial firms can also engage in merger activity to increase their market power, 
thus reducing competition.  If so, prices can be raised allowing the merged firm to earn 
monopolistic profits.  Despite the fact that antitrust authorities can refuse the approval of 
a merger that results in a significant reduction in competition, potential gains for greater 
market power can still be substantial.  Indeed, there is some evidence that merger deals in 
the banking industry are designed to increase market power.  For instance, intrastate 
mergers show higher returns than interstate mergers (Becher (2000), DeLong (1999), 
Houston and Ryngaert (1994)). 
The pace of consolidation activity may also be determined by changes in the 
regulatory environment.  To illustrate, the number of deals in the U.S. banking sector has 
increased significantly after the removal of restrictions on interstate expansion.  Barriers 
to the geographic diversification may have allowed inefficient organizations to survive. 
In Europe, a major impulse to consolidation activity comes from the EU directives setting 
the freedom of operation of financial firms across national boundaries and the 
implementation of the monetary union. This fosters the benefits of diversification and 
achievable economies of scale in cross-border mergers. However, previous studies that 
                                                                                          
4 In this paper we do not follow the approach of comparing pre-merger and post-merger performance using 
accounting data, but I analyze merger benefits based on the stock market reaction to merger 
announcements. A discussion of the two approaches as well as a survey of studies is provided by Rhoades 
(1994) and Pilloff and Santomero (1996). 
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examine the impact of mergers on bidders, targets, and combined firms in the financial 
industry show mixed results.  The evidence is summarized in Table 1.1.  
Table 1.1 
Comparison of event studies on bank mergers 
 
Authors Period Sample Event 
window
Bidder 
return 
(%) 
Target 
return 
(%) 
Combined 
firm 
Return (%) 
De Long (2001) 1988-1995 280 -10+1 -1.68*** 16.61*** 0.04 
Becher (2000) 
 
1980-1997 553 -30+5 -0.1 22.64*** 3.03*** 
 
Pilloff (1996) 1982-1991 48 -20+0 n.a. n.a. 1.32 
Houston and 
Ryngaert (1997) 
1985-1992 184 -2+2 -2.40 20.40*** n.a. 
Houston and 
Ryngaert (1994) 
1985-1991 153 -2+2 -2.32*** 14.39*** 0.38 
Cornett and 
Tehranian (1992) 
1982-1987 30 -1+0 -0.80** 8.00*** n.a. 
Cornett and De 
(1991) 
1982-1986 152 -1+0 0.55*** 8.10*** n.a. 
Toyne and Tripp 
(1998) 
1991-1995 68  -2.25** 14.77*** 0.46 
James and Wier 
(1987) 
1972-1983 60 -4+0 1.77*** n.a. n.a. 
Trifts and Scanlon 
(1987) 
1982-1985 21  -3.25** 21.37* n.a 
Neely (1987) 1979-1985 26 -10+0 
(week) 
1.25 31.26*** n.a. 
***, ** , and * denote significant at 1 %, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 11
Despite their sensitivity to event window selection and to the time period, previous 
studies agree that targets show significantly positive returns, while abnormal returns to 
bidder shareholders are significantly negative or at best insignificantly positive. However, 
the combined banking firm appears to enhance values and that is especially true in recent 
years. 
If mergers, on average, fail to create value for their shareholders, it seems 
plausible that a merger results from managers who tend to serve their own interests 
mainly by raising their compensation as the size of the company they manage increases.  
Therefore, agency costs can help explain the wealth results in value enhancement. Put 
simply, managers may get involved in merger activity to emulate their competitors or to 
avoid becoming an acquisition target. 
As reported in Table 1.1, we notice three important issues concerning the studies 
of bank mergers in the 1980s: the analysis is based on early time periods; the sample 
sizes are limited; and there is no analysis of combined firm returns (James and 
Weir,1987; Neely, 1987; Trifts and Scanlon, 1987).  The empirical results of these 
studies are mixed for the bidder. Specifically, James and Weir (1987) and Neely (1987) 
show that bidder shareholders experience positive abnormal returns, while Trifts and 
Scanlon (1987) find that bidder shareholders experience negative abnormal returns. In 
addition, many of these studies have relatively small sample sizes.  Trifts, and Scanlon 
(1987) examine 21 mergers over 4 years, Neely (1987) studies 26 acquisitions over 7 
years, James Wier (1987) examines 60 out of 264 potential acquisitions over a 9-year 
period, while Toyne and Tripp (1998) examine 68 interstate acquisitions over a 5-year 
period. 
 12
It is noteworthy that only a few essays examine the overall wealth effects of bank 
mergers (Becher, 2000; Houston and Ryngaert (1994)).  Houston and Ryngaert find that 
bank merger neither creates nor destroys value for a sample of 153 mergers between 1985 
and 1991. The authors show that bidders lose and targets gain experience. Also, a recent 
study written by Becher (2000) indicates that target and combined shareholders receive a 
positive wealth gain while bidders at best break-even. His results, however, are sensitive 
to the event window and time period, with overall returns largest in the 1990s. A more 
recent study conducted by Houston et al. (2001) examines 64 large bank mergers from 
1986-1996 and reports that overall these deals create value. Their results, however, 
pertain to a sample of large bank mergers only, and the authors do not test for cross-
sectional variation in these returns. 
Finally, the more recent studies of stock market reaction to bank mergers find that 
they do not create value for the combined firm, and target shareholders gain at the 
expense of bidder shareholders.  Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001) and Becher (2000) 
also find some evidence that target shareholders may gain at the expense of bidder 
shareholders. However, these authors find that bank mergers in the 1990s create value for 
the combined firms and are not solely the result of hubristic motives.  There are several 
alternative explanations for these inconsistencies.  On the one hand, these mergers may 
be wealth-creating events; however, a bidder firm might overpay for the acquisition of 
these synergies.  On the other hand, there may be identifiable differences across mergers 
in that certain mergers are wealth creating while others are not. 
 
 
 13
1.3.1 Cross-Sectional Variations in Bank Mergers 
Many theories have been proposed regarding the characteristics of a stock that 
affects its return.  Fama and French (1992) challenge the Asset-Pricing Model of Sharpe 
(1964), Litner (1965), and Black (1972). Instead, they show that using beta alone does 
not properly estimate the expected return of a stock.  They present evidence that both size 
and book-to-market value are characteristics that need to be represented in a relevant 
model for stock returns. Others, on the other hand, have analyzed the effects of size and 
many different characteristics upon the bidder’s and target’s stock returns. Furthermore, 
several studies have indicated that announcement returns may differ by merger 
characteristics.  For example, DeLong (2001) reports that those mergers that focus both 
in geography and activity create value while all others do not. Also, Becher (2000) finds 
that target and bidder returns are related to the method of payment and number of 
bidders. For these variables, however, the author does not examine combined firm 
returns. 
This section proposes to investigate the effects of relative book-to-market values 
and relative sizes. In addition, mergers are analyzed by method of payment, and number 
of bidders.  
1.3.1.1 Effect of size and book-to-market value on returns of bank mergers 
Fama and French (1992) find two variables that are consistently related to stock 
return: (1) the size of the firm, measured by the market value of its equity (MVE) (2) the 
book-to-market ratio (M/B). They report that small firms and firms with high B/M earn 
higher rates of return than the average stock. In addition, they find no relation between a 
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stock’s beta and its returns. We expect this characteristic to follow in bank mergers as 
well. Accordingly, we investigate the following relationships. 
Relative size (market value of target/ market value of bidder) could either have a 
positive correlation with the abnormal return of the target (small firm effect and small 
target are easier to be integrated to a large bidder) or a negative correlation (less synergy). 
Also, relative size could either have a positive correlation with the abnormal return of the 
bidder (smooth transaction and the merger is expected to be more easier to handle) or 
negative correlation (low synergy or diseconomies of scale). The empirical result will 
determine the sign of the above argument. 
Fama and French (1992) also report that market-to-book value provides much 
information about stock's expected return. Thus, it is expected also to explain the 
abnormal return generated by a bidder, a target, and combined firm. A low market-to-
book value ratio of the target, other things being equal, might signify to the bidder that 
the current management is not effectively using its assets, and that the current market 
value of the target is depressed because the management is inefficient. The hypothesis we 
test here is that the lower the market-to-book value ratio of the target firm, the higher the 
premium offered to the target firm’s shareholders.  
1.3.1.2 Medium of payment 
It has been known for some time that the medium of payment used in mergers is 
an important factor to consider (see Carleton et al. 1983). It has also been noted that 
different methods of financing a project have different informational implications (Myers 
and Majluf 1984; Krasker 1986).  Several hypotheses regarding a predictable relation 
between the medium of payment chosen and the bidder returns have been suggested in or 
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can be inferred from the existing literature. According to the bidder overvaluation 
hypothesis (see Myers and Majluf 1984), if the management of the bidding firm has 
superior inside information that the existing assets of the firm are overvalued 
(undervalued), they are more likely to undertake a stock-financed (cash-financed) merger. 
Rational market participation, on the other hand, will interpret a stock-financed (cash-
financed) merger as a negative (positive) signal of the value of the existing assets of the 
bidding firm and react accordingly. 
According to the wealth redistribution hypothesis, an unanticipated reduction in 
the leverage ratio (as is experienced with a stock-financed merger) makes outstanding 
debt less risky resulting in a transfer of wealth from stockholders to bondholders (Galai 
and Masulis 1976; Travlos 1987). Given that the cash flows of the two firms are not 
perfectly correlated, management has an incentive to finance the merger with stock 
because the default risk of the combined firm will decrease, thereby increasing the firm's 
debt capacity. Unless restructuring occurs, the bondholders of the merged firm will 
receive at least part of this benefit at the expense of the stockholders. As a result, share 
price reaction to the announcement of a stock-financed merger will reflect both the 
potential gains from the merger and the negative wealth redistribution effects. With a 
cash-financed merger no such wealth redistribution is experienced. Thus, according to 
both hypotheses, other things being equal, the returns to the shareholders of a bidding 
firm will be higher in a cash offer than in a common stock exchange offer. 
The medium of payment used to finance a merger has also been widely examined. 
In examining the effects for bidders and targets, Toyne and Tripp (1999) infer that 
patterns in returns are driven by the method of payment. Amihud, Lev, and Travlos 
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(1990) and Houston and Ryngaert (1997) also report that mergers financed with stock 
appear to have lower abnormal returns than those financed with cash. Also, they find the 
more cash that is used to finance a merger, the greater the returns to the combined firms.  
On the other hand, recent studies by Delong (2001) and Becher (2000) report that the 
method of payment does not affect overall merger gains. 
We will analyze mergers by method of payment: all cash or all stock. Cash is a 
binary variable equal to one if the merger is financed with 100% cash, while stock is a 
binary variable equal to one if the merger is financed with all stock. We hypothesize that 
returns to bidders when mergers are announced are related to the method of payment used 
to finance the mergers. Offers of stock are associated with negative returns to bidders, but 
cash offers generate positive returns. Hence mergers financed with stocks are a negative 
signal since the use of the stocks as a mean of payment is likely to occur when the stock 
is overvalued, while the use of cash is interpreted as the firm being undervalued. On the 
other hand, if target shareholders believe their bank is overvalued, they will prefer to 
receive cash. The sign of the regressing coefficient presumably reveals which effect 
dominates. 
1.3.1.3 Number of bidders 
 An important factor that should be considered in our analysis is the number of 
bidders that a target firm received prior to merger. In this regard, the overpayment 
hypothesis has introduced in previous studies. The hypothesis suggests that if multiple 
firms bid on the same target, then returns to the winning bidder should be lower because 
this bidder is overpaying for the target in order to win the deal. If this hypothesis holds 
true, bidders who face competition have lower returns, target firms will experience higher 
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returns when there are multiple bidders. Lastly, this hypothesis does not predict the 
impact of such combination in combined firms. Accordingly, we hypothesize that returns 
to targets are larger when there are multiple bidders, which suggests that an increase in 
competition fir targets firms drives up premiums. Also, returns to bidders are lower when 
they are facing competition in the deal.  
1.3.1.4 Interstate mergers 
Previous research has found that bank merger returns differ for interstate 
(diversifying) versus intrastate (focusing) mergers. Interstate (intrastate) mergers are 
those mergers where the bidders and targets are not (are) located in the same state. 
Houston and Ryngert (1994) provide evidence that intrastate mergers gain significantly 
higher abnormal returns than interstate mergers. Also, DeLong (2001) reports that 
focusing mergers generate positive abnormal returns while diversifying mergers earn 
negative abnormal returns. We use the simple term of intrastate versus interstate merger 
to separate focusing from diversifying merger.  Therefore, we include a dummy variable 
to control for geographic locations. 
1.4 Methodology 
1.4.1 Mergers Sample 
This section looks at the data used to conduct this study. The merger data come 
from the M&A database of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes .To 
create a sample of mergers during the 1980-2001 period, all firms from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes that have a delist code in 200s (merger) or 300s 
(exchange) were selected. To focus on banks, all firms with three-digit SIC codes of 602 
(banks) or 671 (holding companies) were chosen. Reviewing the Wall Street Journal 
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Index and the Lexis-Nexis5 database identifies initial announcement dates. This resulted 
in preliminary sample of 1077 bank mergers. 
To be included in this event study, it is required that both bidder and target had 
stock trading on one of the three main exchanges (the New York Exchange, the American 
Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ) over the entire event window and most of the 
estimation window. The daily stock prices, returns and other trading-related data are 
collected from the CRSP date tapes, and information of bank equities is from the 
COMPUSTAT data tape. 
We notice that SIC code 671_ includes various types of holding companies (for 
example, both Transco Energy and Shawmut, the banking holding company for Shawmut 
National Bank, have SIC code of 6710). As a result, each firm with an SIC code of 671_ 
has to be examined to determine its primary business. Therefore, we have to search Lexis-
Nexis for firms' primary business to determine if they qualify as banking firms. Also, we 
use the Lexis-Nexis database to identify target and bidder states.  
From the preliminary sample, 172 firms are deleted because they are not bank 
holding companies (e.g. oil companies, shipping conglomerates. etc.), 34 additional firms 
are removed for technical reasons, and 86 are eliminated for missing key data. 
This process results in a sample of 785 bank mergers from 1980-2000. For both 
the bidder and target firms we collect the following variables: target cusip, bidder cusip, 
initial merger-announcement date, completion date, target share price, bidder share price, 
bidder market value, target market value, method of payment, target state, bidder state. 
Market data come from CRSP. Method of payment is determined by examining 
all announcements (in the Wall Street Journal and the Lexis-Nexis).  
                                                                                          
5 The Lexis-Nexis database contains full-text articles from several periodicals. 
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Finally, Table 1.2 provides descriptive statistics for selected variables to our bank 
mergers sample. Pane A presents descriptive statistics of the characteristics of target and 
bidder banks. The book value of total assets and the market value of equity are expressed 
in 1999 dollars using the consumer price index. Panel B shows merger characteristics for 
our sample. Of these 785 mergers, 73% are financed with cash and 12.5% are stock 
financed. 59% are classified as intrastate merger and 41% are interstate mergers. 91% are 
classified as single bidder mergers.  
Table 1.2 
Descriptive statistics for selected variables 
Panel A: Bank characteristics 
 Bidder firms 
Variable Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
Market value of equity 9,209 18,119 4,786 15 197,547 
Assets 29,810 49,362 13,216 12 265,231 
 Target firms 
Market value of equity 3,622 6,723 489 4 59,591 
Assets 8,150 23,383 971 5 315,108 
 
Panel B: Merger characteristics 
Variable Full Sample % of Full Sample 
Cash Financed  785 73.20 
Stock Financed  785 12.45 
Intrastate  785 58.83 
Interstate  785 41.17 
Single Bidder Mergers 785 91.05 
 
 
 
 
 20
1.4.2 Methodology  
In this section we apply two unique bank event study methodologies to calculate 
abnormal returns for bidder, target and combined firms. The first one is a modified 
market model that controls for shocks that are common to the banking industry. The 
second one is an EGARCH (1,1) that adjusts for the violated regression assumptions of 
the traditional market model event study. Specifically, it adjusts for the linearity 
assumption, the heteroskedasticity, and the correlation in the error term. Interestingly, to 
the best of our knowledge, none of the previous bank merger studies estimated abnormal 
returns using these two models. 
1.5.2.1 Modified Market Model (Interest and exchange rate) 
Using a sample from the banking industry provides a control for industry-specific 
factors that could affect returns. The common control in previous event studies is the 
market return. However, there may be other factors specific to each industry that should 
be included in order to obtain pure results. Sweeney and Warage (1986) provide evidence 
that investors demand a premium for interest rate risk. In their study, they include interest 
rate change variable in a simple market model to estimate abnormal returns. Hence in this 
study we go beyond the simple market model. We use modification of the standard 
market model that controls for exchange rate and interest rate to test if the merger 
announcement creates value. Unlike the previous bank mergers studies, the abnormal 
returns for bidders, targets, and combined forms will be calculated from the three factors 
model (market, interest and exchange rate). Previous research does not focus on this issue 
– instead it is much more concerned with the event window and controlling for the data in 
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which information was first revealed. By focusing on the banking industry, our model 
corrects for shocks that are common to the banking industry.  
The globalization of the financial services industry has caused increasing 
exposure to foreign exchange risk. Foreign exchange risk arises from changes in foreign 
exchange rates that affects the values of assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet activities 
denominated in currencies different from the bank’s domestic currency. Such risk exists 
because most banks hold assets and issue liabilities denominated in different currencies. 
When the amount of assets differs from the amount of liabilities in a currency, exchange 
rate movement generates a gain or loss that affects the market value of the bank’s 
stockholders’ equity. This risk may exist in off-balance sheet loan commitments 
denominated in foreign currency.   
 Interest rate exposure on the other hand arises from the mismatch in the asset and 
liabilities of the financial intermediaries. Unexpected changes in the interest rate can 
significantly alter a bank’s profitability. One definition of a bank’s interest rates risk 
encompasses the volatility in net interest income associated with changing interest rates.  
All banks tend to mismatch their balance sheet maturities to some degree. Depending on 
the cash flow characteristics of a bank’s assets and liabilities and the existence of 
embedded options, interest rate changes may raise or lower net interest income. The 
market model parameters are estimated (three times, on for the target, one for the bidder, 
and one for the combined firm) from the following three-factor model: 
  titBBitFFitMMiiit RRRR ,,,,,,, εβββα ++++=   (1.1) 
where, 
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itR  = the rate of return on security i (for the target, bidder and combined, as appropriate) 
on day t. 
tMR , = the return on CRSP value weighted index on day t. 
tFR , = the return on foreign exchange index on day t. 
tBR , = the return on one-year T-bill index on day t. 
iα      = the intercept term 
Mi,β = the market risk coefficient for security i. 
Fi,β  = the foreign exchange risk coefficient for portfolio i. 
Bi,β   = the interest rate risk coefficient for portfolio i. 
ti ,ε   = the residuals. 
 
The foreign exchange used in (1.1) is the Major Currencies Index.6 The return is 
computed using the following formula7: 
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6 The major currencies index is a weighted average of the foreign exchange values of the U.S. dollar against 
a subset of currencies in the broad index that circulate widely outside the country of issue. The weights are 
derived from those in the broad index. 
7 Same as that used by Wetmore and Brick (1994.) 
8 Same as that used by Wetmore and Brick (1994) 
 23
where tB  is the interest of one-year T-bill on day t. Actual returns are used because there 
is no difference in the results regardless of whether or not interest rates are anticipated.9  
we also do not orthogonalize the indices, because Giliberto (1985) argues that 
orthogonalizing the indices results in biased estimators. Moreover, Kane and Unal (1998) 
argue that it is not apparent which index is the driving index and which is the driven one. 
Data for both the Indices are obtained from the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System.10 
Modified market model parameters are estimated over day – 240 to day – 41 
relative to the announcement date (t = 0). Returns are calculated using the modified 
model with the CRSP value-weighted index for market returns. Further, we define 
abnormal return for stock of firm i on day t as: 
  ititit RRAR ˆ−=      (1.2) 
where, 
 tBBitFFitMMiiit RRRR ,,,,,, ˆˆˆˆˆ βββα +++=                        (1.3) 
where iα , Mi,β , Fi ,β and Bi,β are modified market model parameters. As such, this model 
measures a bank’s stock return in excess of the return to the whole bank group upon the 
merger announcement. If tFR , and tBR , are common factors to all the banks but are not 
already reflected in the market return, then abnormal returns estimates from the standard 
market model would be upward biased due the omitted variables problem. By including 
tFR , and tBR , , the modified market model can gauge the impact of bank mergers more 
accurately. The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated over several event 
                                                                                          
9 Flannery and James (1984). 
10 All the information are available online from http://www.federalreserve.gov 
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windows to measure the impact of the merger announcement in the periods surrounding 
it. We hypothesize that abnormal returns (on the day of merger announcement) and the 
event period surrounding it are significantly different from zero, which implies that the 
market reacts to mergers. 
Prior studies suggest that merger gains are typically not evenly divided between 
targets and bidders. Thus, we focus on wealth changes for bidder and target firms 
separately, as well as their combined. In doing this, a further step in my empirical 
evaluation is to evaluate abnormal returns of the combined firm (i.e. target plus bidder). 
Indeed, looking only at the two separate banks may give a partial and perhaps distorted 
interpretation of the market reaction merger’s announcement. Therefore, we calculate 
abnormal returns of the combined firm using the method outlined in Houston and 
Ryngaert (1994). 
 
Combined  Abnormal Return =
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Where tMV  is the market value of the target firm’s stock five days before the 
announcement date, bMV is the market value of bidding firm’s stock 10 days before the 
announcement date, tAR  and bAR are the abnormal returns for the ith target and bidder 
firms over the event window. Houston and Ryngaert (1994) point out that this method 
gives the true percentage change in the value of the combined pre-merger firm. 
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1.4.2.2 EGARCH Event Study 
Section 6.1 and previous bank merger event studies utilize the traditional event 
study methodology to test if the merger announcement creates abnormal returns. There is 
a critical assumption in using the traditional event study methodology including the 
linearity of the relationship, and the independence and the homoskedasticity of the stock 
returns.  
However, the empirical studies about stock returns challenge the above 
assumptions. Carroll and Wei (1988) and Akgiray (1989) find some evidence against the 
linearity assumption. Roll (1984), Patel and Wolfson (1984), Jennings and Starks (1985) 
and French and Roll (1986) report autocorrelation in stock returns. Akgiray (1989) and 
Engle and Mustafa (1992) show that daily index stock returns and individual stock 
returns exhibit both autocorrelation and autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) and generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH). Hart 
and Apilado (1998) find that the banking stock returns exhibit ARCH and correlation. 
They use GARCH-M (1,1) event study methodology to examine for the bank returns 
reaction to bank merger regulations. They find that the GARCH-M (1,1) event study 
methodology outperforms the traditional market model event study methodology since 
involving the GARCH-M account for the risk-return trade off, the linearity assumption, 
the heteroskedasticity, and the correlation in the error term. The inclusion of the 
GARCH-M (1,1) is found to improve the efficiency of the estimated model parameters. 
According to Hart and Apilado (1998), GARCH-M event study model accounts 
for the risk-return trade off, and the traditional OLS basic assumptions. However, it does 
not account for the asymmetric volatility or the leverage effect and the leptokurtosis 
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implied in the stock returns. The leptokurtosis implies that the stock returns have high 
dispersion, or the probability of getting outliers in gains (losses) is higher than the 
normal, [Mandelbort, (1963)].  
Elyasiani and Mansur (1998) suggest that because the banking industry is highly 
leveraged then the inclusion of the GARCH models in the mean equation of the banking 
returns is extremely important. According to Elyasiani and Mansur (1998), we expect to 
see more negative skewness in the bank returns compared with other industries. Thus, in 
the banking industry, the increase in volatility following the negative returns would be 
higher compared with other sectors because of the high leverage ratio in the banking 
sector. Regarding the fat-tailed phenomenon, Hentschel (1995) reports that this 
leptokurtosis is reduced when returns are normalized by the time-varying variances of 
GARCH Models, but it is by no means eliminated.  
In short, many studies have shown that daily stock returns may not follow the 
standard assumptions of traditional event study methodology. To our best knowledge, 
most previous bank merger studies incorporate those assumptions. Violation of these 
assumptions could lead to inefficient estimators in the market model.  
Therefore in evaluating full wealth effects from banks mergers, we utilize the 
EGARCH event study methodology. The main purpose of EGARCH model is to provide 
a more statistically efficient event study methodology. It also accounts for the violated 
regression assumptions of the traditional market model event study. In doing so, we take 
the asymmetric volatility phenomenon of the returns into account. Among the GARCH 
family, the EGARCH model proposed by Nelson (1991) is one of the models that allow 
for the inclusion of the leverage/asymmetry term γi. Hentschel (1995) argues that the 
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EGARCH model does not impose sign restriction on ω, δ, ψ and γ. Nelson and Cao 
(1992) argue that the nonnegativity constraints in the linear GARCH model are too 
restrictive. The GARCH model imposes the nonnegative constraints on the parameters ω, 
δ, ψ and γ, while there is no restrictions imposed on these parameters in the EGARCH 
model, the conditional variance σ2t is an asymmetric function of lagged disturbances εt-
i.11 
We employ the EGARCH (1,1) in our formulation since many studies including 
Bollerslev (1986), Akgiray (1989), and Elyasiani and Mansur (1998) report that the p= 1, 
and q = 1 for the conditional (σ2) and unconditional (ε) variance lags are the best in 
describing the economic and finance data. Then the market model with the EGARCH 
(1,1) specification will take the following form: 
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i in equation (5) represents the financial institution, where i in equation 4 
represents the lag. β2i is the EGARCH coefficient, which specifies the risk-return 
relationship. Accordingly, we expect to find a negative sign for this coefficient; µit is a 
white noise random error. Equation (5) is estimated for each bank in the sample. Then the 
abnormal return ARit is calculated as the difference between the actual return and the 
predicted return as estimated from equation (5) for each company i for each day t around 
the bailout date as follows,  
                                                                                          
11 For the problems arising from testing GARCH models that imposes restrictions on ω, δ, and ψ see 
Hentschel (1995).  
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(6)                                                                    )]1,1([EGARCHRAR itit −=  
where 
itAR :  the abnormal return of bank i on day t (where t = 0, the announcement day) 
itR : the actual return of bank i on day t=0 
Abnormal returns (ARs) are calculated for each target, bidder, and combined firm. 
Further, the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated over several event 
windows to better evaluate the market reaction before and after the merger announcement 
date. 
 
1.4.3 Regression Analysis of Merger Returns 
As noted, prior studies provide information about the expected correlation 
between abnormal returns and relative size, relative book-to-market value, method of 
payments, number of bidders -sectional differences in bank merger returns. This section 
attempts to gain insight into which of the independent variables has a significant 
influence on target, bidder and combined abnormal returns.  Toward this end, we conduct 
multiple regression analysis because it is possible that multiple explanatory variables 
influence bank merger returns. In the cross-sectional test, the dependent variable is either 
the combined, bidder or target firm cumulative abnormal announcement period returns. 
we will use the following model  
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where: 
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1,0)CAR(− : the two-day (t=-1 to t=0) cumulative abnormal returns for bank i. 
Size: relative size of the bank to be acquired, measured as the market value of the target 
divided by the market value of the bidder at the time of merger. 
BMV: relative book-to-market value of the bank to be acquired, measured as the book-to-
market value of the target divided by the book-to-market value of the bidder at the time 
of merger.  
Number of bidders: the number of firms that bid for the target firm within a one-year 
window. 
Cash (dummy): dummy variable equal to 1 if all cash financed and 0 otherwise. 
Stock (dummy):.dummy variable equal to 1 if all stock financed and 0 otherwise. 
Interstate (dummy): dummy variable equal to if interstate merger and 0 otherwise. 
iα : intercept term 
1.5 Results 
  We report the empirical results for the modified market model and the new bank 
event study methodology (EGARCH). This will enable us to compare the outcomes of 
two different methodologies  
1.5.1 Results form the Modified Market Model 
1.5.1.1 results for targets and bidder 
Extending the analysis to a relatively larger data set (785 mergers) over a longer 
time period (1980-2000) will provide a better opportunity to measure the full wealth 
impact from the bank mergers. Results from employing event study methodology are 
presented in Table 1.3. We observe that the CARs for target banks are positive for all 
intervals and statistically significant in most windows except for two event windows 
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[(+1,+5) and (+1,+10)]. The positive cumulative abnormal return is the highest for the 21 
day window (-10,+10) with 8.63%, while it reaches the lowest for the window (-5,-1) 
with 4.97%. We can compare the results presented in Table 1.3 with those reported in 
previous studies (Table 1.1).  For a two-day excess return our results (about 7.5%) are 
similar to those reported in the study of Cornett and Tehranian (1992). DeLong (2001) 
reports a mean CAR of 16.61% for the twelve-day window, while our closest event 
window shows a mean of 5.84%.  Becher (2000) over an 11-day event window (-5,+5) 
finds that target significantly gains value (16.94%), while we also find that the target 
significantly gains value, the gains are less (7.59%). The results seem to indicate that 
mergers are anticipated a few days before the announcement day. There is a sharp 
increase in the CARs about one week before the announcement date, and there is a 
downward trend in the days following the announcement.   
Table 1.3 
Cumulative abnormal returns (Target Banks) 
 Modified Market Model EGARCH (1,1) Model 
Event Windows Return (%) t-statistic Return (%) t-statistic 
CAR (-10,-1) 5.84 2.49** 1.05 1.65** 
CAR (-5,-1) 4.97 9.53*** 0.73 2.82*** 
CAR (-1,0) 7.45 15.28*** 0.14 5.17*** 
CAR (0,+1) 7.96 4.24*** 0.31 2.15** 
CAR (+1,+5) -3.14 -1.67 -0.21 -0.96 
CAR (+1,+10) -5.01 -1.33 -0.47 0.23 
CAR (-1,+1) 7.65 10.46*** 0.27 2.07** 
CAR (-5,+5) 7.59 6.13*** 0.76 3.45*** 
CAR (-10,+10) 8.63 5.14*** 1.72 1.38* 
***Indicates statistical significant at the 0.01 level. 
**Indicates statistical significant at the 0.05 level. 
*Indicates statistical significant at the 0.10 level. 
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For bidders (Table 1.4), we observe that the cumulative abnormal returns are 
slightly negative for most event windows except for the (+1,+5) and (+1,+10) windows. 
CARs are positive in those windows but they are statistically insignificant. It is 
noteworthy that bidder banks show a less significant loss in the shorter event windows. It 
seems that our results are consistent with some of the empirical literature reported in 
Table 1. For instance, Cornett and Tehranian (1992) over a 2-day event window (-1,0) 
find a CAR of –0.80%; our comparable CAR is –0.18%. The magnitude of the bank 
mergers in bidders deserves some comment with respect to previous results (Table 1.1). 
Our results show that bidder banks lose less than what is reported in previous work.  
Table 1.4 
Cumulative abnormal returns (Bidder Banks) 
 Modified Market model EGARCH (1,1) Model 
Windows Return (%) t-statistic Return (%) t-statistic 
CAR (-10,-1) -0.73 0.02 0.26 1.02 
CAR (-5,-1) -0.54 -0.41 0.08 .40 
CAR (-1,0) -0.26 -2.13* -0.17 -1.72** 
CAR (0,+1) -0.18 -1.97* -0.06 -2.19** 
CAR (+1,+5) 0.55 1.52 -0.04 -2.3** 
CAR (+1,+10) 0.82 -1.43 -0.16 -0.92 
CAR (-1,+1) -0.33 -2.22** -.05 -1.86** 
CAR (-5,+5) -0.09 -1.98** -.10 -1.64** 
CAR (-10,+10) -0.88 -1.84* -0.14 -2.3** 
***Indicates statistical significant at the 0.01 level. 
**Indicates statistical significant at the 0.05 level. 
*Indicates statistical significant at the 0.10 level. 
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For instance, the negative CAR reaches -0.73% for the window (-10,-1), while DeLong 
(2001) over a similar event window find a CAR of –1.68%. Also, the CAR reaches -
0.33% over the window (-1,+1), while Houston and Ryngaert (1994) over a similar 
window find a CAR of –2.32%. 
These results indicate that bidder shareholders realize significantly negative 
abnormal returns while target bank shareholders gain significantly. Our results suggest 
that mergers have increased only target shareholders’ wealth, which does not support the 
theoretical hypothesis that mergers are driven by synergies. In general, our results are 
consistent with most empirical literature on the banking sector. For instance, Becher 
(2000) over an 11-day event window (-5,+5) finds that the bidder significantly loses 
value (-.88%), while Cybo-Ottone and Murgia find a positive but insignificant abnormal 
return of 0.31% for bidder banks. On the other hand, research by Cornett and De (1991) 
indicate positive abnormal return for bidders, while Cornett and Tehranian (1992), 
Houston and Ryngaert (1994), and Neely (1987) provide results supporting the theory 
that bidder bank shareholders realize non-positive or negative returns. 
1.5.1.2 Combined firm returns 
Table 1.5 reports cumulative abnormal returns for combined firms. The results 
indicate that bank mergers create value for combined firms, with a statistically significant 
positive mean. These results are robust to event window and measurement of value 
changes. This result is consistent with recent studies of bank mergers (Becher, 2000; 
Houston et al., 2001). However, it contrasts with a number of prior studies that find 
negligible evidence of value creation (see. e.g., Houston and Ryngaert, 1999; James and 
Wier, 1987; and DeLong, 2001). All of these studies find that the average combined 
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return to the bidder and target is insignificantly positive. In other words, combined 
partners neither create nor destroy value. 
1.5.1.3 Summary of CARs 
Our results indicate that bank mergers create value for shareholders of the 
combined firms. These findings are consistent with recent studies of mergers 
(Becher,2000; Houston et al. 2001). However, bidder and target shareholders do not share 
gains equally. Consistent with prior studies, bidder shareholders lose value while target 
shareholders gain significantly. 
Table 1.5 
Cumulative abnormal returns (Combined Firms) 
 Modified Market model EGARCH (1,1) Model 
Windows Return (%) t-statistic Return (%) t-statistic 
CAR (-10,-1) 1.53 2.06* 0.58 3.31*** 
CAR (-5,-1) 0.44 2.93** 0.25 2.92*** 
CAR (-1,0) 3.01 3.34*** 0.10 2.74*** 
CAR (0,+1) 3.24 2.20* 0.28 1.97** 
CAR (+1,+5) 0.18 0.37 -0.04 -0.45 
CAR (+1,+10) 1.03 0.29 -0.26 -0.63 
CAR (-1,+1) 3.82 1.81* 0.22 3.51** 
CAR (-5,+5) 2.26 2.51** 0.37 2.39*** 
CAR (-10,+10) 4.74 2.86** 0.54 1.69** 
***Indicates statistical significant at the 0.01 level. 
**Indicates statistical significant at the 0.05 level. 
*Indicates statistical significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
1.5.2 Results from the EGARCH Model 
The main purpose of EGARCH (1,1) is to take care of linearity of the 
relationship, and the independency and the homoskedasticity of the stock returns.  
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Table 1.3 reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for bidders, targets and 
combined firms using EGARCH (1,1) methodology. It should be noted that the same 
computation from Table 1.2 are calculated using the EGARCH (1,1) methodology. The 
results are consistent with prior research: target shareholders enjoy gain while bidder 
shareholders suffer negative returns. Also, the results show that bank mergers create 
value for combined firms. These results are robust to the event window. We observe 
important notes when the EGARCH (Table 1.3) methodology abnormal returns are 
compared to the modified market methodology abnormal returns (Table 1.1). For targets, 
the EGARCH (1,1) methodology shows less statistically positive CARs than that of the 
modified market methodology.  Table 1.3 shows that, generally, the targets experience 
positive wealth gains; the magnitude and the level of significance depend on the event 
window. We observe that the highest gains (1.72%) occur over the 21 day (-10,+10) 
window and  the lowest gains (0.14%)occur over the (-1,0) window. Table 2 shows that 
the targets experience the highest gains (8.63%) occur over the (-10,+10) and the lowest 
gains (4.97%) occur from days-5 to +1. 
As for the bidders, the EGARCH (1,1) methodology shows less statistically 
negative CARs than that of the modified market methodology. Table 1.4 shows that the 
highest loss (-0.17) occurs over the 2 day (-1,0) window and the lowest loss (-0.04%) 
occurs over (+1,+5). Table 3 shows that the highest loss (-0.88) occurs over (-10,+10) 
and the lowest loss (-0.09%) occurs over (-5,+5). The same result is observed for the 
combined firms. These results indicate that merger is regarded good news for targets and 
as bad news for bidders. These results are consistent with previous studies. But our 
results are more robust, because EGARCH provides more efficient estimator and also 
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accounts for the violated regression assumptions of the traditional market model event 
study. It is noteworthy that the EGARCH (1,1) methodology shows that bank merger 
create less value for the combined firms than that of the modified market methodology. 
These results may suggest that the using the modified market methodology may overstate 
the CARs. In other words, the gain from bank mergers is exaggerated using the modified 
market methodology. In short, the results show that empirical conclusions may differ 
when abnormal returns are estimated using a modified market model, rather than using an 
EGARCH (1,1) model.  
Table 1.6 
Target Cumulative abnormal returns by time period 
 
 1980-1990  1991-2000  1980-1990 
versus 
1991-2000 
Event Windows Return (%) t-statistic Return (%) t-statistic p-values 
CAR (-10,-1) 0.96 3.58** 2.22 2.11** 0.39 
CAR (-5,-1) 0.63 3.32** 1.61 1.86** 0.03 
CAR (-1,0) 0.22 1.83** 0.45 0.69 0.02 
CAR (0,+1) 0.42 3.48*** 2.96 1.96** 0.11 
CAR (+1,+5) -0.22 -1.17 -0.19 -1.67 0.45 
CAR (+1,+10) -0.59 -1.19 -0.68 -1.33 0.37 
CAR (-1,+1) 0.49 3.36*** 1.01 2.06** 0.06 
CAR (-5,+5) 0.55 1.96** 0.78 1.88** 0.09 
CAR (-10,+10) 0.52 1.33* 1.89 1.73** 0.01 
Note: expected return is estimated from the EGARCH (1,1) model parameters. The null hypothesis is that 
average (cumulative) abnormal returns are not statistically different from zero. Column 6 provides p-values 
of t-tests. t-tests are constructed comparing CARs from 1980-1990 versus 1991-2000. 
***Indicates statistical significant at the 0.01 level. 
**Indicates statistical significant at the 0.05 level. 
*Indicates statistical significant at the 0.10 level. 
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1.5.3 Analysis of Sub-samples 
 The above results show that the target bank shareholders enjoy significant 
positive abnormal returns while abnormal returns to bidding bank shareholders are 
significantly negative. For combined firms, cumulative abnormal returns are significantly 
positive.  
It can be instructive to examine whether those findings pervade our entire sample or is 
confined to certain sub-samples. Accordingly, we next subdivide our results by time 
periods (1980-1990 versus 1991-2000) and by size (large mergers versus small mergers). 
We first examine the effects of bank mergers over time. In doing so, CARs are 
estimated for time periods: 1980-1990 and 1991-2000.  CARs for bidders across the two 
time periods are reported in Table 1.6. It appears that there is much difference in 
valuation effects between the two periods (1980-1990 vs.1991-2000). The positive 
evaluation effects appear to be more pronounced for bidder banks involved in a merger 
during the period 1991-2000 than those involved in the period 1980-1990. Returns to 
targets in the 1980-1990 period range from over the all event windows from 0.22% in the 
(-1,0) window to 0.96% in the (-10,-1) window, while returns in the 1991-2000 period 
rage from 0.45% in the (-1,0) window to 2.96% in the (0,1) window. It is interesting to 
note that the 1991-2000 period differs significantly from 1980-1990 (see column 6). This 
difference indicates that target returns in the 1990s are statistically more positive than in 
the 1980s. 
 For bidder banks (Table 1.7), returns in the 1980-1990 period range over all event 
windows from –0.36% in the [(-1.0), t = -2.35] to 0.02%in the [(+1,+5), t=0.30], while 
returns for bidders in the 1991-2000 period range from –0.15% (t=-1.81) to 
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0.48%(t=0.23). Clearly, returns appear to be higher in the 1990s, however, statistical 
shows that the 1980-1990 period does not differ from 1991-2000 period. For the 
combined firm (Table 1.8), CARs follow a similar pattern to target returns (Table 1.6). In 
particular, the combined firm returns are more positive in the 1991-2000 period than in 
the 1980-1990 period. Collectively, our findings indicate that more recent bank mergers 
(those occurring in the 1990’s) have greater positive abnormal returns. 
Table 1.7 
Bidder Cumulative abnormal returns by time period 
 
 1980-1990  1991-2000  1980-1990 
versus 
1991-2000 
Event Windows Return (%) t-statistic Return (%) t-statistic p-values 
CAR (-10,-1) -0.19 -0.83 0.48 0.23 0.17 
CAR (-5,-1) -0.25 -0.76 -0.03 1.96** 0.35 
CAR (-1,0) -0.36 -2.35*** -0.14 -1.86** 0.62 
CAR (0,+1) -0.07 -1.85** 0.01 0.78 0.33 
CAR (+1,+5) 0.02 0.30 0.08 0.57 0.49 
CAR (+1,+10) -0.36 -1.69** -0.12 -1.66* 0.30 
CAR (-1,+1) -0.27 -0.40 -0.15 -1.81* 0.01 
CAR (-5,+5) -0.11 -1.68** -0.06 0.77 0.27 
CAR (-10,+10) -0.23 -2.24*** -0.08 -1.97 0.22 
Note: expected return is estimated from the EGARCH (1,1) model parameters. The null hypothesis is that 
average (cumulative) abnormal returns are not statistically different from zero. Column 6 provides p-values 
of t-tests. t-tests are constructed comparing CARs from 1980-1990 versus 1991-2000. 
***Indicates statistical significant at the 0.01 level. 
**Indicates statistical significant at the 0.05 level. 
*Indicates statistical significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
 Table 1.9 presents returns of bank mergers categorized into large merger and 
small mergers. As we observe from this table, the two sub-samples of mergers 
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experienced significant positive abnormal returns. The analysis shows that returns for 
large mergers are greater than those for small mergers. For example, CRA (-10,10) for 
large mergers is 6.02%, compared with 1.44% for small mergers. However, statistical 
tests show (column 6) that large mergers do not differ from small mergers. 
Table 1.8 
Combined Cumulative abnormal returns by time period 
 
 1980-1990  1991-2000  1980-1990 
versus 
1991-2000 
Event Windows Return (%) t-statistic Return (%) t-statistic p-values 
CAR (-10,-1) 0.53 0.92 0.75 1.34* 0.09 
CAR (-5,-1) 0.18 0.94 0.35 1.03 0.06 
CAR (-1,0) 0.08 1.72** 0.31 1.29* 0.03 
CAR (0,+1) 0.16 2.18*** 0.56 1.30* 0.01 
CAR (+1,+5) -0.02 0.10 0.04 1.05 0.08 
CAR (+1,+10) -0.09 0.54 0.02 1.22 0.10 
CAR (-1,+1) 0.11 1.40* 41 1.36* 0.00 
CAR (-5,+5) 0.22 1.65** 0.94 1.56** 0.04 
CAR (-10,+10) 0.35 1.73** 1.09 1.31* 0.02 
Note: expected return is estimated from the EGARCH (1,1) model parameters. The null hypothesis is that 
average (cumulative) abnormal returns are not statistically different from zero. Column 6 provides p-values 
of t-tests. t-tests are constructed comparing CARs from 1980-1990 versus 1991-2000. 
***Indicates statistical significant at the 0.01 level. 
**Indicates statistical significant at the 0.05 level. 
*Indicates statistical significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 1.9 
Combined cumulative abnormal returns by size 
 Large 
Mergers 
 Small 
Mergers 
 Large 
versus 
Small 
Event Windows Return (%) t-statistic Return (%) t-statistic p-values 
CAR (-10,-1) 0.61 1.45* 0.37 0.92 0.07 
CAR (-5,-1) 0.33 1.19 0.13 0.94 0.21 
CAR (-1,0) 0.27 2.09*** 0.05 1.76** 0.61 
CAR (0,+1) 0.45 3.06*** 0.18 2.88*** 0.20 
CAR (+1,+5) 0.12 2.96** -0.06 -0.60 0.16 
CAR (+1,+10) 0.08 1.09 -0.29 -0.82 0.30 
CAR (-1,+1) 0.31 3.80** 0.11 1.45* 0.15 
CAR (-5,+5) 0.49 5.09** 0.14 1.67* 0.55 
CAR (-10,+10) 0.56 6.02*** 0.51 1.44* 0.29 
Note: expected return is estimated from the EGARCH (1,1) model parameters. The null hypothesis is that 
average (cumulative) abnormal returns are not statistically different from zero. Column 6 provides p-values 
of t-tests. t-tests are constructed comparing CARs from large mergers versus small mergers. 
***Indicates statistical significant at the 0.01 level. 
**Indicates statistical significant at the 0.05 level. 
*Indicates statistical significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
Table 1.10 
Expected signs of independent variables 
Independent Variables Target Bidder Combined 
Log (ME of target/ME of bidder) ? ? ? 
Log (BM of target/BM of bidder) ? ? ? 
Payment in Cash (dummy) + + + 
Payment in Stock (dummy) - - - 
Interstate Merger (dummy) - - - 
Single Bidder - + ? 
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1.5.4 Cross-Sectional Analyses 
We learn from section 7.2 that any single set of results based on a specific model 
should be interpreted within the context. This is especially true if further regressions are 
estimated to find out the factors that determine the CARs in response to bank merger 
announcement. In a regression, the estimated CARs are used as the dependent variable. 
Hence such regressions may become meaningless if the initial abnormal return estimates 
are not robust.  Our model (1.1) is regressed using weighted ordinary least squares to find 
the coefficients based upon the sample collected. The only correction to be made is the 
use of White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors (1980) and Covariance in an 
effort to control for heteroskedasticity. All variables are linear in parameters except for 
size, which has been transformed using natural log in an effort to stay consistent with the 
work of Fama and French (1992). 
We report the results of cross-sectional regression analyses in Table 1.11 
(targets), Table 1.12 (bidders) and Table1.13 (combined). Following Houston and 
Ryngaert (1994), we run regressions with and without separate year dummies that are 
included to control for any changes over time that are not captured in the independent 
variables. We observe that the relative size seems to be statistically significant in these 3 
tables.  The coefficient for relative size is negative in Table 1.12. This means that the 
relative size does affect bidders’ returns negatively (i.e. relative size is associated with 
lower bidder returns). Also, it suggests the market reacts more unfavorably when the 
relative size increases. Accordingly, the bidding bank experiences lower abnormal 
returns, indicating low synergy or diseconomies of scale. Also, this could support the 
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overpayment hypothesis in sense that the bidder is willing to pay a higher premium in 
expecting of potential synergy resulting from merger. 
Table 1.11 
Cross-sectional regression results for target firms 
 
Independent Variable 
Regression 1 
 
Regression 2 
 
Intercept 0.246 0.361 
 (0.74) (2.78)*** 
Log (ME of target/ME of bidder) 0.011 0.0198 
 (2.02)** (2.34)** 
Log (BM of target/BM of bidder) -0.042 -0.023 
 (-1.34) (-1.62) 
Payment in Cash (dummy) 0.056 0.196 
 (3.12)*** (2.70)*** 
Payment in Stock (dummy) -0.0303 -0.210 
 (-1.61) (-1.04) 
Interstate Merger (dummy) -0.135 -0.187 
 (-0.524) (-.68) 
Number of Bidders 0.018 0.192 
 (1.36) (1.66) 
Year Dummies No Yes 
   
Adjusted R2 0.158 0.212 
***, ** , and * denote significant at 1 %, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
As for the target and combined firms (Table 1.11 and 1.12), the positive 
coefficient on the relative size indicates that the cumulative returns for the target increase 
significantly as the target size increases relative to the bidder size. This result is 
consistent with the economics of scale hypothesis, suggesting the larger the target relative 
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to the bidder, the greater the abnormal returns to target and combined firms. Indeed, the 
economics of scale argument suggests that the coefficient should be positive. Put 
differently, this observation supports the hypothesis that one motivation of bank mergers 
is the economics of scale or economics of scope.  
Table 1.12 
Cross-sectional regression results for bidder firms 
    
 
Independent Variable 
Regression 1 Regression 2 
Intercept -0.136 -0.155 
 (-0.53) (-0.74) 
Log (ME of target/ME of bidder) -0.142 -0.119 
 (-2.44)** (-3.02)*** 
Log (BM of target/BM of bidder) -0.034 -0.007 
 (-0.225) (-0.55) 
Payment in Cash (dummy) 0.024 0.028 
 (2.05)** (2.39)** 
Payment in Stock (dummy) -0.161 -0.178 
 (-.284)** (-3.45)*** 
Interstate Merger (dummy) -0071 -0.066 
 (-5.09)*** (-5.38)** 
Number of Bidders -0.126 -0.411 
 (-2.47)** (-2.54)** 
Year Dummies No Yes 
   
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.31 
***, ** , and * denote significant at 1 %, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Another interesting interpretation to this result suggests that relatively large targets gain 
significantly larger merger premiums. For bidder returns, the negative coefficient is 
consistent with positive coefficient on relative size in the target regression if the higher 
returns to target in relatively large deals hurt bidder firms. 
Table 1.13 
Cross-sectional regression results for combined firms 
 
Independent Variable 
Regression 1 Regression 2 
Intercept 0.059 0.086 
 (2.12)** (2.23)** 
Log (ME of target/ME of bidder) 0.008 .039 
 (5.07)*** (5.42)*** 
Log (BM of target/BM of bidder) 0.025 0.033 
 (0.79) (1.42) 
Payment in Cash (dummy) 0.008 0.029. 
 (2.02)** (2.35)** 
Payment in Stock (dummy) -0.013 0.059 
 (-0.21) (1.16) 
Interstate Merger (dummy) -0.024 0.013 
 (-0.83) (0.35) 
Number of Bidders -0.032 0.015 
 (-0.59) (0.19) 
Years Dummies No Yes 
   
Adjusted R2 0.221 0.257 
***, ** , and * denote significant at 1 %, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
We observe that payment in cash is positive and significant in all regressions. The 
coefficient on the cash dummy variable is significantly positive for targets, bidders and 
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combined firms. This result indicates that the market reacts positively to the 
announcement of mergers that are financed with cash. As for the payment in stock, the 
coefficient is only negatively significant for bidders. It seems that the rational market 
participants interpret a cash financed merger as a positive signal of the existing assets of 
the bidding bank and react accordingly. This implies that the bidder, target and combined 
receive a positive wealth gain when mergers financed with all cash. These results are 
consistent with Toyne and Tripp (1999) and Houston and Ryngaert (1994). They report 
that mergers financed with stock have lower abnormal returns than those financed with 
cash. However, these results contradict recent studies by Delong (2001) and Becher 
(2000) who report that the method of payment does not influence returns to combined 
firms. 
It is worth noting that the number of bidders is only statistically significant in 
Table 1.12. This variable is negatively related to bidders returns. The negative sign of this 
variable is consistent with the overpayment hypothesis that predicts if more than one 
bidder bid on the same target, the winning bidder will overpay for the target to get the 
deal. As a result, the bidder return will be lower in this case. Surprisingly, this variable 
does not affect target and combined returns. This is inconsistent with our hypothesis that 
predicts target firm will experience higher returns where there are multiple bidders. 
The coefficient for interstate variable is statistically different from zero only in 
bidder returns (Table 1.12). The results indicate that interstate (diversifying) mergers 
create negative abnormal returns to bidders. Relative book-to-market ratio variable is 
never statistically significant. These results indicate that the relative book-to-market 
ratios are not confirmed as relevant factor in our sample. Finally, the yearly dummies 
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appear to provide additional explanatory power when included in the regression 
specifications. 
1.6 Conclusion  
In this essay, we attempt to measure the wealth effect of bank mergers 
announcements on participating banks. For this purpose, we utilize two new bank event 
study methodologies. This is the first essay to apply these two event study methodologies 
in bank mergers. The first one is a modified market model that adjusts for exchange and 
interest rates. If exchange and interest rates are common factors to all the banks but are 
not already reflected in the market return, then abnormal returns estimates from the 
standard market model would be biased due the omitted variables problem. We argue 
that, by including exchange and interest rates, the modified market model can estimate 
the impact of bank mergers more efficiently. The second one is an EGARCH (1,1) that 
takes into account the basic shortcoming of the standard market model event study. 
Specifically, it adjusts for the linearity assumption, the heteroskedasticity, and the 
correlation in the error term. The presence of heteroskedasticity results in unbiased but 
inefficient coefficient estimators and biased estimators of the coefficient variances. It is 
worth of mentioning that none of the previous bank merger studies estimated abnormal 
returns using these two models. The results of two methodologies show that the merger is 
regarded as good news for the target and combined shareholders and as bad news for the 
bidder shareholders. However, EGARCH (1,1) methodology shows that bank merger 
generate lower value for the combined firms than that of the modified market 
methodology, suggesting the using the modified market methodology may overstate the 
CARs. In other words, the gain from bank mergers is exaggerated using the modified 
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market methodology. Hence, we argue that basic conclusions about the effects of bank 
mergers may vary as the choice models describing stocks returns varies (i.e. modified 
market model or EGARHC).   
The second objective of this essay is to investigate the effects of relative size, 
relative book-to-market value, method of payment, number of bidders on the abnormal 
returns of bidder, target and combined firms. Toward this end, we run a weighted 
ordinary least squares regression using White’s method (1980) to control for 
heteroskedasticity. We find evidence that the relative size does affect positively the target 
returns and negatively bidder returns. These findings imply that relatively large targets 
capture significantly large merger premium. Also, larger targets make worse deals for the 
bidder (i.e. are larger negative NPV for bidder).   As for the method of payment, we find 
that target; bidder and combined firms returns are positively related to cash mergers. As 
for the number of bidders variable, it is negatively related to bidders returns. The negative 
sign of this variable is consistent with the overpayment hypothesis. Also, interstate 
mergers are negatively related to bidder abnormal returns, suggesting diversifying 
mergers are associated with lower returns. Finally, we fail to find evidence that number 
of bidder and interstate merger variables affect target and combined returns. Also, it 
appears that relative book-to-market values are not relevant factors to abnormal returns. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE FOLLOWING U.S. BANK 
 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 
 
2.1 Abstract 
This essay examines the long-run stock and operating performance of bank 
mergers during period (1985-1999). To this end, the essay compares the post-merger 
performance with the pre-merger performance of the merging banks utilizing pre-and 
post-merger accounting data. The performance effects measured by profitability ratios are 
mixed. Merged banks show no significant improvement in return on assets relative to 
their peer group, while they have significant improvements in return on equity. The sub-
period analysis suggests that more recent bank mergers have more positive effects than 
earlier mergers, and that large targets are associated with more successful mergers.   
 A buy-and-hold abnormal return technique and the Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model are used to evaluate the long-run returns following bank mergers. The 
empirical evidence indicates that merged banks have significantly under-performed their 
peer group of non-merged banks. Such poor performance can be attributed to the larger 
banks in the sample, suggesting that size is an important explanatory variable of long-run 
post-merger performance. Finally, we examine each calendar year to determine if the 
underperformance is concentrated in certain years of the study, and find evidence that 
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more recent bank mergers are associated with better performance than earlier mergers. 
However, the average performance of recent mergers is still worse than that of 
comparably sized banks. Overall, the analysis shows poor stock and operating 
performance in the years following bank mergers. 
2.2 Introduction 
The last decade has witnessed an unprecedented pace of bank merger and 
acquisitions. In particular, between 1990 and 2002, the number of mergers and 
acquisitions activities surged by about 520 per year compared with 345 per year over the 
(1980-89) period. Consequently, the number of banks operating in the U.S. has declined 
by about 33 as compared to 1990. Such a rapid pace of bank mergers and acquisitions is 
likely to continue into the future. Moreover, the pace of bank acquisitions of securities 
firms and insurance companies is also likely to rise in the future as a result of the recent 
enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act of 1999.12 The said trend in bank 
mergers represents one of the most discussed issues in the current banking literature.  
A number of banking studies have focused on mergers and acquisitions over the 
past few years. Essays have been published about the advantages and disadvantages of 
mergers and acquisitions, and about the most effective form of their implementations. 
However, a number of issues still remain unresolved, in particular the long-run stock 
returns behavior of bank mergers. We investigate a basic issue in this essay, notably, 
bank mergers’ post-merger, long-run performance. This issue is fundamental since the 
assumption of bank mergers’ favorable contribution to the combined wealth of bidder and 
target shareholders is solely based on the findings of event studies over the short term. 
                                                                                          
12 GLB allows banks, brokerage firms and insurance companies to merge. 
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The said studies conclude that abnormal returns to bidders are small or at least 
insignificantly different from zero in the short-run.  
A considerable amount of research has been conducted on bank mergers with a 
focus on merger motives, and the immediate market reaction to their public 
announcement. However, much less attention has been devoted to determining whether 
mergers enhance combined firm value over the long run. Our objective is to evaluate the 
long-term effect of merger on the combined firm. 
 Several reasons make the study of the long- run performance relevant. First, from 
an investor's viewpoint, the existence of price patterns may present opportunities for 
active trading strategies to produce superior returns. Second, the premium paid to merger 
target can be justified only if there is a long-run improvement in both operating and 
market performance of the combined firm. Third, despite continuously ongoing research 
on bank mergers, we still know surprisingly little about the long-run performance 
following bank mergers. While the immediate market reaction to bank mergers has been 
studied extensively, the long-run performance resulting from mergers has been largely 
ignored.  The contribution of this essay to the bank mergers literature is to help bridge 
this significant gap. 
Early studies of long-run performance simply extended event study techniques to 
a longer horizon. Such analysis compares the subsequent equity performance of each 
individual firm associated with the event study to that of a reference portfolio. Some 
researchers make specific adjustments for the security's beta or other factor loading. 
However, Kothari and Warner's (1997) simulation evidence suggests that the size and 
power of these parametric tests are both overstated. In particular, the abnormal returns 
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computed by subtracting benchmark portfolio returns from an individual security's 
returns tend to be substantially skewed. Barber and Lyon (1997) reiterate the importance 
of simple abnormal returns' skewness, and describe additional potential biases that may 
arise from new listings and market portfolio rebalancing. All of these problems can be 
alleviated by using peer-adjusted, buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) to measure 
long-run performance effects, as in Ritter (1991). For each sample firm, Barber and Lyon 
(1997) suggest choosing a peer firm based on market capitalization and their equity's 
book-to-market ratio. The difference between the sample firm's and its peer firm's 
holding period returns then indicates the impact of the studied event on subsequent 
performance. Barber and Lyon conclude that this BHAR technique produces well-
randomized samples when appropriate peer firms are chosen. 
Since there is still no consensus in the literature regarding the valuation 
consequences of bank merger, we believe that it is important to maintain the careful 
evaluation of the performance of banks engaged in mergers using a variety of samples 
and empirical methodologies. More importantly, the principle drawback of the extensive 
event study in bank mergers literature is its short-run focus. While ex ante expectation are 
important sources of information, the possibility exists that the market does not always 
accurately predict the future performance of bank mergers in the short time period 
surrounding announcement. Therefore, an evaluation of the long-run performance of 
bank mergers may be necessary. Accordingly, the essay makes a valuable contribute to 
existing literature by currently investigating the long-run post-merger operating as well as 
market performance of the bank merger sample by examining the monthly returns from a 
sample of banks over thirty-six to sixty-month intervals following their announcements to 
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merger. We also aim to shed light on the long-run wealth effects of bank mergers. To this 
end, we use buy-and-hold abnormal returns and the Fama and French (1993) three-factor 
model to measure long-run effects of bank mergers. This is the first essay to examine the 
long-run performance following bank mergers using those two techniques. Interestingly, 
to the best of our knowledge, there is only one study (Madura and Wiant, 1994) that 
measures the long-run performance resulting from bank acquisitions. However, the 
analysis was based on an event study utilizing standard market model.   
As for operating performance, we utilize traditional ratios such as return on assets 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE). ROA and ROE are the most commonly used measure 
of bank profitability. For the post-merger period, the analysis will focus on the combined 
firm relative to a control group. Post-merger data are compared with pre-merger data to 
determine the performance changes that took place upon the transition from pre-merger 
to post-merger. The control group is particularly valuable because it permits an 
assessment of whether any observed changes in the combined firm simply reflect changes 
in economic environment or, instead, are unique to the combined firm. 
The results of long-run operating performance indicate that there are statistically 
significant improvements in profitability in terms of ROE following mergers. However, 
profitability in terms of ROA shows no virtually improvement (it increases but not 
statistically significant).13 We also find evidence that banks engaged in mergers, on 
average, under-perform the peer group before the merger and outperform it after the 
merger. This indicates that mergers are able to improve ROE, and it may imply that 
profitable motivations are driving bank mergers. Additionally, when we examine pre-
merger and post-merger profitability in terms of ROA, we find that ROA is unrelated to 
                                                                                          
13 ROE is the product of  ROA times equity multiplier. 
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merger activity. Upon further analysis, our findings also show that more recent bank 
mergers have more positive effects than earlier mergers. Notably, only more recent bank 
mergers were able to achieve significant cost cuts. Another interesting finding is that 
mergers in which small banks are involved show large cost savings compared with the 
large bank mergers. This sounds intuitively correct, as it is easier to implement cost 
savings when the overall size of the new banks remains manageable. Lastly, our 
empirical results suggest that large targets are associated with more successful mergers. 
The results of long-run stock returns show that merged banks exhibit significant 
underperformance after a merger. Buy-and-hold abnormal return results indicate that 
merged banks underperforms a matched bank of similar size by almost 18.4% in five 
years following the merger. The Fama-French three-factor regression model yields 
underperformance of –10% over the five-year post-merger period. Notably, Recent 
studies of bank mergers such as Becher (2000) and Houston et.al. (1994) find that bank 
mergers create value for the combined firms, with a statistically significant positive. In 
contrast, we find evidence of long-run underperformance following bank mergers that is 
statistically significant. This finding indicates that it may be difficult for investors to earn 
profits by trading on this underperformance.  Further analysis shows that this poor 
performance can be attributed to the larger banks in the sample. This result confirms our 
earlier finding, suggesting that size is an important explanatory variable of long-run post-
merger performance. Finally, we examine each calendar year to determine if the 
underperformance is concentrated in certain years of the study, and find evidence that 
more recent bank mergers are associated with better performance than earlier mergers. 
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However, the average performance of recent mergers is still worse than that of 
comparably sized banks. 
The reminder of the essay is designed as follows. Section 2.2 reviews related 
literature. Section 2.3 describes the data and methodology. Section 2.4 reports our 
empirical results and section 2.5 concludes.  
2.3 Review of Literature  
 The main reasons for mergers are to improve the financial situation of the 
company concerned and to gain a better position in the market. Banking is becoming an 
increasingly global industry, which knows no geographic and territorial boundaries. The 
trend towards mergers in banking is also affected by unprecedented growth in 
competition, the continued liberalization of capital flows, the integration of national and 
regional financial systems, and financial innovations.,  
 The goals of mergers and acquisitions can be divided into strategic goals, which 
cannot be quantified as a rule, and to quantifiable financial goals, primarily to economies 
on costs. Other reasons for bank mergers are to extend the range of products and services, 
increase the market share, diversification of risks and geographic diversification. 
The bulk of the empirical studies of the impact of bank mergers on bank 
performance can broadly be classified into two broad categories. The first group can be 
found in the banking literature, and comprises what are called “event studies” or ex ante 
studies, which try to assess the bank merger performance indirectly by analyzing the 
reactions of the stock market to merger announcements. The second group consists of 
studies that pursue a direct assessment by analyzing the effects of bank mergers on real 
firm performance in as far as this can be gauged from internally generated accounting 
 54
data, or so called ex post studies. Ex post studies measure bank performance mainly by 
comparing various financial ratios before and after mergers. Comparing the performance 
with a relevant control group of banks typically assesses the rates of success or failure. 
 The “event studies“ generally assume that stock markets are efficient, meaning 
that changes in the share prices of the banks involved, after controlling for market 
movements in general and systematic risk, represent the value of the event.  In this case, 
the market model is typically used to calculate the expected returns for the bank in 
question. Systematic changes on the residuals (abnormal returns) from the market model 
around the event will then show the effects of a merger. An alternative method of 
examining merger benefits is the use of operating performance measures. Operating 
performance is measured by comparing the performance banks, based on accounting 
data, before and after mergers relative to a relevant control group to determine whether 
mergers results in gains. Merger performance studies reflect the interest in cost cutting 
and efficiency in the banking industry, particularly through merger. 
Evidence from a large number of studies analyzing short-term stock reactions to 
bank merger announcements indicates that they do not create value for the combined firm 
and that a target bank’s shareholders benefit, and a bidding bank’s shareholders generally 
lose or break even. Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001) and Becher (2000) report that 
target shareholders gain at the expense of bidder shareholders.14 However, these authors 
find that bank mergers in the 1990s create value for the combined firms. The studies of 
the short-term reactions to bank mergers in the 1980s show mixed results (James and 
Weir, 1987; Neely, 1987, and Cornet and De, 1991). In general, the only consensus result 
of this research is that bidders gain around merger announcements. It is noteworthy that 
                                                                                          
14 In that targets gain while bidders lose. 
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Madura and Wiant (1994) are the only researchers that study abnormal returns of 
acquirers over a lengthy period following the merger. They find that average cumulative 
abnormal returns of acquirers, in a sample of 152 acquisitions taking place between 1983 
and 1987, were negative during the 36-month period following the merger 
announcement. Additionally, abnormal returns were negative in nearly every month. 
Acquirer losses around the time of the announcement may reflect a loss of wealth from 
an overly generous merger price. Negative abnormal returns in months after the 
announcement, however, are not likely to be due to the price. They seem more 
attributable to either the merger achieving fewer benefits than projected, or the market 
revising downward its expectations for the merger.  
A common justification for bank mergers is that they reduce costs and improve 
operating efficiency, which in turn increases shareholder returns. However, the empirical 
studies in the existing research on bank mergers do not support this claim. Much of this 
work shows that bank mergers do not improve bank-operating performance. For example, 
Berger and Humphrey (1992) and Rhoades (1994) find that there is basically no cost 
efficiency improvements associated with banks mergers. Almost all of the studies that 
find no gain in efficiency also find no improvement in profitability, if they include both 
measures. In contrast, the studies that report at least some evidence of performance 
improvement do not obtain consistent efficiency and profitability results, or they are 
unique in some respect, or both. For Example, Frieder and Apilado (1993) analyze a 
profitability measure but not an efficiency measure, and the profitability measure is based 
on differences between actual and hypothetical net income.  Spindt and Tarhan (1992) 
find some improvement in return on equity (ROE) from bank mergers but no significant 
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improvement in return on assets (ROA) or cost efficiency. Corentt and Tehranian (1992) 
compare pre-merger and post-merger performance of thirty large bank holding companies 
occurring between 1982 and 1987. They find that cash flow returns, relative to a national 
group of publicly traded banks that did not engage in merger activity, improve following 
mergers. They also find that ROE improves, but not ROA. Spong and Shoenhair (1992) 
find evidence of an improvement in overhead cost efficiency following bank mergers but 
generally no improvement in ROA or ROE. On the other hand, Peristiani (1993) finds 
some improvement in ROA following mergers but generally no improvement in cost 
ratios and efficiency measures. Spindt and Tarhan (1993) find that mergers do exhibit 
operating gains, but their results may be due to primarily economies of scale.15 
 The work of Linder and Crane (1992) is also noteworthy. They analyze the 
operating performance of 47 bank-level interstate mergers that took place in New 
England between 1982 and 1987. Of the 47 mergers in the sample, 25 were 
consolidations of subsidiaries owned by the same holding company. The authors 
aggregate bidder and target data one year before the merger and compare it to 
performance one and two years after the merger. The performance of merged banks is 
adjusted by the performance of all non-merging banks in the same state as the merging 
entities. Their results show that mergers do not result in improved operating income, as 
measured by net interest income plus net non-interest income to assets. 
 More recently, Rohades (1998) compares bank profitability ratios, such as ROA 
or ROE before and after mergers relative to peer groups of banks that did not engage in 
mergers. He finds improved profitability ratios associated with bank mergers. On the 
                                                                                          
15 It is unclear whether their results are applicable to large mergers which are mot strongly transforming the 
banking industry. 
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other hand, others find no improvements in these ratios ( Pilloff, 1996, Akhavein, Berger, 
and Humphrey,1997).  
Another possible motivation behind bank mergers is diversification. Akhavien et 
al. (1997) report that during periods of industry consolidation, diversification is 
beneficial. Mergers may produce wealth gains even without increasing cost efficiency by 
diversification. Berger (1998) finds that bank mergers serve to diversify banks, thereby 
allowing them to take on more investment risk for a given level of firm risk. However, 
there is no evidence of a link between this incremental diversification and increased 
shareholder returns. Overall, the operating performance studies provide substantial 
evidence that bank mergers do not generally yield performance improvement, in terms of 
either profitability or cost efficiency.  
2.4 Data and Methodology 
This section describes the data and methodology used in this study. The merger 
data come from the M&A database of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
tapes. To create a sample of mergers during the 1985-1999 period, all firms from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes that have a delist code in 200s 
(merger) or 300s (exchange) were selected. To focus on banks, all firms with three-digit 
SIC codes of 602 (banks) or 671 (holding companies) were chosen. The cut-off year of 
1999 is necessary because at least three years of stock return and accounting data should 
be available for each merger. This resulted in preliminary sample of 1323 bank mergers. 
A merger included in the final sample is required to meet the following criteria: 
(a) both of the merged banks must be traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
the American Stock Exchange (AMSE), and Nasdaq daily tapes, (b) data for all of the 
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ratios are available, (c) a single target bank is acquired in the same merger application, 
(d) both of the merged banks did not engage in another merger three years before or after 
the merger date. (e) the merger is not assisted by a bank regulator,  (f) the target does not 
involve a failed bank, and finally (g) the merger must occur before 1999. The first 
criterion eliminates all failed-bank mergers and government assisted bank mergers. The 
second and third filters allow us to compare the three-year pre- and post-merger 
performance without the contamination of another merger, also ensuring the availability 
of banking data for at least two years before the merger date. Finally, we exclude the 
most recent mergers that do not have at least three years of reported data after the merger 
date. This process results in a sample of 662 bank mergers. The financial data used to 
calculate the performance measures for both merged banks and the non-merged banks are 
collected from COMPUSTAT data tape and the report of the Reports of Condition and 
Income Report database (Call Report) on the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s web 
page.16 
Table 2.1 
Descriptive statistics for selected variables 
 Acquirer Bank 
Variable  
(million of dollars) 
Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Market value of equity 7,210 11,652 11 165,223 
Assets 18,905 38,107 244 214,482 
 Target Bank 
Market value of equity 2,734 4,523 5 38,629 
Assets 
Value of transaction 
3,286 
326 
7,448 
910 
85 
2 
67,095 
13 
                                                                                          
16 www.frbchi.org 
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Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for selected variables to our bank mergers 
sample. As the table shows, the book value of total assets and the market value of equity 
are expressed in 1999 dollars using the consumer price index. The average value of bank 
mergers is $326 million. The mean asset value of the acquiring banks is $18,905 million 
and of the targets is $3,286 million. The mean market value of equity of the acquiring 
banks is 7,210 and of the targets is 2,734 
 Our first approach is the operating performance, which permits us to focus 
specifically on profit, costs, and efficiency. To this end, we analyze changes in 
accounting profits rates and cost ratios. The financial performances of bank mergers are 
analyzed over 3-year period pre- and post the merger. The year of the merger is excluded 
from the analysis, because it is affected by one-time merger costs incurred during that 
year.17   Financial performance is measured through the following three ratios; return on 
assets, return on equity, and cost efficiency ratio. We use the following definitions for 
this study: 
Return on Assets (ROA): net income as percentage of total assets. 
Return on Equity (ROE): net income as a percentage of average common shareholder’s 
equity. 
Cost Efficiency Ratio (CER): non-interest expenses divided by total assets. 
ROA is an indicator of profitability and a good overall indicator a banking 
organization’s performance. This ratio shows the ability of a bank to generate profits 
from the assets at its disposal.18  ROE is used as an alternative measure of profitability 
                                                                                          
17 Therefore, including the year of the merger makes it hard to compare with results for other years. 
18 ROA is biased upward for some banks due to profits generated from off-balance sheet operations (see 
Rhoades, 1998). 
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and reflects the return to owners’ investment. CER is a measure of cost control and is 
perceived as important to find whether bank mergers result cost savings from the merger.  
Our second approach utilizes stock return data to measure the long-run 
performance bank mergers. To this end, two measures are used: (1) 5-year buy and hold 
returns for both the merged bank and a set of matching banks and (2) Fama and French 
three-factor model. Also, three benchmarks are used to calculate excess stock returns. 
The first benchmark is the CRSP value-weighted NYSE-Amex-Nasdaq index. The 
second benchmark is a non-merger bank index, created by equally weighting all NYSE, 
Amex, and Nasdaq firms that meet the following restrictions: a Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code of 602 (banks) or 671 holding companies, listed on CRSP for at 
least three years before entering the universe. The third measure of excess return is the 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor time-series regression model. Buy-and-hold returns 
calculations start on the second CRSP-listed day for the sample and end (at the lower 
limit) on the five-year anniversary date of the merger or else the firm's delisting date. 
 Researchers have employed two distinct methodologies when examining the long-
run performance of firms (see Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999)).19 One method involves 
careful construction of a "peer" portfolio that is similar to sample firms in all-important 
respects, except for the fact that the peer portfolio did not experience the event under 
study. Then buy and hold returns for each firm's subsequent holding period are averaged 
(or equally-weighted in the portfolio). 
 As matter of fact, buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) have become the 
standard method of measuring long-run abnormal returns (see Barber and Lyon (1997)). 
BHARs measure the average multi-year return from a strategy of investing in all firms 
                                                                                          
19 Loughran and Vijh (1997) use this methodology to analyze the long-run performance of acquisitions. 
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that complete an event and selling at the end of a pre-specified holding period versus a 
comparable strategy using otherwise non-event firms. Stated differentially, BHARs 
permit easy comparisons with earlier analyses of the long-run wealth effects following 
other financing events. In addition, BHARs measure an investor's experience if s/he were 
to try to profit from expected performance (Barber and Lyon (1997)). 
 Following Ritter (1991) and others, we define five-year holding period returns as 
follows:  
  )itr1(
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where itr is the raw return on firm i in event month t. This measures (HPR) the total 
returns from a buy-and-hold strategy where a stock is purchased at the first closing 
market price after engage the merger announcement and held until the earlier of (i) its 5-
year anniversary, or (ii) its delisiting. In order to evaluate the holding period returns of 
bank mergers, a comparison with the matched banks’ return is made. More specifically, 
we compute holding-period returns for each bank engaged in a merger and each of its 
matched control banks over a three- and a five-year period following the announcement 
date. Finally, as in Ritter (1991), we compute the wealth relative as a performance 
measure, defined as 
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where the average five-year total return is given by 
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We measure buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns (BHAR) as 
 BHAR = HPR (merged banks) – HPR (matched banks)        (2.4) 
Thus, a wealth relative less than one is evidence that the portfolio of banks conducting 
mergers has under-performed the portfolio of matched banks; a wealth relative of greater 
than one can be interpreted as the bank merger sample outperforming a portfolio of a 
matched banks. Wealth relatives based on three-year returns are also calculated. 
 An alternative to the control portfolio method inspired by Fama and French 
(1993) has been employed in several empirical studies.20 Specifically, Fama and French 
(1993) find out that a three-factor model may explain the cross-section of stock returns 
better than other proposed models. The intercept term from estimated regression 
equations containing the three Fama-French risk factors should be statistically 
insignificant in the absence of any abnormal long-run performance. 
 The three-factor model offers the advantage that it does not require size or book-
to-market data for sample firms. Removing this requirement has two implications. First, 
firms without available data on market value of equity or book-to-market ratio can be 
included on the analysis. Second, some large firms or firms with low book-to-market 
ratios my in fact have common stock returns that more closely mimic those of small firms 
or firms with high book-to-market ratios. The three-factor model allows for this 
possibility since the patterns of returns, rather than the explicit measurement of size or 
book-to-market, determines whether the returns on a firm's common stock more closely 
mimic the returns of small firms and/or high book-to-market firms. 
                                                                                          
20 See Loughran and Ritter (1995), Brave and Compers (1997), and Buttimer et al (2001). 
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We follow Fama and French (1993) and adopt a three- factor model to examine 
the long-term performance following the bank's announcement of a merger. The model is 
specified as follows: 
 
 
ptεtHML3βtSMB2β)ftRmtR(1βαftRpt
R +++−+=−    (2.5) 
where ptR  is the return of bank p's stock on date t, assumed to be normally distributed;. 
ftR  is the risk-free interest rate on date t, typically using the 3-month T-bill rate in 
month t; 
mtR  is the market return on date t, using the return to the CRSP value-weighted 
composite market index. 
tSMB  is the monthly difference in returns between a group of small firms and a group of 
large ones; 
tHML  is the monthly difference in returns between firms with high book-to-market and 
low book-to-market firms; 
ptε  is an error term. 
tSMB  is intended to capture a size effect, and tHML is intended to capture a book-to 
market effect.21 Fama-French regression models are estimated for the full sample. This 
regression yields parameter estimates of 3β and ,2β,1β,α . The parameter of interest in 
this regression is the intercept α . A significant intercept term in (2.5) implies that 
abnormal returns are associated with the event analyzed. We estimate this Fama-French 
regression using two alternative portfolio-weighting schemes: value-weighting firms' 
                                                                                          
21 For a more detailed discussion of HML and MB see Fama and French (1993). 
 64
returns and equally-weighting. Previous researchers have observed that variation in the 
number of firms included in a different month's portfolio may cause heteroskeasastic 
residuals in (2.5). We address this concern by reporting OLS and weighted least squares 
(WLS) coefficient estimates, where the WLS weights equal the square root of the number 
of firms in the portfolio for that month. 
2.5 Results  
2.5.1 Long-run operating performance 
 The most frequently cited motivation for bank mergers is that they improve 
performance by cutting costs. In order to examine this issue, we collect accounting data 
for the mergers sample for a period three-years before and after the merger. To measure 
pre-merger performance, accounting data for the acquiring and acquired banks is 
combined to find pro forma performance for the merged firms. More specifically, for the 
year before merger, we find the weighted-sum of the ex ante accounting data of the 
acquiring and the acquired bank. The weights used are based on total assets for the 
acquiring and acquired banks before the mergers.22 Our main objective is to measure the 
impact of bank mergers on the performance of the combined firms. To this end, we 
compare the ROA, ROE, and CER ratios in the year preceding the merger with each of 
the three years following the merger, excluding the merger year itself, for the bidder and   
the acquired bank. Because some of the difference between pre- and post-merger 
performance may be due to economy-wide or industry factors, we use a control group of 
non-merged banks (matched bank). The non-merged banks are defined as banks 
                                                                                          
22 The weights are the relative sizes (measured by total assets) of the two banks at the beginning of each 
year. 
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comparable in terms of size, which is measured by total assets. This accounts for different 
market circumstances (or industry trends).   
To measure the post-merger changes in bank operating performance, we compare 
the post-merger performance of the merged bank relative to its control group of similar 
sized banks with pre-merger performance of the merged banks to the peer group. Thus, 
we define change in relative operating performance for the ith bank merger as: 
][][ PeerBBi
Peer
AAi RRRRR −−−=∆     (2.6) 
where R∆  is the difference between pre-merger and post-merger, subscript A stands for 
after-merger and subscript B stands for before-merger. The absolute performances of 
each peer group ( PeerR ) are the average across all banks in the group of the three-year 
mean of the performance measure before and after the merger. For the merged banks, the 
absolute performance measures ( iR ) are the three-year mean of the performance variable 
before and after the merger year. It is important to note that subtracting the absolute 
performance of the peer group from that of the merged banks produces the relative 
performance of the merged banks before and after the merger. Additionally, subtracting 
the relative performance of the merged banks before the merger from its relative 
performance after the merger yields the changes in relative operating performances. A 
positive ROA∆  and ROE∆  indicate large profitability is achieved following merger, 
while negative CER∆  indicates cost saving is achieved after the merger. 
2.5.1.1 Return on assets (ROA)  
The pre-merger and post-merger return on assets (ROA) for the merged banks is reported 
in Panel A of Table 2.2.  
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Table 2.2 
Pre-merger, post-merger, and changes in performance for merging banks 
  1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 Full Sample 
Panel A: ROA(%)      
  All mergers 
Pre-merger  0.06 0.11*** 0.17* 0.083 
Post-merger  0.08 0.15 0.23** 0.159** 
Difference  0.02 0.40 0.06* 0.076 
  Large mergers 
Pre-merger  0.11 0.04 0.10 0.072* 
Post-merger  0.07* 0.05 0.12 0.66 
Difference  -0.04 0.01*** 0.01 0.584 
  Small mergers 
Pre-merger  0.14 0.17* 0.19 0.171 
Post-merger  0.22 .042 0.28** 0.193 
Difference  0.08 0.25 0.09 0.022 
Panel B: ROE (%)      
  All mergers 
Pre-merger  -1.09 -0.80 -1.40 -1.86* 
Post-merger  1.24 1.85 2.3 1.75 
Difference  2.33*** 2.65* 3.70** 3.61*** 
  Large mergers 
Pre-merger  -0.06 -0.44* -2.30 -0.95 
Post-merger  1.93** 1.58 0.16 1.34* 
Difference  1.99 2.02** 2.46** 2.25*** 
  Small mergers 
Pre-merger  -0.02 0.01 -0.033 -0.021 
Post-merger  0.51 0.85 1.407 0.938 
Difference  0.53 0.84*** 1.44* 0.959** 
Panel C: CER (%)      
  All mergers 
Pre-merger  -0.05** -0.07** -0.28* -0.123 
Post-merger  -0.14* -1.17** -1.62* -0.984** 
Difference  -0.09 -1.10 -1.34** -0.861 
  Large mergers 
Pre-merger  -0.03* -0.01** -0.33** -0.145 
Post-merger  -0.27 -0.19 -1.07 -0.570 
Difference  -0.24 -0.18 -0.74*** -0.425 
  Small merger 
Pre-merger  -0.12* -0.38** -0.18* -0.233*** 
Post-merger  -1.78* -2.22* -1.24** -1.759 
Difference  -1.66 -1.84** -1.06* -1.526 
      
(*,**,***) Differences are significantly different from zero at the 10%5%(1%) level, respectively. 
 Notes: Before the merger, performance measures for the merged bank are weighted averages of target and 
acquirer values, with the weights being the relative size of the two banks. All performance measures 
control for size. Mean differences are the mean values of pair-wise differences in the pre- and post-merger 
period means.  
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As we can see from this Panel, there is improvement on ROA following the mergers for 
the entire sample of 0.076%. This improvement, however, is not statistically different 
from zero. This finding suggests that mergers are not associated with significant change 
in return on assets (ROA), implying that managers are unable to generate benefits from 
bank mergers. To measure the effects of bank mergers over time and to examine the more 
recent mergers in particular, changes are calculated for three time periods: 1985-1989, 
1990-1994, and 1995-1999. For the three periods, there are 119, 198, and 345 banks, 
respectively. In the 1985-1989 period, during the three years before the mergers the 
sample mean return on assets (ROA) is 0.06% above the peer group, and for the three 
years after the mergers, it is 0.08% above the peer group. Although this result shows the 
merged banks outperforming the peer group, the increase (0.02%) is not statistically 
significant from zero. A similar result is found when examining pre- and post-ROA 
merger for the period 1990-1994, indicating ROA is unaffected by merger activity, as 
ROA shows no significant improvement. Our findings are consistent with those reported 
by Cornett and Tehranian (1992) and Pilloff (1996). On the other hand, we notice that 
there is significant improvement in ROA in the 1995-1999 period. The pre-ROA was 
0.17% and rose to 0.23% after the mergers. The difference (0.06%) is significantly 
different from zero. The results for the 1995-1999 mergers suggest that recent banks 
mergers seem to be more profitable than earlier bank mergers. 
2.5.1.2 Return on equity (ROE) 
 Our second measure of profitability is return on equity (ROE). Panel B of Table 
2.2 shows that, following bank merger, there is statistically significant improvement in 
ROE.  All of the entries in Panel B are positive, reflecting strong performance of the 
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mean sample bank relative to the peer group. This result is consistent with those of 
Cornett and Tehranian (1992). However, it contrasts with those reported by Pilloff 
(1996). Table B also details our results over the same three time periods used for ROA.  
For the 1985-1989 period, the pre-ROE was -1.09% and rose to 1.24% after the merger. 
For the 1990-1994 period, the pre-ROE was -0.80% and rose to 1.85% after the merger. 
As for the 1995-1999 period, the pre-ROE was –1.40% and rose to 2.3% after the merger. 
Clearly, ROE tends to increase significantly following mergers. Another interesting 
finding in this table is that banks engaged in mergers are, on average, under-performing 
the peer group before the merger and outperforming it after the merger. This indicates 
that mergers are able to improve ROE, and it may imply that profitable motivations are 
driving bank mergers. 
2.5.1.3 Efficiency ratio (CER) 
Following Cornett and Tehranian (1992) and Rhoades (1998), we examine an 
operating cost ratio that excludes interest expenses. Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) 
argue that cost ratios do not control for input prices, and so a reduction in costs per unit 
of output or assets can reflect either lower interest expenses due to increased market 
power in setting deposit interest rates or greater efficiency in input usage. They suggest 
that cost ratios that exclude interest expenses are not subject to this problem.23 Therefore, 
we use cost efficiency in terms of non-interest expenses divided by total assets.  
Panel C of Table 2.2 shows pre-merger and post-merger cost ratios as well as 
changes in cost ratio for the overall period and the three time periods. As we can see from 
this table, there is no significant improvement in this ratio for the entire sample. Also, 
there are decreases of 0.09%, 1.1%, and 1.3% in the ratio of non-interest expenses to total 
                                                                                          
23 For more details about the drawback of other ratios see Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999). 
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assets for the 1985-1989, 1990-1994, and 1995-1999 time period, respectively. However, 
only the decrease of 1.3% is significantly different from zero, suggesting improved 
efficiency in the 1995-1999 period. For the 1985-1989 and 1990-1994 periods, cost ratios 
indicate that the merged banks do no better or worse than the peer group in controlling 
their non-interest expenses as percentage of total assets. This finding is comparable to the 
results obtained by Cornett and Tehranian (1992). The results presented in this table also 
confirm our earlier findings reported in Panel A using ROA, suggesting that recent banks 
mergers seem to be more efficient than earlier bank mergers. 
It is worth noting that before the mergers the sample mean cost ratio (non-interest 
expenses to total assets) is below the peer group, and after the mergers it is also below the 
peer group. However, looking at the change in the cost ratio, it is not clear that mergers 
result in significant efficiency except for the recent mergers. 
2.5.1.4 Small mergers versus large mergers 
In sections 3.1, we examined pre-merger and post-merger performance, as well as 
changes in operating performance for the 1985-1989, 1990-1994, and 1995-1999 periods 
and for the full sample. In order to find whether the size of the mergers affects our 
results, we analyze our results separately for large mergers and small mergers. Ratios of 
firms both before and after the merger are computed relative to the peer group in order to 
assess performance changes.  
Panel A of Table 2.2 shows that profitability in terms of ROA is largely unrelated to 
size. There is no systematic pattern in the size distribution of the average ROA ratios. 
Surprisingly, this is not the case for ROE. There is some evidence that size may matter as 
we see the distribution of the ROE ratios in Panel B of Table 2.2 Small bank mergers 
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appear to be less profitable, especially relative to group of largest banks in the respective 
subsamples. Mergers of large banks achieved higher improvements in ROE compared to 
small bank mergers. There is significant increase in ROE of 2.25% following large 
mergers. When we examine large merger across three time periods, we find that they 
achieved 1.93%, 2.02%, and 2.46% improvement for the 1985-1989,1990-1994, and 
1995-1999 periods, respectively. In the case of small bank mergers, improvements were 
much smaller, averaging around 0.94% for the 1985-1989, 1990-1994, and 1995-1999 
periods. Possible explanations are that very small banks rely on a limited range of 
products to generate revenues and/or have less market power than their larger 
competitors.  
In the case of cost efficiency ratio (CER, Panel C), merged banks seem to have 
increased their cost efficiency in the years after the mergers (only for 1995-1999 period). 
This is especially true when the deal occurred between two small banks. Mergers in 
which small banks are involved show large cost savings compared with the large bank 
mergers. This sounds intuitively correct, as it is easier to implement cost savings when 
the overall size of the new banks remains manageable. 
2.5.1.5 Cross -sectional analysis of ratio changes 
 Post-merger performance may be influenced by the pre-merger performance of 
either the acquirer or target or the relative difference in acquirer and target bank 
performance. For example, an efficient acquirer may think that it has superior managerial 
capabilities and thus look for poor performing targets to which its superior management 
skills may be applied. On the other hand, a weakly performing acquirer may try to find a 
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merger partner (target) and use the merger as the channel to overcome managerial 
ineffectiveness and improve its functions.  
Table 2.3 
Correlations of performance changes with pre-merger performance variables 
 ),( WRRCorr ∆ ),( WARRCorr ∆  ),( WTRRCorr ∆
Ratio (R) (1985-1989) 
ROA=Net Income/Total Assets 0.119 -0.234* 0.475*** 
ROE= Net Income/Total Equity  0.247 -0.215** 0.469*** 
CER=Non-interest Expense/Total 
Assets 
0.263 0.152 -0.228** 
 (1990-1994) 
ROA=Net Income/Total Assets 0.228 -0.184* 0.323** 
ROE= Net Income/Total Equity  0.349 -0.146** 0.277** 
CER=Non-interest Expense/Total 
Assets 
0.161 -0.135 -0.169* 
 (1995-1999) 
ROA=Net Income/Total Assets -0.065 -0.93 0.283* 
ROE= Net Income/Total Equity  0.155 -1.05** 0.160** 
CER=Non-interest Expense/Total 
Assets 
0.072 -0.057 -0.029 
 Full sample 
ROA=Net Income/Total Assets 0.315 -0.131* 0.479*** 
ROE= Net Income/Total Equity  0.058 -0307 0.463*** 
CER=Non-interest Expense/Total 
Assets 
0.262 -0.154 0.180. 
Note: The term R∆ is the difference between pre-merger and post-merger ratio. The term WR  is the 
weighted difference between acquirer and target ratio. The term WAR  is the weighted measure of acquirer 
pre-merger ratio, and WTR  is the weighted measure of target pre-merger ratio. All ratios are control for size. 
*,**,*** indicate significant at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 72
In other words, mergers may be used to discipline inefficient managers. According to 
Berger (1998) the merger enables banks to wake-up management or the merger may be 
an excuse to restructure both partners (acquirer and target). 
To examine whether merger-related improvements are influenced by a merger 
partner’s characteristics, correlations between pre-merger characteristics with changes in 
post-merger performance are analyzed. Table 2.3 reveals our results that show the 
relationships between acquirer and target pre-merger ratio and the merger-related changes 
in those same ratios. As we notice from Table 2.3 (the second column), the 
WWW CERROEROA ,,  ratios (the relative difference in acquirer and target ratios) have 
littlie influence on changes in post-merger performance 
as ),(),,( WW ROEROECorrROAROACorr ∆∆ , and ),( WCERCERCorr ∆ are statistically 
insignificant. This finding is comparable with those reported by Berger and Humhrey 
(1992) and Pilloff (1996) who examine the relationship between acquirer-target 
differences and changes in post-merger performance.24  
The results in column (3) suggest that acquirer pre-merger ROA, and ROE ratios 
are correlated to post-merger changes. The correlation between WAROA  ( WAROE ) and 
their respective ROA∆ ratios are significantly negative, suggesting that mergers are 
associated with profitability losses when acquirer profitability is high and therefore 
contributing to such losses. Stated differently, the greater the acquirer’s profitability, the 
more negative the merger’s earnings impact is.  On the other hand, a positive correlation 
exists between WTROA ( WTROE ) and ROA∆ (column 4), implying that targets with high 
profitability are associated with high post-merger gains. Lastly, there is some evidence of 
                                                                                          
24 Their sample was limited to banks with assets over $1 billion. 
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a greater efficiency gain the larger the targets expense ratio is, as ),( WTCERCERCorr ∆ is 
significantly negative. In other words, the high-cost targets are associated with reduced 
expenses. 
2.5.1.6 Performance changes with size 
 Pilloff (1996) hypothesizes that performance changes may be related to both size 
and relative size of acquirer and target. To test the influence of a merger partner’s size, 
correlations between changes in performance measures (ratios) and the target’s and 
acquirer’s size, and their relative size are examined in Table 2.4.  Interestingly, 
ROA∆ and ROE∆ (changes in profitability) are positively related to the target size 
(column 3), while the acquirer’s profit characteristic is positive but insignificant (column 
2). This result implies that the profits are more likely to increase when the target is larger. 
The results in column (4) suggest that the larger the relative size of the target is, the more 
likely profit is to increase. Collectively, these findings indicate that large targets are 
associated with greater merger gains. Our results are comparable with those reported by 
Pilloff (1996). 
2.5.1.7 Summary of long-run operating performance 
 Before-and-after merger comparisons are unambiguously favorable with ROE 
ratio, which is always higher after merger than it is before. This result indicates that bank 
mergers increase profitability in terms of return on equity (ROE). The comparisons are 
unfavorable with return on assets ratio (ROA), showing insignificant improvement in the 
1985-1989 and 1990-1994 periods. However, ROA increased significantly following the 
1995-1999 period, suggesting that recent banks mergers seem to be more profitable 
(ROA) than earlier bank mergers. The mixed results obtained using profitability ratios 
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(ROA, ROE) is consistent with those reported by Cornett and Tehranian (1992). They 
argue that such findings may indicate that improvement in accounting measures of 
profitability surrounding the merger may be due to management’s choice of debt versus 
equity financing rather than the more efficient management of assets.  
Table 2.4 
Correlations of performance changes with size and relative size 
Ratio Change  ),( ASIZERCorr ∆ ),( TSIZERCorr ∆ ),( RELSIZERCorr ∆
 (1985-1989) 
ROA∆  0.155 0.119** 0.261* 
 ROE∆  0.148 0.059** 0.349*** 
CER∆  0.081 0.077 -0.311 
 (1990-1994) 
ROA∆  0.199 0.286*** 0.163** 
 ROE∆  0.211 0.356** 0.328** 
CER∆  0.095* -0.018 -0.304 
 (1995-1999) 
ROA∆  0.167 0.233** 0.292* 
 ROE∆  0.133 0.150* 0.445*** 
CER∆  -0.108 -0.220 -0.298 
 Full Sample 
ROA∆  0.237 0.168*** 0.346*** 
 ROE∆  0.225 0.141* 0.220*** 
CER∆  0.039 -0.097 -0.116 
Note: The term R∆ is the difference between pre-merger and post-merger ratio. The terms ASIZE and 
TSIZE are the log of acquirer’s and target’s total assets. Relative size equals target total assets divided by 
target plus acquirer total assets. Total assets are measured at the end of the year before the merger date. 
 is the weighted difference between acquirer and target ratio. All ratios are control for size. 
*,**,*** indicate significant at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
ROA is conventionally considered a better indicator of bank’s efficiency in asset 
management, where as ROE is more directly a measure of return to stockholders. Lastly, 
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before-and-after comparisons are ambiguous with cost ratio measure. Even though there 
is a decrease in this ratio in the 1985-1989, 1990-1994, and 1995-1999 periods, the 
decrease is only statistically significant for 1995-1999 subperiod. This implies only more 
recent bank mergers were able to achieve significant cost cuts. When we analyze our 
results separately for large mergers and small mergers, we find evidence that mergers of 
large banks achieved higher improvements in ROE compared to small bank mergers, 
while mergers in which small banks are involved show large cost savings compared with 
the large bank mergers. Interestingly, we find evidence that large targets are associated 
with more successful mergers. Lastly, we find that the following target banks are likely to 
associate with successful mergers – more profitable targets with higher return on assets 
(ROA) and/or rerun on equity (ROE). 
2.5.2 Long-run stock performance of bank mergers 
 Although the operating performance of bank mergers deteriorates, it might be that 
this performance is anticipated by investors and may already be factored into the stock 
price. We address this issue by examining the long-run stock performance of merged 
banks.  We examine the long-run stock return performance of the mergers in our sample 
two ways. First, we compute the buy-hold-abnormal returns (BHAR) of the merged 
banks relative several benchmarks.25 Second, We use the Fama-French three-factor 
regression model. 
2.5.2.1 BHAR Results 
This section examines the long-run stock performance of merged banks using the 
BHAR technique. Long-run performance is measured by comparing the returns on 
merged banks and returns on a benchmark made up of matched banks over periods of 
                                                                                          
25 BHAR is similar to the measures used in takeover study of Loughran and Vijh (1997). 
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three, and five years. Fama and French (1992) document that firm size may influence 
returns statistics. Therefore, we analyze the long-run stock performance of the aggregate 
bank merger sample after sorting by size. Table 2.5 divides the sample into two groups 
on the basis of median market value. Five-year and three-year buy-and-hold returns are 
calculated over identical time periods for the merger banks and two different 
benchmarks, the -CRSP value- weighted NYSE-Amex-Nasdaq index and the equally-
weighted bank index.  
As shown in Panel A of Table 2.5, for the merged banks, the five-year holding 
period return is 24.5%, while the holding-period return for their peer group is 42.9%. The 
difference in holding-period returns is –18.4% and is significant at the one percent level. 
The significance of the raw and abnormal returns is tested by using t-statistics.26 This 
suggests that the merged banks significantly underperform the CRSP value-weighted 
NYSE-Amex-Nasdaq index over the five-year holding period by -18.4%. It is interesting 
to note that this poor performance can be attributed to the larger banks in the sample, 
which lagged the index by -25.7%. In Panel B, we compare the merger banks to the 
equally weighted bank index. The results still indicate that merged banks significantly 
underperform their peer group. However, the difference in holding-period return is lower 
in this case (-11.3%). Further, the results indicate that the largest banks lagged the bank 
index by -13.7% over the five-year period. Panel C presents three-year buy-and-hold 
returns over identical time periods. As we can observe from this Panel, the three-year 
buy-and-hold return for the merged banks is 15.3% compared to 32.9% for NYSE/ Amex 
value-weighted index, showing significant (at the one percent level) underperformance of 
17.6% over three years.   
                                                                                          
26 These statistics have become the standard in the long-run performance literature since Ritter (1991). 
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Table 2.5 
Average BAHR for bank mergers 
Size group Bank 
mergers 
returns 
Benchmark 
index returns 
Excess 
returns 
(t-statistic) 
Panel A : Five-year BAHR, benchmark is value weighted NYSE-Amex-
Nasdaq index 
All Banks 24.5% 42.9% -18.4% (-2.17) 
Small 35.8% 43.4% -7.6% (-0.52) 
Large 15.6% 41.3% -25.7% (-2.92) 
Difference    -1.89 
Panel B : Five-year BAHR, benchmark is equally weighted bank index 
All banks 22.5% 27.3% -4.8% (-1.45) 
Small 35.8% 39.5% -3.7% (0.32) 
Large 15.6% 35.2% -19.6% (-1.96) 
Difference    -2.04 
Panel C: Three-year BAHR, benchmark is value weighted NYSE-Amex- 
Nasdaq index 
All Banks 15.3% 32.9% -17.6% (-3.19) 
Small 26.7% 41.5% -14.6% (-0.82) 
Large 18.6% 39.4% -20.8% (-3.92) 
Difference    -2.08 
Panel D: Three-year BAHR, benchmark is equally weighted bank index 
All banks 15.3% 26.6% -11.3% (-1.21) 
Small 26.7% 34.8% -8.1% (0.55) 
Large 18.6% 32.3% -13.7% (-2.93) 
Difference     -2.56 
 
The results indicate that stockholders of the merged banks suffer statistically significant 
wealth loss of about 17.6% over the three years following the merger completion. 
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Consistent with our finding in Panels A and B, the poor performance can be attributed to 
the larger banks in the sample, which lagged the index by -20.8%. In Panel D of this 
table, we compare the merger banks to the equally weighted bank index. The results still 
indicate that merged banks significantly underperform their peer group. However, the 
difference in holding-period return is lower in this case (-11.3%). Further, the results 
indicate that the largest banks lagged the bank index by -13.7% over the five-year period. 
Table 2.6 
Long-run stock returns of bank mergers, relative alternative benchmarks 
 
Benchmarks Bank 
mergers 
returns 
Benchmark 
index returns 
Abnormal 
return 
Wealth 
relative 
Panel A : Equal weighted buy-and-hold returns (%) 
CRSP VW 35.24 65.26 -30.02 0.82 
CRSP EW 35.24 60.84 -25.60 0.84 
NYSE-Amex-
Nasdaq VW 
35.24 58.62 -23.38 0.85 
Matched banks 35.24 46.95 -11.71 0.92 
Panel B :  Value weighted buy-and-hold returns (%) 
CRSP VW 50.10 67.32 -17.22 0.90 
CRSP EW 50.10 63.46 -13.36 0.92 
NYSE-Amex-
Nasdaq VW 
50.10 59.37 -9.27 0.94 
Matched banks 50.10 70.33 -20.20 0.88 
Note: wealth relative =(1+average five-year total return on merged banks) /(1+average five-year  
total return on matched banks). 
 
 Table 2.6 presents the long-run performance for the sample of bank mergers from 
an event time strategy in which each merger constitutes an event. In panel A, we weight 
the returns of the bank mergers and their benchmarks equally. One of our metrics to 
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measure abnormal returns is the wealth relative. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess 
and Affleck-Graves (1995) calculate wealth relatives for the five year period by taking 
the ratio of one plus the equal-weighted return on the bank merger portfolio over one plus 
the equal weighted return on the chosen benchmark. Wealth relatives greater than one 
imply that merged banks have higher returns than their matching banks, while wealth 
relatives less than one imply underperformance by the merged banks compared to their 
matching banks. As we can see in panel A (Table 2.6), the five-year wealth relative is 
less than 1.0 for all benchmarks, ranging from 0.82 to 0.92. The five-year excess returns 
are all negative, anywhere from -11.71% versus matched banks (peer) to -30.02% versus 
the CRPS value-weighted index. Stated differently, the average holding-period return for 
bank mergers is 35.24%, while the average holding-period return for their industry-and-
size matched counterparts is 46.24%. This 11% difference is statistically significant at the 
0.01 level using a paired t-test (t = 4.82). As alternative measure of long-run performance 
for merged banks, the five-year wealth relative, gives similar findings. The wealth 
relative for year 5 is 0.92 indicating substantial merged banks underperform the matched 
bank control group. Stated differently, a strategy of investing in banks engaged in merger 
at the close of trading on the day of the merger and holding them for five years would 
have left the investor with only 92.0 cents relative to each dollar invested in size matched 
banks that did not engage in merger. 
Panel B presents value-weighted results for our sample. In panel B value 
weighting reduces, but does not eliminate, underperformance. Wealth relatives are now 
between 0.88 and 0.94 and the excess return is between -9.27% and -20.20%. It is 
noteworthy that the average holding-period return for bank mergers is 50.10%, while the 
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average holding-period return for their book-to-market-and-size matched counterparts is 
70.30%. This 20.20% difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level using a paired 
t-test (t = 5.77). Value-weighted results (Panel B) show that holding this investment for 
five years would have left the investor with only 88.0 cents relative to each dollar from 
investment in similar non-bank mergers. 
Recent studies of bank mergers such as Becher (2000) and Houston et.al. (1994) 
find that bank mergers create value for the combined firms, with a statistically significant 
positive mean. In other words, the announcement of bank mergers has positive impact on 
shareholder wealth of the combined firm. Unlike the announcement period literature, our 
findings indicate that there is significantly negative long-run impact on shareholder 
wealth. In other words, long-run stock returns do not improve following bank mergers. 
An important aspect of our findings is that the market may overreact at the time of the 
announcement.  As a result, we argue that prior studies that focus on return at the time of 
announcement may be inadequate, and it may be necessary to examine performance over 
an extended period following the merger to determine the full impact of that merger. 
2.5.2.2   Fama-French three factor model 
In order to ascertain that our long-run abnormal returns are not the products of a 
mis-specified methodology, we apply the Fama and Frecnch (1993) three-factor model.  
The Fama and French three-factor time-series model has gained acceptance in the 
literature as a benchmark measure of abnormal returns. Therefore, as additional of 
robustness, we provide the results for this regression in Table 2.10. Table 2.10 reports the 
results of the Fama-French three-factor regressions on monthly returns for merged bank 
in their first five years after merging. We report OLS estimations for both value-weighted 
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and equal-weighted portfolio returns. Since the number of firms in monthly portfolio 
varies over time, we also control for potentially heteroskedastic residuals by undertaking 
weighted least squares (WLS) estimation. Recall that the intercept )α( from this 
regression measures abnormal returns.  
Table 2.7 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor regression on monthly returns for bank 
mergers (five years following merger) 
   
Regression coefficient α  1β  2β  3β  Adjusted 
2R  
Panel A: Ordinary lest squares regressions (OLS) 
Value-weighted sample -0.038*** 1.20*** 0.34*** 0.11* 0.674 
(t-statistics) (-2.72) (32.45) (3.62) (1.83)  
      
Equal-weighted sample -0.085*** 1.06*** 1.34*** 0.22** 0.791 
(t-statistics) (-3.32) (16.12) (8.23) (2.42)  
      
Panel B: Weighted least squares regressions (WLS) 
Value-weighted sample -0.057** 1.15*** 0.38*** 0.90** 0.803 
(t-statistics) (-3.24) (32.35) (4.04) (2.32)  
      
Equal-weighted sample -0.096** 1.35*** 0.91*** 0.34** 0.845 
(t-statistics) (-5.21) (19.07) (9.06) (2.63)  
*,**, and *** denote significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 Table 2.7 reports that our sample bank mergers' estimated intercepts are all 
significantly negative. Intercepts for both equal-weighted and value-weighted samples are 
significantly negative. Value-weighting the merger banks' subsequent returns yields 
estimated monthly return of -3.8% using OLS or -5.7% using WLS estimation.  The 
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intercepts' t-statistics (-2.72 and -3.24) indicate that these abnormal returns differ from 
zero with 99% confidence. It is interesting to note that the negative abnormal return 
approximately compounds to over 10% in a five-year period. It is not obvious that one 
should value-weight the portfolio returns. Loughran and Ritter (2000) point out that 
value-weighting will reduce the extent of measured miss-valuations, which are likely to 
be more prevalent among small firms. We, therefore, present results for equal-weighted 
portfolio returns in the second and last rows of Table 2.10. As predicted by Loughran and 
Ritter (2000), the equal-weighted intercepts (-8.5% and -9.6%) are somewhat larger than 
those in value weighting. 
Table 2.8 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor regression on monthly returns for bank 
mergers (three years following merger) 
   
Regression coefficient α  1β  2β  3β  Adjusted 
2R  
Panel A: Ordinary lest squares regressions (OLS) 
Value-weighted sample -0.019*** 3.91*** 0.09** 0.10 0.721 
(t-statistics) (1.87) (20.77) (2.56) (1.53)  
      
Equal-weighted sample -0.026** 2.16*** .034** 0.042 0.560 
(t-statistics) (2.42) (60.22) (2.58) (0.079)  
      
Panel B: Weighted least squares regressions (WLS) 
Value-weighted sample -0.037* 1.55*** 0.98*** 0.14* 0.841 
(t-statistics) (1.94) (22.46) (8.54) (1.92)  
      
Equal-weighted sample -0.045*** 1.67*** 1.91*** 0.23 0.723 
(t-statistics) (5.21) (33.38) (10.49) (1.48)  
*,**, and *** denote significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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 Table 2.8 reports results for Fama-French regressions similar to those reported in 
Table 2.7, but with the time frame reduced to three years following the merger. Shorting 
the interval for subsequent merger provides a few changes in the results. The full-sample 
value-weighted intercept is now –1.9% using OLS or 4.5% using WLS estimation. These 
values are lower than those reported in Table 2.7. However, Table 8 results support the 
hypothesis that merged banks have negative long-run performance in the first three years 
after the merger.  
Table 2.9 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor regression on monthly returns for non-merged 
banks (three year following merger) 
   
Regression coefficient α  1β  2β  3β  Adjusted 
2R  
Panel A: Ordinary lest squares regressions (OLS) 
Value-weighted sample 0.050** 0.09** 0.29*** 0.04 0.564 
(t-statistics) (2.47) (2.17) (3.56) (0.65)  
      
Equal-weighted sample 0.032** 0.08 .044** 0.12*** 0.686 
(t-statistics) (2.16) (1.22) (3.58) (2.89)  
      
Panel B: Weighted least squares regressions (WLS) 
Value-weighted sample 0.075*** 1.5* 0.48*** 0.14** 0.621 
(t-statistics) (3.76) (1.75) (6.14) (2.32)  
      
Equal-weighted sample 0.086*** 0.12* 0.91*** 0.22*** 0.754 
(t-statistics) (4.21) (33.38) (12.49) (6.38)  
*,**, and *** denote significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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 If the negative intercept in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 is from the three-factor model's 
inability to fit the type of banks in our merger sample, we should also find negative 
intercepts for the matched peer banks (non-merged banks). Table 2.9 represents the result 
of estimating the Fama-French regressions of the style-matched peer banks. The intercept 
terms are always positive, suggesting positive long-run abnormal returns. For example, 
Panel A shows that the value-weighting the merger banks’ subsequent returns yields 
estimated monthly return of 5% using OLS or 7.5% using WLS (Panel B). The 
intercepts’ t-statistics (2.47 and 2.16) shows that these abnormal return are statistically 
significant. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that bank mergers 
themselves are associated with poor performance manifested in Tables 2.7 and 2.8.  
 
2.5.2.3 Time-series patterns in the post-bank merger performance  
The above results indicate that the stocks of merged banks perform poorly after 
merger. It can be instructive to examine whether this result pervades our entire sample or 
is confined to certain years. Accordingly, we examine each calendar year to determine if 
the under-performance is concentrated in certain years of the study. In Table 2.10, banks 
are categorized by the year in which the merger occurred. The results indicate that 
significant underperformance by bank mergers is not concentrated in a particular time 
period. In the 15 years covered by our sample, all years have three-year matched-bank 
wealth relatives less than one; that is the average performance of the bank mergers 
sample in the subsequent three years worse than that of comparable sized banks. Our 
findings indicate that investors who buy immediately after listing and hold shares for five 
years will make substantial losses. It is noteworthy that when we examine the wealth 
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relatives for the most recent bank mergers (during the 1995-1999 period), there is still 
some evidence of underperformance but it is much smaller. Most three-year wealth 
relatives are close to one. Therefore, we can conclude that the underperformance has 
diminished in recent years. 
Table 2.10 
Long-run stock returns of bank mergers categorized by year of merger 
 
Year Bank mergers 
%HPR 
Matched banks 
%HPR 
Wealth 
relative 
1985 8.4 33.6 0.81 
1986 10.9 34.4 0.83 
1987 15.5 41.2 0.82 
1988 12.5 40 0.80 
1989 24.7 45.2 0.86 
1990 32.5 60.6 0.83 
1991 28.6 51.3 0.85 
1992 30.5 44 0.91 
1993 20.2 30.4 0.92 
1994 36.4 49.8 0.91 
1995 39.9 51.2 0.93 
1996 45.3 57.3 0.92 
1997 52.3 60.6 0.95 
1998 39.2 48.1 0.94 
1999 48.6 54.5 0.96 
Note: wealth relative =(1+average three-year total return on merged banks) / 
(1+average three-year total return on matched banks). 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 The last decade has witnessed an extraordinary pace of bank merger and 
acquisitions, dramatically changing the structure of the U.S. banking industry. The 
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number of banks has notably declined, with fewer smaller banks and more large money 
center banks. This study analyzes the long-run stock returns and operating performance 
following bank mergers. A better understanding of the long-run performance of bank 
mergers may shed some light on the implications of continuing mergers and acquisitions 
in the banking industry. To this end, we examine the post-merger performance of 662 
bank mergers between 1985 and 1999. Accounting data from both pre-merger and post-
merger data are used in the analysis and evaluated for evidence of a change in the 
performance around the merger activity. Particularly, we utilize conventional ratios such 
as return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). ROA and ROE capture the 
profitability of banks (profitability indicators). We also examine an operating cost ratio 
(CER) that excludes interest expenses. CER is a measure of cost control and is perceived 
as important to find whether there is cost saving associated with bank mergers. Consistent 
with previous studies, our findings suggest that the various expected performance and 
earning benefits of bank mergers may not in fact be realized. The performance effects 
measured by profitability ratios are mixed. Merged banks show no significant 
improvement in ROA relative to their peer group, while they have significant 
improvements in ROE. Also, no significant improvement in CER following the mergers 
is found. We also find that more recent bank mergers (1995-1999 period) are associated 
with significant improvement in ROE and CER, suggesting profit and cost efficiency 
associated with the most recent bank mergers. As for the 1985-1989 and 1990-1994 
period, changes in ROE and CER do not indicate that merged banks performed better in 
the post-merger period. Further, we find evidence that mergers of large banks achieved 
higher improvements in ROE compared to small bank mergers, while mergers in which 
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small banks are involved show larger cost savings (CER) compared with the large bank 
mergers. We also find evidence that large targets are associated with more successful 
mergers. Lastly, we find that the following target banks are likely to be associated with 
successful mergers – more profitable targets with higher return on assets (ROA) and/or 
return on equity (ROE). In other words, large targets are associated with more successful 
mergers.   
Our second objective is to evaluate the long-run stock return following bank mergers. 
Such an evaluation of the long-run stock performance has been made possible by new, 
improved long horizon methodologies that have been applied to a variety of corporate 
events, including mergers. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) and Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model are used to measure long-run performance effects. To 
our knowledge, this first study to examine the long-run performance of merged banks 
using those two techniques. The results of long-run stock returns show that merged banks 
have under-performed their peer group of non-merged banks.  One possible explanation 
of this underperformance (large negative returns after mergers) is that the market is slow 
to adjust to the merger event. If so, the long-run stock returns performance reflects that 
part of the net present value of the merger to the acquirer that is not captured by the 
announcement period return.  This poor performance can be attributed to the larger banks 
in the sample. This result confirms our earlier finding, suggesting that size is an important 
explanatory variable of long-run post-merger performance. Finally, we partition our 
sample by time period, and find evidence that more recent bank mergers are associated 
with better performance than earlier mergers. However, the average performance of 
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recent mergers is still worse than that of comparably sized banks. Taken as a whole, the 
empirical findings indicate long-run benefits from bank mergers appear to be absent. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE IMPACT OF MERGERS AND ACQUISTIONS  
ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE U.S BANKING INDUSTRY 
 
3.1 Abstract  
Using the Stochastic Frontier approach, this study investigates the cost efficiency 
and profit efficiency effects of bank mergers on the U.S banking industry. The relative 
efficiencies of the acquiring, acquired and merged banks are estimated relative to their 
peers. The effects of the mergers are then examined by comparing the pre-merger and 
post-merger cost and profit efficiency levels of the merged banks with control groups of 
non-merged banks. The empirical results indicate that mergers seem to have improved 
cost and profit efficiency of the banks involved in the 1990s. On the contrary, significant 
cost efficiency gains were absent in the 1980s, while a significant increase in profit 
efficiency occurred relative to other banks. Principally, evidence shows that both the 
acquiring and acquired banks have lower efficiency levels relative to their peer group 
prior to the merger. Following the merger the combined banks increased their efficiency 
to or beyond levels consistent with industry peers. In addition, prior to the mergers, the 
acquiring banks were at least marginally more efficient than the acquired bank based on 
both cost and profit efficiency. Collectively, these findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that mergers are used to discipline inefficient managers.  
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The non-parametric technique of Data Envelopment Analysis is used to evaluate the 
production structure of the merged and non-merged banks. The empirical evidence 
appears to indicate that merged banks have lower costs than non-merged banks because 
they are using the most efficient technology available (technical efficiency), and they are 
using the cost minimizing input mix (allocative efficiency). Additionally, managers of 
merged banks are relatively better at choosing the proper input mix given the prices, 
suggesting that mangers of non-merged banks waste more resources than mangers of 
merged banks. The results suggest that there is an economic rational for future mergers in 
the banking industry. Mergers seem to allow efficient banks to gain control of weaker 
banks, thus helping to increase input efficiency. Also, mergers may allow the banking 
industry to take advantage of the opportunities created by improved technology.  
3.2 Introduction  
One of the most commonly researched events studied in banking is the merger. 
Over the past decade, the U.S. banking industry has registered a record level of 
consolidation as through mergers and acquisitions. As a result, bank regulators and anti-
trust authorities, among others, are interested in gaining a better understanding of the 
potential welfare consequences of bank mergers. Specifically, they are interested in 
knowing whether or not bank mergers improve efficiency of the combined firms. Bank 
mergers may increase efficiency by allowing the bank to achieve economies of scale or 
by achieving a combined output that is more profitable than before. Moreover, bank 
mergers may lead to efficiency gains by changing the input-output mix in a manner that 
optimizes costs and/ or revenues. 
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Bank mergers have stimulated much research, which can be broadly divided into 
two areas: event studies and assessment of pre-merger and post-merger operating 
performance. Event studies examine the impact of merger announcements on share 
price27. The results of these event studies have a set of well-known problems (Berger, 
1998). It is unclear what event window is most appropriate. If the event period is 
important, the window selected for analysis may influence results substantially. 
Furthermore, it is uncertain how many days after the announcement date are sufficient to 
enable the market to fully trade on information regarding the proposed transaction. 
Another problem may arise from not capturing the effect of information leakage. Lastly, 
it is impossible to determine whether changes in market values are caused by changes in 
market power or changes in efficiency.  
The use of the operating performance methodology can take various formats. In 
this regard, Berger, Demstez, and Strahan (1999) make a distinction between static and 
dynamic analyses. Static analysis is defined as studies that relate to the potential 
consequences of mergers to certain characteristics of financial institutions that are 
associated with the mergers, such as institution’s size. Static analysis does not use data on 
mergers and, hence, does not provide direct information on the effects of mergers. 
However, they may be useful in predicting the consequences of mergers, for example, in 
terms if realizable scale and scope economies.  
One the other hand, dynamic analysis is defined as studies that compare the 
operating performance of financial institutions pre-merger and post-merger, or compare 
the behavior of recently merged banks with other banks that have not engaged in 
mergers.  As reported in Berger at al. (1999), dynamic analysis is more comprehensive 
                                                                                          
27 The market’s interpretation of the value gains/losses from merger activity.  
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than static analysis. They recommend, among other recommendations, that future 
research should focus on dynamic analysis methods that evaluate the impact of bank 
mergers by comparing the behavior of merged banks with a relevant peer group of non-
merged banks. One method of dynamic analysis involves analyzing the changes in both 
the cost and profit efficiency of banks following mergers. A number of studies have 
measured bank performance by employing financial ratios (Rhoades (1986,1990), 
Srinivasin(1992) and Pilloff(1996)). To measure cost efficiency, studies compare simple 
cost ratios, such as the operating costs to total assets ratio, and typically find no 
substantial change in cost performance associated with bank mergers. However, the use 
of these financial ratios has some drawbacks; including the fact such ratios do not 
consider the input price and output mix.28 Also, they ignore the current market value of 
the bank and do not reflect economic value-maximization. In addition, the selection of 
the weights of these ratios is highly subjective  
 In view of the abovementioned shortcomings, this essay adopts a frontier 
approach29 to examine the cost efficiency effects of bank mergers. The frontier 
methodology involves econometrically estimating an efficient cost frontier for a cross-
section of banks. For a given bank, cost efficiency is measured as the deviation between 
the actual cost and the minimum cost point on the frontier. Profit efficiency models not 
merely require that services be produced at a minimum cost, they also involve the 
maximization of revenues. Rogers (1998) finds that profit efficiency is not positively 
correlated with cost efficiency, suggesting the possibility that cost and revenue 
inefficiencies may be negatively correlated. This finding indicates that a bank with higher 
                                                                                          
28 See Berger and Humphrey, 1992. 
29 Berger and Humphrey (1997) recommend the use of the frontier approach to overcome the limitation of 
the financial ratio approach.  
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costs may compensate for this apparent inefficiency by achieving higher revenues than its 
competitors. A bank may realize these revenues either by employing a different 
composition of its vector of production or through the benefit of greater market power in 
pricing derived from specialization. Therefore, a measurement of cost inefficiency may 
be contaminated by the composition of the output; an output vector of higher quality 
could be more costly but not necessary inefficient. As a result, profit efficiency analysis 
provides a more important source of information for bank management than the partial 
vision offered by only analyzing cost efficiency. Moreover,  the estimation of a frontier 
profit function can capture productive specialization, allowing the higher revenues 
received by banks that produce differentiated or higher quality outputs to compensate for 
the higher costs incurred.  
 As a further test of our hypotheses, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is utilized 
to compare the behavior of merged banks with other banks that have not engaged in 
mergers. DEA decomposes cost (input saving) efficiency into allocative efficiency and 
technical efficiency, where allocative inefficiency is defined as a decline in performance 
due to an ineffective production plan, while technical inefficiency is defined as the poor 
implementation of this production plan. DEA also allows us to decompose technical 
efficiency into pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. These decompositions 
enhance our understanding of the sources of efficiency and inefficiency that may be 
associated with bank mergers. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there are no 
previous studies that have used DEA analysis to identify the sources of efficiency gains, 
if any, associated with mergers in the U.S. banking industry. 
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This essay not only examines the cost efficiency but also the profit efficiency 
effects of bank mergers. In addition, the sources of efficiency gains associated with bank 
mergers are investigated. This analysis spans a longer time period than previous research, 
with the advantage of considering more recent bank mergers. For this purpose, the 
Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) is employed to estimate the cost and profit 
efficiencies given a data sample that extends over (1986-2000). To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, there is only one essay (Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey 1997) 
that investigates the profit efficiency effects of bank mergers. However, the analysis was 
limited to the bank “mega mergers” of the 1980s between banking institutions with assets 
over US $1 billion. 
This analysis differs from previous studies of bank mergers in two different 
important aspects. First, it investigates bank mergers of all sizes. Prior empirical studies 
of efficiencies in bank mergers have either examined large bank mergers, or fully 
neglected merger’s size. Second, this essay attempts to identify the existence and the 
magnitude of efficiency gains from bank mergers employing a parametric approach and 
non-parametric approach. Equally important, this study contributes to the current 
literature by offering a new and fresh perspective on the economic rational for the 
proliferation of mergers over the period under study. It seems especially important to be 
able to offer insight into the behavior of merged banks in recent years. Secondly, there 
are very few studies that look at the profit efficiency effects of bank mergers. Moreover, 
very little research attention has been focused on examining bank mergers of all size. It is 
important to compare the economic impact of small bank mergers to that of large 
mergers. The final contribution of this analysis is the identification of the sources of 
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efficiency gains associated with bank mergers. DEA analyzes the relative efficiency and 
managerial performance of productivity units of merged banks and non-merged banks, 
with the same multiple inputs and multiple outputs.  
The results of the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) indicate that merged banks 
have achieved greater post-merger gains in the 1990s in both cost and profit efficiency as 
compared to non-merged banks. Furthermore, while merged banks significantly increased 
their profit in the 1980s, there were no significant increases in cost efficiency from bank 
mergers activity during that time period.  Another result from the SFA suggests that if 
merged banks and non-merged banks use the same production technologies, the average 
merged banks would operate closer to their efficient level than average non-merged 
banks. Moreover, it is found that prior to merging, the acquiring banks are more efficient 
on average than the acquired banks; and that generally after the merger the combined 
bank is able to adhere to the higher efficiency levels. However, prior to the mergers, both 
the acquiring and acquired banks have a somewhat lower efficiency level than their peer 
group. This finding is consistent with the conventional corporate finance of a market 
takeover’s explanation of mergers (well-managed banks acquire poorly-managed banks 
and consequently improve their efficiency). The essay’s most striking result is that small 
bank mergers operate more efficiently in terms of cost but less efficiently in terms of 
profit than large bank mergers. This difference may suggest the existence of monopoly 
power in the banking industry where large bank mergers can realize greater profits, 
despite having greater costs. Finally, as an alternative check of the efficiency effects of 
mergers, the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used to analyze the efficiency of the 
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merged and non-merged banks, allowing investigating whether merged and non-merged 
banks have different levels of efficiency.  
The results indicate that the most significant source of efficiency gains among 
merged banks versus non-merged banks is the technical efficiency; suggesting that 
merged banks are on average more technically efficient than non-merged banks. 
Technical efficiency reflects the ability of managers to control costs and is measured by 
how close bank costs are to those of fully efficient banks when the effects of scale, 
product mix and other exogenous variables that may influence banking costs, are 
considered. In short, SFA results provide statistical evidence that, on average, bank 
mergers do result in an increase in cost and profit efficiency post-merger relative to other 
banks. Moreover, DEA results suggest merged banks are more efficient than non-merged 
banks because not only they deploy their resources efficiently, but also tend to choose the 
“right mix” of resources to manage. Mergers seem to allow stronger bank to gain control 
of weaker banks, thus helping to increase input efficiency. Mergers also allow the 
banking industry to take advantage of the opportunities created by improved technology 
and deregulation. 
The reminder of the essay is designed as follows. Section 3.2 reviews related 
literature. Section 3.3 provides the estimation of efficiency. Section 3.4 summarizes the 
methodology. Section 3.5 describes the data and definition of variables. Section 3.6 
reports our empirical results and section 3.7 concludes.  
3.3 Review of Literature  
     A Bank acquires another bank for several reasons, including market power, 
diversification, and managers’ preferences. But the most frequently cited reason for 
 97
recent bank mergers is efficiency improvement. There is considerable confusion, 
however, about whether and how bank mergers improve efficiency. In theory, pruning 
fixed expenses (e.g., by eliminating overlapping braches offices or duplicate bank office 
system) can create scale economies by allocating the overhead of a single bank across the 
activities of two previously independent banks. However, the empirical literature finds 
that scale economies are limited to the smallest banks and are not available in many bank 
mergers.  
Therefore, several studies have focused on improvement efficiency.30 
Improvement in efficiency (movements toward the optimal point on the best-practice 
efficient frontier) may be accomplished through mergers by improving the cost and profit 
efficiencies. A bank is cost efficient if it minimizes costs for a given quantity of output, 
and it is profit efficient if it maximizes profits for a given combination of inputs and 
outputs. There are several ways in which mergers can improve efficiency. First, for 
example, if the bidder bank is more efficient ex ante and tends to bring the efficiency of 
the target up to its own level by spreading its superior managerial expertise or policies 
and procedures over more resources. Alternatively, the merger event itself may have the 
effect of awakening to the need for improvement or may be used as an excuse to 
implement substantial unpleasant restructuring. Second, the larger banks that result from 
mergers may gain access to cost-saving technologies or spread their fixed costs over a 
larger base, thus reducing average costs. Third, efficiency may be improved by exploiting 
of economies of scope.31   Finally, mergers may improve the managerial efficiency. 
                                                                                          
30 See Berger and Humphrey (1992, 1994), and DeYoung (1997).  
31 The deal may allow the merging parties to enter new markets and cross-sell their products to a wider 
customer base. 
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 In this essay we consider both cost and profit efficiency. Cost efficiency 
improvements occur when a bank moves closer to what a “frontier-efficient” or best 
practice bank's cost (the most efficiently managed banks) would be for producing the 
same output bundle using the same input prices and other environmental conditions. 
Profit efficiency improvements occur when a bank moves closer to the profit of a best-
practice bank under the same conditions. Profit efficiency is a more inclusive concept 
than cost efficiency. Profit efficiency incorporates cost efficiency, the effects of scale, 
scope, and product mix on both costs and revenues, and to some degree the effects of 
changes in the risk-expected return tradeoff. Profit efficiency also corresponds better to 
the concept of value maximization than cost efficiency, since value is determined from 
both costs and revenues.  
The literature suggests that there is a substantial potential for efficiency improvements 
from the mergers of banks. Average inefficiencies on the order of about 20% of costs and 
about 50% potential profits are typical found (Berger and Humphrey 1997). Simulation 
results also indicate that large efficiency gains are possible if the best-practice bidders 
reform the practices of inefficient targets (See Savage 1991, Shaver 1993). But the issue 
of whether or not mergers actually lead to efficiency gains has not been conclusively 
resolved. 
Early research suggests that many banks engage in mergers for the purpose of 
improving efficiency. For example, Berger and Humphrey (1992) study the 57 U.S. 
banking mega-mergers from 1981 to 1989. They estimate a neo- classical cost function, 
which allows them to consider only two types of efficiencies, namely scale economics, 
and X-efficiency. Berger and Humphrey produce two main results. First, if more efficient 
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banks take over less efficient banks, a merger may create substantial efficiency gains. 
First, the ex ante choice of merger partners often did satisfy the condition for being 
conductive to improving efficiency. In 55 to 72 percent of the cases, the bidder bank was 
more cost efficient than the target bank. Second, the mergers were not successful on 
average in improving cost efficiency. The average efficiency improvement was less than 
five percentage points and was not statistically significant. Moreover, because of 
diseconomies of scale, the combined firms actually performed slightly worse on average 
after the mergers, although also this effect was small and often not statistically 
significant. They conclude that the diseconomies created by the megamergers easily 
offset any x-efficiency gains, resulting in a decline in cost efficiency. On the other hand, 
DeYoung (1997) find that 58% of a sample of 348 deals in 1987 and 1989 (employing a 
thick-frontier cost function) generates small cost efficiencies. Although some of these 
gains were due to mergers involving insolvent targets (where support from the FDIC 
might have helped in improving the bank’s performance), 61% of the solvent bank 
purchases also generate cost efficiencies. Moreover, the results of DeYoung (1997) 
indicate that mergers of equal-sized banks capture smaller than average cost efficiencies, 
and that bidders that are experienced dealmakers obtain larger average improvements. 
Peristiani (1993) studies in-market mergers, or mergers in which there is some local 
market overlap prior to merger. He reports that bidder banks are more profitable than 
targets. However, he finds that generally no efficiency gains were created. Using 
simulation, Shaffer (1993) finds that large X-efficiency gains are possible if the best 
practice banks merger and reform the practices of the least efficient banks. 
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More recently, some studies have found that bidder banks are more efficient ex 
ante than targets (Altunbas, Maude, and Molyneux 1995, and Pilloff and Santomero 
1998). It has also been found that bidder banks bid more for targets when the merger 
would lead to significant diversification gains, consistent with a motive to improve the 
risk-expected return tradeoff and increase profit efficiency (Benston, Hunter and Wall 
1995). 
 A number of studies measure the change in cost efficiency after mergers. Most of 
the studies generally show very little or no cost efficiency improvement on average from 
the mergers of the 1980s, on the order of 5% of costs or less (Berger and Humphery 
1992, Rhoades 1993, Peristiani 1997). A parentally, the potential gains from 
consolidation branches, or computer operations, etc., may have been offset by managerial 
inefficiencies or problems in integrating systems. Studies using 1990s data are mixed, but 
sometimes showed more cost efficiency gains (Berger and Humphery 1992, and Rhoades 
1993). Rhoades (1998) examines the efficiency effects of nine bank mergers. He findings 
suggest that the cost efficiency effects of mergers may depend on the motivation behind 
the mergers and the consolidation process  
 Although the main stream research focuses on cost efficiency, few studies have 
tried to cover all possible effects of mergers (also on the income side) by using a profit 
function. Studies of profit efficiency usually paint a more favorable picture of mergers. 
Studies of the profit efficiency effects of mergers from the 1980s and early 1990s found 
that mergers improved profit efficiency, and that this improvement could be linked to an 
increased diversification of risks and an improved risk-expected return tradeoff 
(Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey 1997, Berger 1998). After the merger, the banks 
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tended to shift their asset portfolios from securities to loans, hold more assets and loans 
per dollar of equity, and raised additional uninsured purchased funds at reduced rates, 
consistent with a more diversified portfolio. The most recent analyses find unexploited 
scale economics even for fairly large bank sizes (Berger and Mester, 1997, Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997). The prospects of scale efficiency gains appear to be greater in the 
1990s than in the 1980s. This finding is usually ascribed to technological progress, 
regulatory changes and the beneficial effects of lower interest rates (Berger et al., 1999). 
In addition, Berger et al. report that mergers may be geared to exploit economies of scale 
or scope, improve the X-efficiency of the merged banks, may enable the merged banks to 
exercise increased market power. Moreover, it may simply be motivated by the 
management’s desire to increase size. Consequently, bank mergers may cause diverging 
effects on cost and profit efficiency, as well as on loan and deposit pricing.  
In this essay, we deeply examine the effects of bank mergers by investigating the 
production and cost structure of banks involved in mergers. To this end, we estimate cost 
and profit efficiencies using the stochastic frontier approach. The estimation of cost and 
profit efficiency allows us to distinguish between improvements in efficiency versus 
market power effects. This distinction is impossible to accomplish with simple cost and 
profit ratios. Also, this enables us to evaluate whether and by how much bank mergers 
affect cost and profit efficiencies. 
 Because there is still no consensus in the literature regarding the valuation 
consequences of bank mergers, we believe that it is important to continue to carefully 
evaluate the performance of banks engaged in mergers using a variety of samples and 
empirical methodologies. In our view, to complete this picture we believe that it would be 
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valuable to deeply examine the impact of bank mergers by estimating the production and 
the cost structure of banks involved in mergers. Also, we think that quantifying efficiency 
gains from bank mergers is an extremely important step towards analyzing the trade-off 
between the gains and the potential adverse effects of bank mergers. Therefore, we 
provide a comprehensive investigation of the cost efficiency and the profit efficiency 
effects of bank mergers. In doing this, we adopt the frontier approach which provides an 
overall, objectively determined, numerical score and a ranking, something that is not 
available with other methods. For example, accounting data ignores the current market 
value of the bank and does not reflect economic value-maximizing behavior. In addition, 
these financial ratios do not consider the input price and the output mix (See Berger and 
Humphrey, 1992), and the selection of the weights of financial ratios is subjective. 
3.3.1 Efficiency Estimation 
 The measurement of bank efficiency is a controversial issue. Accounting ratios 
are the initiated approach to measure the efficiency of banks. It is the most intuitive way 
to measure bank efficiency. However, DeYoung (1997) points out that accounting-based 
ratios are misleading. The statistical-based efficient cost frontier approach has better 
accuracy in bank cost efficiency measurement. If a bank systematically incurs relatively 
higher costs than other banks in a competitive environment, it is considered inefficient.  
 In the survey of Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993), there are several econometric 
and linear programming techniques that have been proposed for estimating efficiency. 
They are Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA), Thick Frontier Approach (TFA), Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and distribution-Free Approach (DFA).32 DEA has the 
                                                                                          
32 The Stochastic Frontier Approach is also called Econometric Frontier Approach (EFA). SFA, TFA, and 
DFA are parametric approach while DEA is a nonparametric approach.  
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advantage of being a flexible, a nonparametric technique that makes no assumptions 
about the form of the production function. Instead, it estimates an empirical best practice 
frontier from the observed inputs/outputs of individual decision-making units (DMUs), 
which replicates their individual behavior rather than the average sample estimate of 
conventional production functions. A DMU is found to be efficient when comparisons 
with other units indicate no inefficiency in the utilization of inputs/outputs, as measured 
by its position relative to the efficient frontier. The DEA best practice frontier is 
generally piecewise linear and approximates the true production function. DEA is so-
named because the data from the best practice DMUs generate the production frontier 
and thereby “envelopes” the data from other DMUs.33  
The nonparametric approach generally emphasizes the technological optimization 
rather than economic optimization, and does not correspond to the cost and profit 
efficiency concepts discussed by Berger and Mester (1997). Parametric approaches are 
the stochastic econometric frontier approach (SFA). SFA employs a composite error 
structure in which inefficiencies are assumed to follow an asymmetric distribution, 
usually the half-normal distribution, while random errors are normally distributed, and 
both are orthogonal to the cost function's exogenous variables (Berger and Mester, 
1997).34 All frontier approaches use the same sequence of estimate frontier efficiency. 
First, the best practice bank is benchmarked. In this stage, the frontier approach uses 
accounting data of multiple input and output variables to form an efficient frontier and 
locate the best practice bank across the sample. Second, all other banks are compared to 
the constructed benchmark and are then assigned an efficiency score. At this stage, the 
                                                                                          
33 DEA and its applications are treated usefully and extensively in Fried, Lovell, and Scmidt (1993). 
34 Unlike SFA, DEA does not for the presence of a random error term. Hence, DEA attributes any deviation 
from the efficient frontier as being purely as associated with inefficiency.  
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frontier approach calculates individual inefficiency scores for the banks located outside 
of the frontier in terms of their deviations from the best practice bank. Thus, frontier 
efficiency measures the observed bank’s deviation in performance from that of the best 
practice bank in the frontier. Then, each observed bank is compared to the benchmark 
and assigned an individual efficiency score. Efficiency ranges over the (0,1] interval, and 
is equal to one for the best practice in the sample. Also, a deviation from a score of 1 
shows the degree to which an inefficient bank can improve its efficiency relative to the 
best practice bank. On the cost side, a bank is cost efficient if it minimizes costs for a 
given quantity of output. On profit side, it is profit efficient if it maximizes profit for a 
given combination of inputs and outputs. 
 In this study, to be comprehensive, we use SFA to form the efficiency frontier and 
examine the effects of bank mergers on cost and profit efficiency. Then, we estimate cost 
efficiency and profit efficiency for the merging bank (acquiring, acquired, or 
consolidated) relative to its peer group. The peer group banks are defined as the group of 
banks that belong to the same type and are comparable in term of size, measured by total 
assets. In addition, we employ DEA to investigate and identify the sources of efficiency 
gains, if any, associated with mergers in the U.S. banking industry. 
3.4 Methodology 
The analysis of cost and profit efficiency takes size and technology as given and focuses 
on how production factors are combined, by comparing a bank’s actual costs or profits 
with the costs or profits of the best practice banks. Mergers may increase efficiency, by 
transferring superior managerial skills from the bidder to the target. However, the 
opposite may also happen, for example when the managers of the bidder enter into new 
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geographic or product markets or when the merger is motivated by empire building 
strategies pursued by relatively inefficient managers. 
 There are several approaches to estimate cost and profit efficiency. The simplest 
approach consists of comparing financial ratios that describe costs and profitability.35   
However, this methodology does not consider the input price and output mix. Therefore, 
another complex approach has employed in the literature to control that drawback. This 
allows us to measure cost and profit efficiency by comparing the best practice of the 
industry, as determined by statistical techniques, taking into account for each bank: the 
inputs, outputs and the prices it faces. One approach estimates a stochastic frontier (a 
combination of inputs, outputs and prices) along with how all efficient banks would 
operate, and the distance of each actual bank from the frontier is taken as a measure of its 
(in) efficiency.  
Given the fact that the production technology of the fully efficient firm in a 
banking industry is not known, it should be estimated from observations in practice. We 
employ Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) to evaluate whether and buy how much bank 
mergers affect cost efficiency and profit efficiency. I will analyze both cost and profit 
efficiencies. The type of profit efficiency method employed in this study is the non-
standard profit efficiency model, which is the latest development in the literature (Berger 
and Mester, 1997, and DeYoung and Hasan, 1998, Khumbakar et al., 2001). Further, we 
use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to investigate the sources of efficiency gain, if 
any, associated with bank mergers.  
                                                                                          
35 Operating costs over gross income and return on equity. 
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3.4.1 Parametric cost efficiency  
Cost efficiency measures how well the observed bank manages its costs relative to 
the best practice bank. Cost efficiency can be estimated by employing either a 
nonparametric or a parametric approach. Nonparametric cost efficiency is estimated by 
using linear programming techniques.  Whereas, the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) 
is a parametric approach used in recent studies to estimate efficiency in financial 
institutions. SFA assumes that inefficiencies observe an asymmetric half-normal 
distribution, and random errors are normally distributed.  The underlying reason for half-
normal distribution assumption is that inefficiencies cannot be negative.36 Actually, cost 
efficiency is derived from a cost function in which variable costs depend on the input 
prices, quantities of variable output, random error, and inefficiency. Cost efficiency 
models seek to minimize costs by employing the optimal levels of inputs by assuming 
given bank current input prices and output quantities. Thus, the inefficiency is caused by 
the excess use of inputs or produces too less outputs.  Also, it assumes that banks are cost 
minimizing firms; their production process can be represented by the stochastic frontier 
cost function 
    vutPYCC ++= ),,,( β     (3.1) 
where  
C: represents variable cost. 
Y: represents the output vector. 
P: represents the input price vector. 
T: represents time and capture possible technological changes. 
                                                                                          
36 It is impossible for a bank to waste more than 100% of the resources it is currently using. 
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β : represents the vector of parameters to be estimated. 
u: represents the one-side, non negative, stochastic element that represents cost 
inefficiency.37  
v: represents the classical random error term, independent from u. 
Also, the cost function can be expressed in logarithmic terms, assuming that the 
efficiency and random error terms are multiplicity separable from the remaining 
arguments of the cost function. 
vuPYfC lnln),(ln ++=                 (3.2) 
   Clearly, from equation (3.2), we need to specify a relationship (function) 
between bank production and bank cost in order to estimate the inefficiency. We use the 
translog function forms to estimate cost structure of banks and to derive the measure of 
bank inefficiency.38 The translong function has been widely used to analyze the cost 
characteristics of depository institutions.39  The translog variable function is given by the 
following: 
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where  
 stC = variable cost for observation s in year t. 
                                                                                          
37 We assume that u follows the half-normal distribution. This assumption has been standard in the 
literature. 
38 The translong function is also used as the cost equation in Mester (1987) and English et al. (1993). 
39 See the survey of Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993). 
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istY  = output i (i=1,2,3,4) for observation s in year t. 
kstP   = price of input k (k=1,2,3) for observation s in year t. 
  Greek symbols = parameters to be estimated.  
stv  = cost inefficiency for observation s in year t. 
stu  = random error term. 
Cost efficiency is defined as a measure of how far a bank’s actual cost is from the 
best practice bank’s cost (most cost efficient banks) if they were to produce the same 
output. Cost efficiency score attains values over (0,1]. A score of 0.6 for a bank implies 
that it is about 60% cost efficient, i.e., it wastes about 40% of its costs relative to a bank 
on the frontier facing similar conditions. Our main objective is to investigate the 
efficiency effects of bank mergers. In doing this the above model will be estimated for 
the merging banks and for a relevant peer group of non-merging banks. This will allow us 
to detect if there is any efficiency gain from mergers. 
3.4.2 Alternative profit efficiency  
DeYoung and Nolle (1996) indicate that cost-based models might misrepresent 
the nature and the extent of inefficiency in banks. For instance, banks might create more 
revenue by increasing costs. Thus, revenue efficiency might lead to cost inefficiency. If 
revenue efficiency overcomes cost inefficiency, banks will be more profitable. Berger 
and Mester (1999) and Berger DeYoung (2002) recommend profit maximization is 
superior to cost minimization for the study of firm performance because the profit 
function more completely addresses the economic goals of firms and their owners, who 
take revenue into account as well as costs. Profit efficiency is based on the economic goal 
of profit maximization, which requires the same amount of managerial attention to raise a 
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managerial dollar of revenues as to reduce a managerial dollar of costs. Thus, profit 
efficiency may better capture the sources of efficiency gains, if any, associated with bank 
mergers.  
There are two ways to estimate the profit efficiency; standard profit function and 
alternative profit function. Alternative profit efficiency measures how close a bank is to 
generating maximum profits given its output levels instead of output prices, unlike the 
standard profit efficiency concept. While the standard function is specified in terms of 
input prices and output prices, the alternative profit function is specified in terms of input 
prices and output quantities. Alternative profit efficiency is derived from a profit function 
with the same right-hand-side variable as the cost function and is estimated using the 
same functional form. As indicated by Berger and Mester (1997,1999), alternative profit 
efficiency is particularly closer to reality when some of the standard assumptions of 
perfect markets do not hold.40 They compare the two approaches and conclude that the 
alternative profit function is the better measurement. Berger and Mester (1997) report 
four conditions that alternative profit efficiency may provide better information. They are 
(i) substantial unmeasured differences in the quality of banking services, (ii) banks 
cannot achieve every output scale and product mix, (iii) output markets are not perfectly 
competitive, and (iv) output prices are not accurately measured. Since we estimate the 
efficiency for merging banks and for a relevant peer group of non-merging banks in the 
U.S, substantial differences in the bank’s service quality exist. Not all banks can achieve 
every output scale and product mix. Under the regulation in the banking industry, we 
cannot say that the output markets are perfectly competitive. Output prices are not 
                                                                                          
40 In the case of banking sector, whenever the assumption of perfect competition in pricing is questionable, 
or when there are differences of production quality among the banks in the sample. 
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available to all sizes of the banks. Therefore, only alternative profit efficiency is 
estimated in this study. 
More recently, Berger and DeYoung (2002) employ alternative profit function 
rather than the standard profit function to test the effects of geographic expansion on 
bank efficiency because of the data availability and better bank profit explanation. They 
report that output prices are difficult to measure accurately for banks, and because of 
output quantities are relatively fixed in the short-run and cannot respond quickly to 
changing prices as is assumed in the standard profit function, vary across banks more 
output prices and thus better explain differences in bank profits. In this study, we conduct 
the test by using the SFA approach to evaluate whether and how much bank mergers 
affect cost efficiency and profit efficiency. The type of profit efficiency method 
employed in this study is the alternative profit function.  
 In log form, alternative profit function can be written as follows: 
   ππβπ vutPYCa ++=+ ),,,(ln)ln(                                     (3.4) 
Indeed, the alternative profit function employs the same independent variables as the cost 
function, as shown below:  
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where,π  represents net profits of the bank b; a  is a constant added to the profits of each 
bank so that natural log is taken of a positive number since minimum profits are typically 
negative; and all other variables are as explained previously in the equation (3.3). Profit 
efficiency measures how close a bank is generating maximum profits given its output 
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levels. A 70% profit efficiency score for a bank suggests that it would earn about 30% 
more profits than what it is making now if it were operating on the efficient frontier. 
3.4.3 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a mathematical programming technique 
originally proposed by Charnes et al. (1978). It is a methodology for analyzing the 
relative efficiency and managerial performance of productivity units having the same 
multiple inputs and multiple outputs. DEA allows us to compare the relative efficiency of 
banks by determining efficient banks as benchmarks and by measuring the inefficiencies 
in input combinations (slack variables) in other banks relative to the benchmark. The 
most important advantage of DEA over traditional econometric frontier studies is that it 
is a non-parametric, deterministic method and therefore does not require a prior 
assumption about the analytical form of the production function. Also, it constructs the 
best practice production function solely on the basis of observed data, and therefore, the 
probability of a misspecification of the production technology is zero.  On the other hand, 
the main disadvantage of DEA is that, being a non-parametric method, it is more 
sensitive to possible miss-measurement problems.41 
 DEA has become widely popular in measuring efficiency in national banking 
industries. For example, in Sherman and Gold (1985), Rangan et al. (1988), Ferrier and 
Lovell (1990), Aly et al. (1990) and Berger et al (1993). The method uses linear 
programming techniques in the estimation of frontier functions; banks on the frontier are 
considered efficient. Other banks are compared with the best practice units and 
inefficiency levels are computed using the estimated frontier. For a bank facing input 
                                                                                          
41 DEA is sensitive to extreme observations and measurement errors (the basic assumption is that random 
errors do not exist and that all deviations from the frontier indicate inefficiency.  
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price vector kp and producing the output vector ky , 
*
kc  is the cost minimizing input 
vector. Cost efficiency is computed as kkkkk xpcpC /
*= , that is kC = minimum cost / 
actual cost.  
 For the case of a bank producing four outputs with three inputs, minimum cost is 
calculated by the following linear programming: 
∑ ikxMin ikp  s.t. 
∑≤
k
jkkjk yy µ  , j = 1,2,3,4. 
∑≥
k
ikkik xx µ   , i = 1,2,3,4. 
0≥µ    ,k = 1.2,…..,n. 
∑ =
k
k 1µ   
where ip = price of input I; ix = input I; jy = output j; kµ = intensity variables which 
allows convex combinations of observed input and output quantities; k is the bank index 
and n is the sample number of observations. 
3.4.5 Data and definition of variables 
This section describes the data and variables used in this study. All information 
necessary for estimating both cost and profit efficiency is obtained from the Reports of 
Condition and Income Report database (Call Report) on the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago’s web page.42 We use data from the 1986-2000 interval to analyze the effects of 
mergers of U.S. banks. Our merger sample is also obtained from the merger file at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The initial sample consists of 2552 mergers that are 
                                                                                          
42 www.frbchi.org 
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selected from the same web page.  A merger included in the final sample is required to 
meet the following criteria: (a) both of the merged banks must be healthy institutions at 
the time of the merger, (b) data for all of the variables in the model are available, (c) a 
single target bank is acquired in the same merger application, (d) both of the merged 
banks did not engage in another merger two years before or after the merger date. (e) the 
merger is not assisted by a bank regulator,  (f) the target does not involve a failed bank, 
and finally (g) the merger must occur before 1999. The first criterion eliminates all 
failed-bank mergers and government assisted bank mergers. The second and third filters 
allow us to compare the two-year pre- and post-merger efficiency without the 
contamination of another merger, also ensuring the availability of banking data for at 
least two years before the merger date. Finally we exclude the most recent mergers that 
do not have at least three years of reported data after the merger date. This process results 
in a sample of 1640 bank mergers. 
‘A Reliable’ efficiency prediction requires appropriate definitions and certain 
assumptions regarding the measurement of input, output, and input price vectors. The 
exclusion of certain important bank inputs and /or outputs might bias the final efficiency 
measures by constructing of the frontier (the locus of the efficient combination of inputs 
and outputs). In choosing which variables to specify as outputs versus inputs, one should 
decide on the nature of banking technology. In literature on the theory of banking, there 
are two main approaches competing with each other in this regard: the “production 
approach” and the” asset approach” or “intermediation approach” of Sealey and Lindley 
(1977). The production approach considers banks as firms producing services to 
customers; being deposit-holders as well as borrowers, using labor and capital as inputs. 
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As a consequence, this theory generally excludes interest costs from total costs and uses 
operating costs as a dependent variable.  
Table 3.1 
Variables employed in measuring the cost and alternative profit efficiency 
 
Symbol Variable Name Definition 
 Dependent Variables  
C Total cost Operating expenses plus interest expense, includes 
costs of purchased funds, deposits, and labor 
π  Profits Profits, which include revenues from loans and 
securities less costs 
 Variable Output 
Quantities 
 
1y  Real estate loans  
2y  Individual loans The dollar value of loans to individual for 
household, family, and other personal expenditure 
also, includes installment and credit card and 
related plans.  
 
3y  Business loans Include all other individual loans and real estate 
loans 
4y  Securities All non-financial assets (Gross total assets, GTW-−−− 321 yyy physical capital*)  
 
 Variable Output Prices  
1p  Price of labor Salaries and employee benefits divided by the 
number of full-time-equivalent employees 
2p  Price of purchased funds Interest paid on large time deposits, foreign 
deposits, federal funds purchased and all other 
liabilities except core deposits, divided by the 
total dollar values of these funds 
3p  Price of deposits Interest paid on domestic transactions accounts, 
and time and savings, divided by the total dollar 
values of these deposits.  
 
* : Physical capital includes premises and other fixed assets. 
 
Like many studies on bank efficiency (e.g., DeYoung and Nolle 1998; Beger and Mester, 
1997; DeYoung and Hasan, 1998), we use the asset approach. Under this approach, the 
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banks play the role of the financial intermediary between depositors and borrowers, 
where deposits are viewed as an input to produce loans. Stated differently, all liabilities 
(core deposits and purchased funds) and financial equity capital provide funds and are 
considered to be inputs that generate costs. All assets (loan and securities) using bank 
funds and are considered to be outputs that generate revenues. Physical inputs (labor and 
premises) are specified as inputs that generate costs. Accordingly, the specifications for 
all variables in (3) and (4) are the following:  
C: operating expenses plus interest expense, includes costs of purchased funds, deposits, 
and labor.  
π : profits, which include revenues from loans and securities less costs. 
ky : bank output quantities; (k=1) real estate loans, (k=2) individual loans, (k=3) business 
loans, and (k=4) securities. 43 
lp : bank input price; (l=1) price of labor, (l=2) price of purchased funds (foreign 
deposits, federal funds purchased, all other liabilities except core deposits) , and (l=3) 
price of deposits (domestic transactions accounts, time and savings).  
Table 3.1 reports the definition of all the variables used in the cost and profit 
functions. The price of labor includes salaries and employee benefits divided by the 
number of full-time-equivalent employees.  Price of purchased funds is interest paid on 
large time deposits, foreign deposits, federal funds purchased and all other liabilities 
except core deposits, divided by the total dollar values of these funds. Price of deposits is 
defined as interest paid on domestic transaction accounts, and time and savings, divided 
by the total dollar values of these deposits. Table 3.2 gives the sample means and 
                                                                                          
43 Individual loans include installment and credit card and related plans. Business loans include all other 
than individual loans and real estate loans.  Securities are all non-financial assets. 
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standard deviations of all variables for 1987, 1993, and 1999. Although the continuous 
variables are generally expressed in natural logs in (3) and (5), following Berger and 
Mester (1999), we report the means and standard deviations of the levels to be more 
informative. There are no strange surprises; securities represent the largest output share, 
followed by business loans.  Price variability is lower than input variability, suggesting 
competition in the input markets. 
Table 3.2 
Sample statistics of variables 
 
Years 1987 1993 1999 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variables       
C 39,028 364,199 36,693 255,041 67,400 742,995 
π  4,543 35,898 5,674 36,922 13,263 137,682 
Variable Output 
Quantities 
      
1y  97,654 671,674 133,993 868,577 287,848 2,864,242 
2y  56,162 373,205 58,293 373,835 92,900 931,515 
3y  95,340 798,387 85,204 725,949 187,597 2,442,498 
4y  203,421 1,746,428 243,853 1,793,622 472,966 6,204,781 
Variable Output Prices       
1p  25.49 6.18 31.19 10.73 40.46 11.08 
2p  0.0397 0.1109 0.0316 0.1431 0.0309 0.0537 
3p  0.0510 0.0073 0.0526 1.145 0.0344 0.0065 
 
3.5 Results  
The first method we use to examine the efficiency effects of bank mergers is to 
compare the cost and profit efficiency for merged and non-merged banks. The non-
merged banks are defined as banks comparable in terms of size, which is measured by 
total assets. Two approaches are applied to estimate the efficiency levels, the first of 
which being the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). The second approach is the Data 
envelopment Analysis (DEA). 
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Table 3.3 
The ML cost and profit frontier parameter estimates 
 
 Cost 
function 
Profit 
function 
 Cost 
function 
Profit 
function 
Coefficient   Coefficient   
0a  0.276** 8.629* 1,1 pyµ  -0.882 -.981 
1ya  -2.922 0.359 3,1 pyµ  -.121* -2.902 
2ya  -0.798 -0.108 1,2 pyµ  -.508 0.603 
3ya  1.725 1.402 3,2 pyµ  0.421 0.366 
4ya  1.277* -3.185 1,3 pyµ  0.771 -0.253 
1pβ  -1.893 -0.1460** 3,3 pyµ  -.428 0.952** 
2pβ  2.563 0.110 1,4 pyµ  .208 2.650 
1,1 yya  -0.495 0.136 3,4 pyµ  -.109 0.831 
2,2 yya  -.0098 -0.907 
3,3 yya  0.321 -0.135 
4,4 yya  -0.327 0.191 
2,1 yya  0.174 -0.583 
3,1 yya  0.482** -0.116 
4,1 yya  -0.326 0.532 
3,2 yya  0.176 0.377 
4,2 yya  -0.335 0.368 
4,3 yya  -0.543* 0.657 
1,1 ppβ  0.822 -0.148** 
3,3 ppβ  0.115 0.589** 
3,1 ppβ  0.265** 0.181* 
Log likelihood are 7.78 and 3.65 for the cost and profit functions respectively.  
 
3.5.1 Results from parametric efficiency 
3.5.1.1 Cost efficiency  
In this section, the results of estimating Equation (3.3) for cost efficiency and its 
equivalent for profit efficiency are presented. The empirical results of the estimated 
models are presented in Table 3.3. It is important to recall that the independent variables 
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in the cost and non-standard profit functions are identical. These variables are able to 
explain more of the profit variations than of the cost variations across the sample under 
study. The adjusted 2R s for the cost and profit OLS models are around 92% and 81%, 
respectively. Clearly, the alternative profit function fits the data nearly as well as the cost 
function. The stochastic cost and profit efficiency scores are part of the composite error 
(residual) of either a profit or cost function model. However, because all variables are in 
logs, we need to take the anti-log of the residuals: 
INEFF (Inefficiency) = exp (residual)-1 
In order to find the cost and profit efficiency scores, we convert the INEFF to EFF 
(efficiency)  
EFF= 1/(1+INEFF)                (3.6) 
Table 3.4 
Summary statistics for the stochastic cost efficiency of the non-merged and merged 
banks 
 Non-merged banks Merged banks Difference 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean t-stat 
1987 0.737 0.0056 0.726 0.0029 0.011 0.26 
1988 0.745 0.0084 0.734 0.0030 0.014 4.64*** 
1989 0.782 0.0062 0.766 0.0029 0.016 0.08 
1990 0.813 0.0065 0.789 0.0033 0.024 2.29** 
1991 0.824 0.0053 0.874 0.0040 -0.050 3.42*** 
1992 0.855 0.0048 0.881 0.0055 -0.026 8.06*** 
1993 0.858 0.0052 0.899 0.0064 -0.041 1.66* 
1994 0.869 0.0046 0.897 0.0067 -0.028 3.65*** 
1995 0.856 0.0039 0.937 0.0532 -0.081 0.80 
1996 0.873 0.0031 0.966 0.0034 -0.093 1.68* 
1997 0.877 0.0026 0.960 0.0041 -0.092 12.43*** 
1998 0.886 0.0028 0.978 0.0092 -0.113 5.43*** 
1999 0.894 0.0033 0.979 0.0048 -0.085 1.65* 
1987-99 0.825 0.0066 0.894 0.0027 -0.069 2.21** 
Note: Non-parametric wilcoxon test is used to test difference in means assuming unequal variances across 
groups. The results are qualitatively the same whether variances are assumed to be equal. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*     Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Summary statistics of the cost efficiency scores for both merged and non-merged 
banks during the period 1987-1999 are given in Table 3.4. This breakout of the time 
period gives a rigorous check for our findings. The results show a reading of (0.894) for 
merged banks on average, rendering them more cost efficient than non-merged banks 
(0.825). This could signify that 89% of resources used would have been sufficient for 
merged banks to produce the services they generated, while 82% of resources would have 
been sufficient for non-merged banks to generate their services. Stated differently, 
merged banks waste about 12% of total costs relative to a best-practice bank, while non-
merged banks waste about 21% of costs relative to best-practice banks. On the other 
hand, it would be possible for merged banks to reduce costs by about 12% simply by 
eliminating X-inefficiencies, while it would be possible for non- merged banks to reduce 
costs by about 21%. It is worth noting that for both merged and non-merged banks, cost 
efficiency is not significant for 1985 and 1995. The results for the non-merged banks are 
comparable to the results obtained by Berger et al. (1998) and consistent with the results 
reported by Berger and Mester (1997).44  The mean cost efficiency for merged banks 
rises from 0.726 in 1987 to 0.979 in 1999, while it rises from 0.737 to 0.894 for non-
merged banks over the same time span. It is also noticeable form Table 3.4 that the period 
(1987-1990) is a relatively poor period for merged banks compared with the non-merged 
banks. For the period (1987-1990), non-merged banks have a higher cost efficiency than 
merged banks (0.822 against 0.744). This finding is consistent with the results reported 
by Peristiani (1997) who finds evidence of a small but significant deterioration of the 
average efficiency for merged banks relative to non-merged banks in the period (1980-
1990). This result is also comparable to the results obtained by Berger and Humphery 
                                                                                          
44 Berger and Mester (1997) find that the average cost efficiency for bank in U.S. is around 87%. 
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(1992) and Rhoades (1993).45  However, during the period (1991-1999), merging banks 
tended to have a higher cost efficiency as compared to non-merging banks (0.940 against 
0.853). The difference in cost efficiency between merged and non-merged is also 
economically significant, suggesting a cost efficiency improvement on average from the 
mergers of the 1990s. 
Table 3.5 
Summary statistics for the stochastic profit efficiency of the non-merged and 
merged banks 
 Non-merged banks Merged banks Difference 
Year Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean t-stat 
1987 0.5044 0.3143 0.5483 0.2882 -0.046 3.43*** 
1988 0.5192 0.4822 0.5316 0.3355 -0.0124 2.55** 
1989 0.5386 0.3076 0.5792 0.2477 -0.0072 0.36 
1990 0.4473 0.4358 0.5803 0.2885 -0.1330 1.56* 
1991 0.5097 0.5213 0.5932 0.2206 -0.0835 9.56*** 
1992 0.5478 0.3271 0.5997 0.3426 -0.0519 7.28*** 
1993 0.5610 0.5028 0.5882 0.4152 -0.0272 10.27*** 
1994 0.5683 0.3372 0.6189 0.3284 -0.0326 1.69** 
1995 0.5732 0.3294 0.6425 0.2257 -0.0693 0.19 
1996 0.5796 0.3615 0.6517 0.2922 -0.0721 7.44*** 
1997 0.5841 0.2744 0.6962 0.2152 -0.1121 2.15* 
1998 0.5868 0.2236 0.7604 0.1692 -0.1736 3.22*** 
1999 0.5915 0.2431 0.7731 0.1587 -0.1816 6.16*** 
1987-99 0.5246 0.3246 0.6741 0.2633 -0.1495 1.65* 
Note: Non-parametric wilcoxon test is used to test t difference in means assuming unequal variances across 
groups. The results are qualitatively the same whether variances are assumed to be equal. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*     Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
3.5.1.2 Profit Efficiency   
Table 3.5 shows mean and standard deviations for the sample bank’s profit 
efficiency. The first observation refers to a considerably lower average profit efficiency 
score than the average cost efficiency score. This finding is consistent with the results 
                                                                                          
45 These studies find no cost efficiency improvement on average from the mergers of the 1980s. 
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reported in Berger and Mester (1997) and Rogers (1998). In measuring bank efficiency 
using various econometric efficient frontier models, the authors report that U.S. banks 
have an average cost efficiency of about 86% and an average profit efficiency of about 
56%. This suggests that banks manage costs relatively efficiently, but have significant 
inefficiencies in their profit generation. The mean profit efficiency from the alternative 
function for non-merged banks is around 0.525, while the mean profit efficiency for 
merged-banks is around 0.674. The difference in profit efficiency between merged and 
non-merged is also statistically significant.  
Table 3.6 
Pre-merger and post-merger cost and profit efficiency 
 
Year of merger 1987 1993 1999 
 
Cost efficiency 
Year preceding merger (t-1) 0.789 0.895 0.924 
    
Years following mergers    
t+1 0.723 0.898 0.959 
    
t+2 0.740 0.923 0.962 
    
t+3 0.761 0.945 0.978 
 
Profit efficiency 
Year preceding merger (t-1) 0.496 0.553 0.571 
Years following mergers    
    
t+1 0.585 0.683 0.731 
    
t+2 0.652 0.695 0.785 
    
t+3 0.689 0.742 0.833 
Notes: The pre-merger cost (profit) efficiency level is the combined  
cost (profit) level of the acquired and acquiring banks weighted by  
their asset size. 
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Clearly, merged banks have higher profit efficiency than non-merged banks by 
approximately 15 points.  An average profit efficiency of 67.4% for merged banks 
indicates that the average merged bank earns only an estimated 67.4% of the profits of a 
best practice bank producing the same output bundle under the same environmental 
conditions. Stated differently, merged banks are closer to the best practice frontier than 
those of non-merged banks. In addition, it is noticed from Table 3.6 that merged and non-
merged banks’ profit efficiency is not significantly different for 1989 and 1995.  
The results seem to match the motivations given by practitioners for mergers-
which are largely related to improvement in cost and profit efficiency. These results may 
indicate that expected efficiency gains might be achieved; however, these results could be 
liable to a number of drawbacks. There may be selection bias in the peer group sample of 
non-merging banks that serve as a benchmark for comparison. Moreover, even if a peer 
sample could be constructed perfectly, the mergers of their competitors might influence 
the performance of the non-merging banks indirectly. The former could react to mergers 
of their rivals by improving their efficiency, or by widening the range of products offered 
to their customers. Therefore, measured gains from mergers relative to the control sample 
could understate actual gains. The gains from mergers may only emerge fully after some 
time. If this is the case, a short post-merger period analysis fails to account for the 
efficiency gains of the mergers. As a result, following sections will focus on the pre-
merger and post-merger cost and profit efficiency with a view to giving a more in-depth 
analysis of the efficiency effects of banks mergers. 
 
 
 123
3.5.1.3 Pre-merger and post-merger efficiency  
 This section examines the efficiency effects of bank mergers by comparing the 
pre-merger and post-merger cost and profit efficiency. The pre-merger and post-merger 
efficiency for the merging banks are reported in Table 3.6. We compare the cost and 
profit efficiency in the year preceding the merger with each of the three years following 
the merger, excluding the merger year itself. For the year before merger, we find the 
weighted-sum of the ex ante efficiency of the acquiring bank and the acquired bank. The 
weights used are based on total assets for the acquiring and acquired banks before the 
mergers. Before–and-after merger comparisons are favorable the profit efficiency, which 
is higher after mergers than before. Profit efficiency tends to increase significantly after 
mergers. In 1987, the profit efficiency increased from 0.496(prior to merger) to 0.585 
(one year after merger) and remains to increase for two years. In 1993, the profit 
efficiency moved from 0.553 to 0.683. In 1999, the profit efficiency climbed from 
0.571(prior to merger) to 0.731(post-merger). On the other hand, before-and-after 
comparisons are unfavorable for cost efficiency. For some reason, 1987 mergers 
performed poorly, and 1990s mergers did quite well.  It is worth noting that the average 
cost efficiency does not improve following mergers in 1987, while there is considerable 
improvement in profit efficiency. These observations suggest that some of the 
motivations behind bank mergers may have changed in the 1990s. This finding is 
consistent with those of Berger and Humphery (1992), Rhoades (1993) and Akhavein et 
al. (1997). 
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Table 3.7 
Changes in cost efficiency for merging banks 
 
Year 1987 1993 1999 
 Merging Peer 
group 
Merging Peer 
group 
Merging Peer 
group 
  
 All mergers 
Pre- merger 0.789 0.783 0.895 0.874 0.924 0.929 
       
Post-merger 0.741 .810 0.922 0.892 0.978 0.946 
       
Changes -0.048 0.27 0.027** 0.018* 0.054* 0.017 
  
 Large mergers 
Pre- merger 0.771 0.779 0.793 0.883 0.911 0.875 
       
Post-merger 0.735 0.822 0.795 0.892 0.929 0.886 
       
Changes -0.036* 0.043 0.013** 0.009 0.018** 0.011* 
  
 Small mergers 
Pre- merger 0.793 0.791 0.856 0.878 0.946 0.921 
       
Post-merger 0.775 0.806 0.887 0.871 0.983 0.945 
       
Changes -0.018* 0.015 0.028* -.007 0.037** 0.024 
*(**) Changes are significantly different from zero at the 5%(1%) level. 
Notes: The pre-merger cost (profit) efficiency level is the combined cost (profit) level of the acquired and 
acquiring banks weighted by their asset size. 
Small mergers include all mergers in which both the acquirer’s total assets and the total of the acquired 
banks’ total assets are below the median value ($450 million). Large mergers are those mergers above the 
median .On average, over the sample period around 55% of the mergers are small mergers and 45% are 
large mergers. 
 
3.5.1.4 Changes in cost and profit efficiency  
 An alternative way to analyze the impact of mergers on bank efficiency is to find 
changes in cost efficiency (CE) and profit efficiency (PE) from one year before the 
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merger to each of three post-merger years. These changes are calculated for the merging 
and non-merging banks.46  
Also, we focus on the combined firm relative to a control group. The control group is 
particularly important in our analysis because it permits an assessment of whether any 
observed changes in the combined firm simply reflect changes in the economic 
environment or instead are unique to the merger events. Therefore, efficiency is estimated 
for each bank involved in a merger: (i) the acquiring bank during the available years 
before the merger, (ii) the acquired bank during the available years before the merger and 
(iii) the merging bank during the available years after the merger.  The ex post change in 
CE of the merged banks ( CE∆ ) is the difference between the CE of the merged banks 
( mCE ) and weighted-sum of the ex ante CE of the acquirer bank ( 1CE ) and acquired 
bank ( 2CE ), that is  
))()(()( 122111 −− +−=∆ ttm CEwCEwCECE  
where 1w  and 2w are weights for the acquiring and acquired banks before the merger 
such that 21 ww + =1. The weights used are based on total assets (TA), so that 
)/( 21 TATATAw ii += , where i is 1 for the acquiring bank and 2 for the acquired bank. 
For non-merging banks, the change in CE is  
1−−=∆ tt CECECE . Similarly, we find the changes in profit efficiency.  
Table 3.8 displays the changes in profit efficiency. We notice that there are 
statistically significant improvements in profit efficiency for the 1987, 1993 and 1999 
                                                                                          
46 Garden and Ralston (1999) apply this calculation to find the efficiency changes of credit union mergers. 
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mergers. Our findings are consistent with those reported by Berger (1998), who provides 
similar evidence associated with megamergers.47  
Table 3.8 
Changes in profit efficiency for merging banks (1987-1999) 
 
Year 1987 1993 1999 
 Mergers Peer 
group 
Mergers Peer 
group 
Mergers Peer 
group 
  
 All Mergers 
Pre- merger 0.496 0.514 0.553 0.566 0.571 0.582 
       
Post-merger 0.654 0.532 0.700 0.589 0.783 0.669 
       
Changes 0.158* 0.018 0.147** 0.023* 0.212* 0.087 
  
 Large Mergers 
Pre- merger 0.516 0.493 0.564 0.570 0.583 0.591 
       
Post-merger 0.640 0.511 0.707 0.581 0.745 0.626 
       
Changes 0.124** 0.018* 0.143** 0.011 0.162* 0.035 
  
 Small Mergers 
Pre- merger 0.485 0.520 0.539 0.568 0.579 0.583 
       
Post-merger 0.523 0.488 0.573 0.572 0.633 0.590 
       
Changes 0.038** -0.032 0.034* 0.046 0.054** 0.007* 
*(**) Changes are significantly different from zero at the 5%(1%) level. 
Notes: The pre-merger cost (profit) efficiency level is the combined cost (profit) level of the acquired and 
acquiring banks weighted by their asset size. 
Small mergers include all mergers in which both the acquirer’s total assets and the total of the acquired 
banks’ total assets are below the median value ($450 million). Large mergers are those mergers above the 
median .On average, over the sample period around 55% of the mergers are small mergers and 45% are 
large mergers. 
 
                                                                                          
47 His sample was limited to banks with assets over $1 billion. 
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Clearly, profit efficiency tends to increase significantly after mergers. For 1987 mergers, 
the pre-merger profit efficiency was 0.496 and rose to 0.654 for the merging banks after 
the merger. For 1993 mergers, the pre-merger profit efficiency was 0.553 and rose to 
0.700 for the merging banks after the merger. As for 1999, the pre-merger profit 
efficiency was 0.571 and rose to 0.783. Another interesting finding in this table is that 
banks engaged in mergers are less profit efficient on average than their peer group prior 
to merger. However, they become more profit efficient than the peer group after the 
merger. This indicates that mergers are able to improve the profit efficiency, and it 
suggests that profit efficiency motivations were driving U.S. bank mergers in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  
Table 3.7 reveals pre-merger and post-merger cost efficiencies as well as the 
changes in cost efficiency for the 1987, 1993 and 1999 mergers. As we can see from this 
table, the improvement in cost efficiency is significant only for the 1993 and 1999 
mergers. The results presented in this table also confirm our earlier findings that banks 
that engaged in mergers in the 1990s were more cost efficient on average than other 
banks and they were able to improve their cost efficiency level following the mergers. 
Notably, comparing the cost and profit efficiency improvements of merging banks with 
the improvement of its peer group suggests that this is a merger related improvement in 
efficiency and not a result of the economic environment of the banks. The spreading of 
fixed costs, such as branch offices, computer equipment, and customer information across 
several financial products and services, would constitute the most likely rational for such 
gains. 
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3.5.1.5 Small mergers versus large mergers 
In order to find whether size of the mergers affects our results, we analyze our 
results separately for large mergers and small mergers. Cost and profit efficiency levels 
of firms both before and after the merger are computed relative to the peer group in order 
to assess performance changes. In the case of cost efficiency (Table 3.7), our findings can 
be almost completely attributed to the subsample of small banks. Mergers in which small 
banks are involved show larger improvements compared with the large bank mergers. For 
1993 mergers, small banks mergers moved from a score of 0.856 to score of 0.887, 
registering a significant 5% increase. On the other hand, large banks show a significant 
improvement of only 1.5%.  Small bank mergers in 1999, moved from a score of 0.946 
up to 0.983, yielding a 4% increase in cost efficiency level. Large banks record an 
increase of only 1.8%. Our results indicate that when small banks combine, there is 
improvement on average in cost efficiency.  These findings suggest that small banks may 
have taken an advantage in the merger market, including easier integration of computer 
and accounting systems and fewer internal struggles for control. As for the profit 
efficiency (Table 3.8), the results in general indicate that banks involved in mergers have 
a higher profit efficiency level compared to the group of non-merging peer banks. Large 
merging banks are chiefly responsible for this finding. Mergers of large banks recorded 
higher improvements in profit efficiency compared to the small bank mergers. They 
achieved 24%, 26% and 27% improvements for the 1987,1993 and 1999 mergers 
respectively.  These results suggest that when large banks are merged, the average result 
is considerable improvement in profit efficiency. In the case of small bank mergers, 
improvements were much smaller, averaging around 7.0% for the 1987, 1993 and 1999 
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mergers. In short, our results indicate that bank mergers appear to significantly improve 
profit efficiency relative to other banks. Improvements also appear to be greater in the 
1990s. Another interesting finding from the above analysis is that large banks are less 
efficient in cost efficiency terms compare to small ones. There are a couple of possible 
explanations for this finding. First, the large majority of non-performing loans are 
concentrated mainly in large banks. Further, it is worth noting that there is a substantial 
difference between the cost and profit efficiency estimates. Large banks are more 
efficient in profit terms than small banks. Larger banks may have the ability to exercise 
monopoly power, which allows them to earn more profits despite having relatively high 
costs. 
Table 3. 9 
Pre- merger cost efficiency for acquiring and acquired banks 
 
 1987 1993 1999 
 Mergers Peer group Mergers Peer group Mergers Peer group 
 All mergers 
 
Acquiring 
bank 
 
0.776 
 
0.753 
 
0.889* 
 
0.863** 
 
0.964* 
 
0.913* 
Acquired 
bank 
0.790 0.688 0.872* 0.877** 0.892* 0.895** 
 Large mergers 
 
Acquiring 
bank 
 
0.783* 
 
0.786 
 
0.796** 
 
0.891* 
 
0.923** 
 
0.986** 
Acquired 
bank 
0.769 0.772 0.782** 0.886** 0.844* 0.888* 
 Small mergers 
 
Acquiring 
bank 
 
0.787 
 
0.799 
 
0.852* 
 
0.873** 
 
0.957* 
 
0.989* 
Acquired 
bank 
0.795* 0.810 0.854** 0.795** 0.874* 0.895* 
* (**) Paired difference test results show that acquiring and acquired banks have significantly lower cost 
efficiency compared to their peers i.e. significantly different from zero at the 5%(1%) level. 
Notes: The pre-merger cost (profit) efficiency level is the combined cost (profit) level of the acquired and 
acquiring banks weighted by their asset size. 
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3.5.1.6 Acquiring and acquired cost and profit efficiency  
In this section, we investigate the cost and profit efficiency levels for both the 
acquiring and acquired banks. Tables 3.9 and 3.10 report both cost and profit efficiency 
estimates, respectively.  
The samples of both small and large merging banks show a relatively low pre-merger 
efficiency level. For example, large bank mergers in 1987 have a pre-merger profit 
efficiency of 0.536 against 0.562 for the peer group (Table 3.10).  
Table 3.10 
Pre- merger profit efficiency for acquiring and acquired banks 
 
 1987 1993 1999 
 Mergers Peer group Mergers Peer group Mergers Peer group 
 All mergers 
 
Acquiring 
bank 
 
0.522* 
 
0.535 
 
0.559** 
 
0.566 
 
0.580* 
 
0.599 
Acquired 
bank 
0.482** 0.511 0.537* 0.548 0.536* 0.562 
 Large mergers 
 
Acquiring 
bank 
 
0.536** 
 
0.562 
 
0.571* 
 
0.582 
 
0.591* 
 
0.616 
Acquired 
bank 
0.497** 0.516 0.519* 0.533 0.558** 0.583 
 Small mergers 
 
Acquiring 
bank 
 
0.498* 
 
0.536 
 
0.545* 
 
0.576 
 
0.584* 
 
0.624 
Acquired 
bank 
0.443* 0.519 0.487** 0.512 0.505* 0.547 
* (**) Paired difference test results show that acquiring and acquired banks have significantly lower profit 
efficiency compared to their peers i.e. significantly different from zero at the 5%(1%) level. 
Notes: Small mergers include all mergers in which both the acquirer’s total assets and the total of the 
acquired banks’ total assets are below the median value ($450 million). Large mergers are those mergers 
above the median .On average, over the sample period around 55% of the mergers are small mergers and 
45% are large mergers. 
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Interestingly, acquiring banks have a somewhat higher efficiency level than the acquired 
banks (0.536 against 0.497). Notably, the acquired banks are characterized by 
considerably significantly lower profit efficiency than the peer group (0.497 against 
0.512). This finding holds for the 1993 and 1999 mergers including the large and small 
bank mergers (Tables 3.9 and 3.10). Collectively, the results reported in Tables 3.7-3.10 
are consistent with the relative low efficiency hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, greater 
merger efficiency gains are predicted if the acquiring bank is more efficient than the 
acquired bank or both banks have poor performance prior to the merger. According to 
Berger (1998) the merger enables banks to wake-up management or the merger may be 
an excuse to restructure both banks. This suggests that management abilities may be 
spread over more resources. Another interesting interpretation for our results is that the 
acquiring bank tends to bring the acquired towards to it’s own level of efficiency. Stated 
differently, the transferring of successful managerial policies and operating procedures 
over more resources (acquired bank) have the improved the combined bank’s 
performance. 
3.5.2 Results from non-parametric efficiency (DEA) 
3.5.2.1 Comparison between merged and non-merged banks 
 In this section we use the DEA frontier approach to investigate the sources of 
efficiency gains associated with bank mergers. DEA will allow us to further characterize 
the efficiency effects of bank mergers. Particularly, it allows us to decompose cost 
efficiency (CE) into its components technical (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE).48 CE 
measures possible reductions in cost that can be achieved if a bank is technically as well 
                                                                                          
48 Cost and technical efficiency allow us to back out levels of allocative efficiency using the relationship: 
CE = TE*AE, where CE=cost efficiency, TE=technical efficiency, and AE=allocative efficiency.   
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as allocatively efficient.49 The level of technical efficiency (TE) of a particular bank is 
characterized by the relationship between observed production and some ideal or 
potential production. More specifically, TE is just one component of overall cost 
efficiency. However, in order to become cost efficient, a bank must first be technically 
efficient. Profit maximization requires a firm to produce the maximum output given the 
level of inputs employed (i.e. be technical efficient), use the right mix of inputs in light of 
the relative price of each input (i.e. input allocative efficient) and produce the right mix 
of outputs given the set of prices (i.e. be output allocative efficient).50 In other words, a 
bank is said to be technically efficient if it operates on the efficient frontier and 
allocatively efficient if it is properly choosing the correct mix of inputs given the input 
prices.  Technical efficiency can be decomposed to pure technical efficiency (PTE), with 
a proportional reduction in input usage until inputs are not wasted, and scale efficiency 
(SE), proportional reduction until the bank achieves constant return to scale. Pure 
technical inefficiency results from using more inputs than necessary (input waste), while 
scale inefficiency occurs if the bank does not operate at constant return to scale. 
 To understand the potential consequences of enhanced bank mergers, we estimate 
five different measures of non-parametric efficiency scores (X-efficiencies); namely 
allocative efficiency, technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency, scale efficiency, and 
over all cost efficiency. All of these point estimates attain values between zero and one 
for the least and the most efficient units in the sample. The summary statistics (see Table 
3.11) show several statistically significant differences between the merged banks and 
non-merged banks. Consistent with the results of the SFA analysis, the average values of 
                                                                                          
49 See Elyasiani and Mehdian (1990) for more details.  
50 TE = PTE*SE. 
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the estimates indicate that the merged banks are, on average, more cost efficient than 
non-merged banks (0.844 against 0.779). However, the differences are statistically 
significant only for 1993 and 1999.  
Table 3.11 
Mean efficiency measures of merged banks and non-merged banks 
 
 Measures 
 CE AE TE PTE SE 
Group 1987 
  
Merged banks 0.717 0.872 0.823 0.846 0.973 
Non-merged 
banks 
0.683 0.854 0.800 0.838 0.952 
 Tests for differences 
t-stat 1.19 -0.22 2.17** 1.60 2.27** 
 1993 
Merged banks 0.828 0.961 0.862 0.893 0.965 
Non-merged 
banks 
0.789 0.952 0.829 0.876 0.947 
 Tests for differences 
t-stat 2.622*** 3.94*** 2.09** 2.44** 0.68 
  
 1999 
Merged banks 0.856 0.982 0.873 0.901 0.969 
Non-merged 
banks 
0.896 0.964 0.837 0.892 0.939 
 Tests for differences 
t-stat 8.71* 2.88** 1.603 1.65** 7.56*** 
  
 Full sample 
Merged banks 0.844 0.924 0.906 0.948 0.956 
Non-merged 
banks 
0.779 0.912 0.855 0.910 0.938 
 Tests for differences 
t-stat 1.96** 4.11** 1.67* 3.65*** 0.24 
Note: CE: Cost efficiency, AE: Allocative efficiency, TE: Technical efficiency, PTE: pure technical 
efficiency, SE: Scale efficiency. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*     Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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 The results suggest that merged (non-merged) banks could have produced the same level 
of output using only 84.4% (77.9%) of the inputs actually used. Apparently, the average 
input waste (inefficiency) is lower for the merged banks (18.5% against 28.4%). These 
results also hold for 1993 and 1999. For example, merged banks in 1993 have a higher 
cost efficiency score (0.828) than non-merged banks (0.789). It is worth noting that there 
is room for significant cost savings if both groups utilize their productive inputs more 
efficiently. 
Since the cost efficiency measure (CE) is a composted of technical efficiency 
(TE) and allocative efficiency (AE), the relative sizes of these measures provide evidence 
as the to the source of cost efficiency. The empirical results show that, in general, the 
technical component is relatively more important than the allocative component as a 
source of cost inefficiency. This implies that inefficiency in banks may be explained by 
the wasting of inputs rather than by choosing the incorrect input combinations. This 
finding is consistent with results reported by Berger and Humphery (1991). The average 
allocative inefficiency is about 1% for the merged banks, whereas average allocative 
inefficiency is about 4% for the non-merged banks.51 The average technical inefficiency 
is about 10.4% for the merged banks, while average technical inefficiency is about 17.0% 
for the non-merged banks. Technical inefficiencies refer to the proportional of overuse of 
inputs while other inefficiencies due to the wrong mix of inputs are allocative. Because 
the ultimate responsibility for the transformation process is in hands of the management, 
X-efficiencies are often seen as a measure of managerial quality.  Collectively, these 
results indicate that merged banks have lower costs than non-merged banks because they 
                                                                                          
51 The relation between efficiency (E) and inefficiency (IE) is IE = (1-E) / E. This relation can be derived 
from Eq.(6) in page 21. 
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are using the most efficient technology (technical efficiency) and they are using the cost 
minimizing input mix (allocative efficiency). Also, managers of merged banks are 
relatively better than managers of non-merged banks at choosing the proper input mix 
given the available prices. Stated differently, managers of non-merged banks waste more 
resources than managers of merged banks. 
 To gain more understanding of the sources of efficiency, we look at the 
components of technical efficiency (TE). We notice that, in general, the major source of 
technical inefficiency is pure technical inefficiency and not scale inefficiency, suggesting 
that banks tend to lose little output due to scale efficiency. Overall, average scale 
efficiency for the merging banks is higher than those of the non-merged banks (0.956 
versus 0.908), suggesting that merged banks produce at more efficient scale than non-
merged banks, leading to lower unit costs and higher profits. Also, average pure technical 
efficiency for the merged banks is higher than that of non-merged banks (0.948 versus 
0.910). These observations indicate that managers of merged banks are more efficient 
than managers of non-merged banks. Our results provide strong evidence that merged 
banks achieve greater gains in cost, technical, allocative, pure technical, and scale 
efficiency than non-merged banks, implying that the restructuring of the banking industry 
has produced significant efficiency gains.  To sum up, the results of the DEA analysis 
indicate that merged banks have achieved greater post-merger gains in efficiency than 
non-merged banks. Efficiency gains may derive from the fact that merged banks gain 
access to cost-saving technologies or spread their fixed cost over a larger base, thus 
reducing average costs. Finally, mergers may have improved managerial efficiency, by 
transferring superior managerial skills from the acquiring banks to the acquired banks. 
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3.5.2.2 Productivity growth 
The use of DEA permits us to compute the Malmquist index (MI), which is the 
standard technique for measuring the evolution of the productivity and efficiency over 
time. The Malmquist index approach is applied to analyze changes in productivity over 
time for merged banks and non-merged banks. According to Malmquist analysis, it is 
possible to separate shifts in frontier (technical change) from improvement in efficiency 
relative to the frontier (technical efficiency changes). Therefore, the product of the 
technical efficiency change (∆TE), which is how much closer a bank gets to the efficient 
frontier (catching up effect or falling behind), and technological change (∆TC), which is 
how much the benchmark production frontier shifts at each bank’s observed input mix 
(technical innovation or shock), is measured by the Malmquist index (MI).52 To illustrate, 
a reading of MI greater than 1 indicates that total factor productivity progress has 
occurred, while a reading of MI less than 1 indicates productivity loss. 
∆TE (∆TC) between two periods t and t+1 can be computed as technical 
efficiency (technological efficiency) at time t+1 divided by technical efficiency 
(technological efficiency) at time t. A ratio of technical and/or technological change can 
attain a value greater than or less than one. A ratio takes a value greater one implies that 
the bank has experienced technical and/or technological progress between periods t and 
t+1, while a ratio less than one means the opposite. We then decompose the technical 
efficiency changes into changes in pure technical (∆PTE) and scale efficiency (∆SE), and 
distinguish between pure technical change and changes in scale of technology.  
                                                                                          
52 For more detail see Ferrier (1993). 
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To illustrate the Malmquist concept, consider the single-input, single-output case 
shown in Figure1. The curves labeled PFt and PFt+1 represent the production frontiers in 
periods t and t+1, respectively. There are two input-output combinations in this case: 
(Ojt, Ijt) for period t, and (Oj,t+1, Ij,t+1) for period t+1. Note that technological changes 
and improvements in technical efficiency occur between the two periods. An efficient 
bank should produce more output per unit of input in period t+1 compared to period t. 
Conversely, the same output (Ojt) can be obtained using less input (A instead of C) in the 
period t+1. Thus, technological change occurs, and is measured by 
)/(*)/( OAOCOBODTC =∆ . Technical efficiency changes depend on how close the 
firm operates relative to the production frontier, and this can be denoted by 
)//()/( ,1, tjtj OIOCOIOBTE +=∆ . 
 
Figure 1: Technical and Technological Efficiency Change (Malmquist Productivity 
Index) 
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Table 3.12 
Productivity and efficiency changes for merged banks and non-merged banks 
 
 Measures 
 MI TE TC PTE SE 
Group 1987/1988 
  
Merged banks 0.969 0.963 1.007 1.044 0.922 
Non-merged 
banks 
0.951 0.968 0.981 1.026 0.945 
 Tests for differences 
t-stat 0.83 -0.012 2.35** 0.54 -0.33 
 1993/1994 
Merged banks 1.043 0.997 1.046 1.036 0.962 
Non-merged 
banks 
1.029 1.031 0.998 1.069 0.965 
 Tests for differences 
t-stat 1.81** -1.66** 1.96** -0.77 -1.03 
  
 1999/2000 
Merged banks 1.113 1.035 1.075 1.022 1.013 
Non-merged 
banks 
1.054 1.030 1.023 1.026 1.004 
 Tests for differences 
t-stat 2.56*** 1.04 1.56* -0.09 1.36* 
  
 Average (1987-2000) 
Merged banks 1.147 1.045 1.098 1.030 1.015 
Non-merged 
banks 
1.072 1.052 1.019 1.039 1.013 
 Tests for differences 
t-stat 3.07** 0.94 5.02* 0.14 0.06 
Note: MI: Change in productivity (Malmquist index of productivity); TE: Change in technical efficiency; 
TC: Technological change; PTE: Change in pure technical efficiency, and SE: Change in scale efficiency. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*     Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
Table 3.12 reports results from measuring productivity progress of merged banks 
and non-merged banks. The results reveal that merged banks have experienced 14.7% 
productivity growth over the sample period, while the non-merged banks have registered 
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only 7.2% productivity growth. This finding indicates that merged banks experienced 
significantly larger gains in total factor productivity over the sample compared to non-
merged banks, consistent with the argument that mergers lead to efficiency gains. Given 
that the Malmquist index of productivity change (MI) is a multiplicative composite of 
technical change and technological change, the major cause of productivity 
improvements can be determined by comparing the values of technical change and 
technological change indexes. Put differently, the overall gain in productivity can be the 
result of technical efficiency increases, technological advancement, or both. 
The findings show that merged banks were capable of achieving such productivity 
primarily from becoming more technological advanced (9.8%), than from being more 
technically efficient (only 4.5%). In the case of non-merged banks, the overall gain in 
productivity over the period is composed of an average technical efficiency increase 
(movement toward the frontier) of 5.2%, and an average technological innovation of 
1.9%. The outcome of the analysis indicates that merged banks were especially 
successful at incorporating new technological advancement into their operations. 
Interestingly, efficiency increases in each types of bank (merged and non-merged) seem 
to be driven by the improvement in PTE rather than SE, implying that the management of 
banking operations has improved for these banks. For example, the mean efficiency 
increase for merged banks is 4.5%, with a pure efficiency increase (PTE) of 3.0%, and a 
scale efficiency increase (SE) of 1.5%. As regards non-merged banks, the mean 
efficiency increase is 5.2%, with a PTE increase of 3.9%, and a SE increase of 1.2%. A 
similar result is found between 1999 and 2000 (the merged banks have achieved higher 
productivity growth than non-merged banks). Between 1993 and 1994, productivity 
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growth for merged banks was 4.3% due to technological innovations (4.6%) which offset 
a slight decline in efficiency (-0.3%.). The level of productivity growth for non-merged 
banks is comparable (2.9%) but is due to efficiency increases (3.1%) rather than 
technological change (-0.2%). Finally, the average merged bank experienced a 
productivity loss between 1987 and 1988 (by about – 3.0%) due to an efficiency decrease 
(-3.7%) which offset a slight increase in technology (0.7%). The level of productivity loss 
for non-merged banks is higher (-4.9%) and is a result of efficiency decrease (-3.1%) and 
technological regress (-1.9%). Collectively, the results in Table 3.12 indicate that merged 
banks experienced significantly larger gains in total factor productivity over the sample 
than did non-merged banks. 
Table 3.13 
Spearman rank order(s) correlation coefficients among efficiency estimates and 
proxy-measured of performance 
 
 CE AE TE PTE SE AVCR ROA 
AE 0.752**       
        
TE 0.642*** 0.468** 0.723*     
        
PTE 0.563** 0.332* 0.688***     
        
SE 0.603* 0.564*** 0.702** 0.544***    
        
AVCR -0.171** -0.209* -0.462** -0.08* -0.273*   
        
ROA 0.135* 0.196* 0.341** 0.140* 0.042** -0.288**  
        
ROE 0.294** 0.254*** 0.181* 0.23** 0.207* -0.216* 0.386*** 
a: Spearman correlation coefficient of tests for zero correlation. AVCR is average cost  
(Total cost / Total assets). ROA is return on assets (Net income / Total assets). REQ is return on equity 
(Net income / equity). : CE: Cost efficiency, AE: Allocative efficiency, TE: Technical efficiency, PTE: 
pure technical efficiency, SE: Scale efficiency. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*     Significant at the 0.10 level 
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3.5.2.3 Efficiency correlates 
 To examine the consistency, robustness, and reasonability of the efficiency results 
we calculate several rank correlations with standard accounting variables that may be 
considered raw-data measurements of performance. We calculated rank-order Spearman 
correlation coefficients to examine the possible relationship among the X-efficiency 
measures and accounting measures of performance. The Spearman (s) correlation 
coefficients are presented in Table 3.13.  
The null hypothesis is that the correlation coefficient between the two variables is zero. 
As the results indicate, the Spearman [s] correlation coefficients are all significantly 
different from zero, indicating that there is a strong association among the X-efficiency 
measures and proxy measures of performance. Cost efficiency (CE) is positively and 
statistically significantly associated with other X-efficiency measures; namely, AE, TE, 
PTE, and SE (ρCE,AE=0.752, ρCE,TE=0.642, ρCE,PTE=.563,ρCE,SE=0.603, 
respectively). TE is more related to SE than to PTE (ρTE,SE=0.702 versus 
ρTE,PTE=0.688),confirming the dominant effect of scale efficiency in determining the 
technical efficiency of the banks in our sample, which we stated earlier. The correlation 
between the efficiencies and each of the financial ratios follow the expected pattern. The 
five measures of efficiency are negatively and significantly correlated with the average 
cost ratio (AVCR), and positively and significantly correlated with the standard 
profitability ratios ROA and ROE. This finding is consistent with results reported by 
Berger and Mester (1997) and Elyasiani et al. (1994). The efficiency correlates confirm 
that our efficiency measures are robust and are not simply the consequences of our 
methods. 
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3.6 Conclusion  
The recent wave of bank mergers has raised concern with its effect on efficiency. 
This essay utilizes the Stochastic Frontier Approach to examine the efficiency effects of 
bank mergers by comparing the pre-merger and post-merger cost and profit efficiency. 
The results provide statistical evidence that bank mergers do results in an increase in cost 
and profit efficiency following 1993 and 1999 mergers, using a control group of non-
merged banks to account for different market circumstances. This result holds in a 
subsample of large and small bank mergers. However, small bank mergers record greater 
cost efficiency improvement than the large banks. We find no evidence of cost efficiency 
improvement following the 1987 mergers. This finding is comparable to the results 
obtained by Peristiani (1997), who finds evidence of a small but significant deterioration 
of average efficiency for merged banks relative to non-merged banks in the period 1980-
1990. The results for the 1987 mergers, in terms of cost efficiency, are also consistent 
with the findings of Berger and Humphrey (1992) bank mergers in the 1980s had no 
significant effects on cost efficiency. It is noteworthy that for the 1987 mergers, the 
acquiring banks are more cost efficient than their merging partners, but this does not 
result in cost efficiency improvement following 1987 mergers. One interesting 
explanation for this result is that the managers were not able to transfer this cost 
efficiency to the merged firm. 
With respect to profit efficiency, we find that mergers tend to improve profit 
efficiency for both large and small banks. However, large bank mergers are associated 
with larger improvement than the small bank mergers. This finding is consistent with that 
reported by Berger (1998), who investigates the effect of megamergers on profit 
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efficiency and finds a significant increase in profit efficiency following megamergers. It 
is worth mentioning that the empirical results report significant profit efficiency 
improvements associated with the 1987 mergers, while the cost efficiency is hardly 
affected by the mergers. One possible explanation for this result is that merger benefits 
may be located mainly at the revenue side instead of the input side of the banking firm. 
This would support the view that mergers are driven by strategic motivations rather than 
only by cost reductions. Also, as argued by Berger and Mester (1997), “profit efficiency 
is superior to the cost efficiency concept for evaluating the overall performance of the 
bank (p. 900)”. With imperfect competition, cost minimizing is not equivalent to profit 
maximization, and the latter may be the more important driver of the structure of the 
banking industry. 
 It is also noteworthy that acquiring banks are more profit efficient on average 
than acquired banks, prior to merger, and that generally, after the merger the merging 
bank is able to adhere to the high efficiency. However, prior to the mergers, both the 
acquiring and acquired banks have a somewhat lower efficiency level than their peer 
group. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that mergers are used to “wake-up” 
inefficient managements. In addition, our results suggest that merger events enable 
efficient (acquiring) banks to improve the performance of inefficient (acquired) banks. 
This supports the traditional market for corporate takeovers explanation of mergers (well-
managed banks acquire poorly-managed banks and consequently improve their 
efficiency). One of the main findings of this study is that small bank mergers operate 
more efficiently in terms of cost but less efficiently in terms of profit. This difference 
may suggest the existence of monopoly power in the banking industry where large bank 
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mergers can realize greater profits, while also having greater costs. Put differently, small 
banks rely on a limited range of products to generate revenue and/or have less market 
power than their larger competitors. 
Finally, as an alternate way to analyze the efficiency effects of mergers, we use 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Overall, the analysis leads to a conclusion that the 
most significant cause of efficiency among merged banks versus non-merged banks is the 
technical efficiency, suggesting that merged banks are on average more technical 
efficient than merged banks. Technical efficiency reflects the ability of managers to 
control costs and is measured by how close its costs are to those of fully efficient banks 
when the effects of scale, product mix and other exogenous variables, which may 
influence banking costs, are considered. Another possibility is that mergers introduce 
new production methods and optimize the use of inputs, increasing efficiency.  
The overall conclusion is that bank mergers appear to be driven for the most part 
by economically practical objectives and have beneficial effects on the efficiency in the 
banking industry. Superior management or production technology may have reduced 
costs more for merged banks more than for non-merged banks and subsequently reap 
higher profits. Also, improvements in information processing and credit scoring may 
have resulted in greater costs reductions for the merged banks. 
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